Policy, people, and the new professional: de-professionalisation and re-professionalisation in care and welfare by Duyvendak, Jan Willem et al.
www.ssoar.info
Policy, people, and the new professional: de-
professionalisation and re-professionalisation in
care and welfare
Duyvendak, Jan Willem (Ed.); Knijn, Trudie (Ed.); Kremer, Monique (Ed.)
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Sammelwerk / collection
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
OAPEN (Open Access Publishing in European Networks)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Duyvendak, J. W., Knijn, T., & Kremer, M. (Eds.). (2006). Policy, people, and the new professional: de-
professionalisation and re-professionalisation in care and welfare (Care & Welfare, 1). Amsterdam: Amsterdam Univ.
Press. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-272164
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Policy, People, and 
the New Professional
De-professionalisation and Re-professionalisation 
in Care and Welfare
care &
welfare
A          U           P    A          U           P    
edited by
Jan Willem Duyvendak
Trudie Knijn
Monique Kremer
D
u
yven
d
ak | K
n
ijn
 | K
rem
er (ed
s.)
Policy, People, and the N
ew
 Professional
care &
w
elfare
care &
welfare
Professionals have been a topic of debate since the nineteen-seventies. One 
point of criticism was that professionals were overly focusing on their own 
interests rather than that of clients. Another was that their expertise was 
overestimated: clients were knowledgeable too. Recently, however, a different 
sound has been noted: professionals are put under pressure too much. The 
emphasis on accountability, marketisation, and demand-led services has 
totally undermined the position of doctors, social workers, and care workers.
Policy, People, and the New Professional: De-professionalisation and Re-
professionalisation in Care and Welfare clearly shows that the introduction 
of new policy concepts in various European welfare states, while necessary, 
has indeed had many perverse effects on the everyday practice of care and 
welfare. But not all the outcomes are negative. In addition to the processes 
of de-professionalisation traces re-professionalisation are becoming evident.
Jan Willem Duyvendak is Professor of Sociology at 
the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands.  
Trudie Knijn is Professor of Interdisciplinary Social 
Science, Utrecht University, the Netherlands.  
Monique Kremer is research fellow at the 
Netherlands Scientiﬁc Council for Government Policy.
www.aup.nl
ISBN-13 978 90 5356 885 9
ISBN-10 90 5356 885 9
This fresh and exciting study book addresses 
key issues faced by welfare professionals, from 
‘contract culture’ and evidence-based practice, 
to dealing with multi-culturalism or fostering 
neighbourliness. It will be of immense value to 
professionals struggling to redefine their role 
in a changing world; to academics reaching for 
new theoretical frameworks; and to students of 
social and public policy.
Prof. dr. Janet Newman, Professor of 
Social Policy at the Open University, UK
AUP_Duyvendak_def.indd   1 17-05-2006   11:13:10
Policy, People, and the New Professional
CARE & WELFARE
Care and welfare are changing rapidly in contemporary welfare states.
The Care & Welfare series publishes studies on changing relationships
between citizens and professionals, on care and welfare governance, on
identity politics in the context of these welfare state transformations, and
on ethical topics. It will inspire the international academic and political
debate by developing and reflecting upon theories of (health) care and
welfare through detailed national case studies and/or international com-
parisons. This series will offer new insights into the interdisciplinary
theory of care and welfare and its practices.
series editors
Jan Willem Duyvendak, University of Amsterdam
Trudie Knijn, Utrecht University
Monique Kremer, Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy
(Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid – WRR)
Margo Trappenburg, Utrecht University, Erasmus University Rotterdam
Policy, People, and
the New Professional
De-professionalisation and
Re-professionalisation in Care and
Welfare
Jan Willem Duyvendak
Trudie Knijn
Monique Kremer
(eds.)
In memory of Eliot Freidson (1923-2005), whose work has been a great in-
spiration for this book.
This publication has been made possible with the financial support of
the Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, the Netherlands Orga-
nisation for Scientific Research, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and
Sciences, the Netherlands Institute of Care and Welfare/Department of
Social Policy, Verwey-Jonker Institute, The Amsterdam School for Social
Science Research/University of Amsterdam and the Department of In-
terdisciplinary Social Science/Utrecht University.
Cover illustration: © Sake Rijpkema/Hollandse Hoogte
May 2005: Ouder Kind Centrum (OKC), Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
This centre is a collaboration of various partners, including accou-
cheuses, maternity care, Municipal Health Services, health centres, and
child welfare organisations services. Boy being examined by a doctor,
while his mother and sister watch.
Cover design: Sabine Mannel/NEON Design, Amsterdam
Lay-out: JAPES, Amsterdam
ISBN-13 978 90 5356 885 9
ISBN-10 90 5356 885 9
NUR 740
© Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam 2006
All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above,
no part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval
system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the written permission of both
the copyright owner and the author of the book.
Table of Contents
1. Policy, People, and the New Professional 7
An Introduction
Jan Willem Duyvendak, Trudie Knijn and Monique Kremer
PART I POLICY
2. The Rise of Contractualisation in Public Services 19
Trudie Knijn and Peter Selten
3. Evidence-Based Policy 34
From Answer to Question
Giel Hutschemaekers and Bea Tiemens
4. Societal Neurosis in Health Care 48
Margo Trappenburg
5. When Ideologies Bounce Back 64
The Problematic Translation of Post-Multicultural Ideologies
and Policies into Professional Practices
Jan Willem Duyvendak and Justus Uitermark
PART II PEOPLE
6. Safe Neighbourhoods 81
Sophie Body-Gendrot
7. When Diversity Matters 97
Marleen van der Haar
8. From Residents to Neighbours 109
The Making of Active Citizens in Antwerp, Belgium
Maarten Loopmans
9. Authority, Trust, Knowledge and the Public Good in Disarray 122
Monique Kremer and Evelien Tonkens
PART III PROFESSIONALS
10. Heroes of Health Care? 137
Replacing the Medical Profession in the Policy Process
in the UK
Celia Davies
5
11. Tensions in Medical Work between Patients’ Interests and
Administrative and Organisational Constraints 152
Werner Vogd
12. Empowerment of Social Services Professionals 164
Strategies for Professionalisation and Knowledge Development
Jeroen Gradener and Marcel Spierts
13. Professional Management of Professionals 181
Hybrid Organisations and Professional Management in
Care and Welfare
Mirko Noordegraaf
About the contributors 194
References 197
Index 217
6 table of contents
Policy, People, and the New Professional
An Introduction
Jan Willem Duyvendak, Trudie Knijn and Monique Kremer
In the 1970s and 1980s, scholars were loudly criticising the power and
intentions of social professionals. Three decades later, one hears a differ-
ent voice, that of professionals whose power, expertise and knowledge
are being undermined, which is causing serious problems. During an
interview, Bourdieu (1998) said that the right hand of the state does not
know what the left hand is doing. In other words, technicians, bureau-
crats and policymakers have no clue about the work of those who actu-
ally implement public policy, such as teachers, policemen and social
workers. As a consequence, the knowledge of what is really going on in
society is not shared with decision makers, who in turn do not acknowl-
edge the specific character of socio-professional work. They do not dis-
tinguish between the logic of the market and professional logic: ‘How
can we not see, for example, that the glorification of earnings, productiv-
ity, and competitiveness, or just plain profit, tends to undermine the very
foundation of functions that depend on a certain professional disinter-
estedness often associated with militant devotion?’ (Bourdieu 2002: 183-
184).
Bourdieu and other analysts of social policy point out that the role of
professionals has been changed – or reduced – as a consequence of the
restructuring of welfare states by way of marketisation and accountabil-
ity, the redefinition of citizens into consumers, and an accentuation of
client participation. New modes of governance have intentionally limited
the discretionary space of professionals. Marketisation and the focus on
consumer-led services stress the voice of users or consumers at the ex-
pense of professionals. Since clients have now gained both voice (by
means of legal appeals and by ‘turning organisations upside down’) and
exit options (by giving clients vouchers or money to choose their pre-
ferred services), professionals have lost autonomy and authority. This
makes it difficult to intervene in people’s lives, even when clients may
need support (Tonkens 2003). Additionally, the stress on accountability
forces professionals to live up to managerial and bureaucratic standards.
These new forms of governance have changed the motivation of profes-
sionals, their workload and the content of their job (Clarke & Newman
1997; Exworthy & Halford 1999). Rather than behaving like profes-
sionals they are led by a new kind of consciousness, ‘a dispersed man-
agerial consciousness’, as Clarke and Newman put it.
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The most striking evidence for the change in climate is the fact that a
leading critic of professional power, Eliot Freidson, published in 2001 a
book in defence of professionalism, Professionalism: The Third Logic. He
describes two dominant logics that have now overruled the logic of pro-
fessionalism: bureaucracy and consumerism. What worries Freidson is
not so much the restriction of the knowledge monopoly of professionals,
but the fact that professionals are no longer supposed to be the moral
protectors of this knowledge. If they can no longer decide how and
where this knowledge is to be put to use, professionalism itself is at
stake. ‘Professionals have a claim of license to balance the public good
against the needs and demands of the immediate clients or employers.
Transcendent values add moral substance to the technical content of dis-
ciplines… While they should have no right to be the proprietors of the
knowledge and techniques of their disciplines, they are obliged to be
their moral custodians’. This is how Freidson’s book ends (2001: 222).
Knowledge, authority, morality, expertise and skills to deal with social
problems: what exactly is lost when the professional logic is under-
mined? What is, more generally, the problem according to the critics
cited above? It seems that they want to warn us that a process of de-pro-
fessionalisation is underway; they worry that the professional logic is no
longer respected because of the intrusion of both market and bureau-
cratic logic. In this book many authors take the same position, at least as
a starting point. De-professionalisation is not their last word, however.
On the contrary, in-depth empirical analysis shows that reverse pro-
cesses are underway as well, as re-professionalisation might also be at
stake. Interestingly, many authors claim that trends such as accountabil-
ity (Body-Gendrot), contracting (Knijn & Selten) and evidence-based
work (Hutschemaekers) may in fact have rather positive effects, or are at
least ambivalent effects. Being accountable implies that you can partici-
pate in forms of deliberative professionalism: what do you do as a pro-
fessional and why? Resulting in what? In several articles, the authors
stress that though new logics may have perverse side effects, the very
idea of a pure professional logic that can only be polluted by other logics
is an overtly theoretical, essentialist and pessimistic argument. Duyven-
dak and Uitermark make a more general claim that practices and logics/
theories are not directly related anyway. Hence, changes in ideologies
and predominant logics are never fully reflected in professional practices
because ideological changes tend to bounce back since people in practice
can stick to traditions, professionals can intentionally refuse to adapt to
the new morals, and so on. Professionals are not only passive objects of
change; they themselves play a role in defining professionalism.
As far as the processes of de-professionalisation are taking place, it
may also have been necessary to limit the discretionary space of profes-
sionals – or at least of some professionals in some contexts. Therefore,
this book deals with several types of social professionals, in several coun-
tries. This provides the opportunity to look at the conditions under
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which professional change can be harmful or useful, and for whom in
what context. We have not selected cases from specific countries in order
to compare them – rather, we demonstrate that comparable tendencies
occur in several Western countries, where processes of re- and de-profes-
sionalisation occur in relation to marketisation and bureaucratisation.
Inspired by the concerns of scholars like Bourdieu, Clark and New-
man, and Freidson, this book brings together three political and aca-
demic debates that are hardly ever dealt with in one go: professionalism,
changing people and policy. Which policies are influential to processes
of de-professionalisation and re-professionalisation? Is the comeback of
(the debate on) professionalism linked to the increased political and pub-
lic attention to social issues all over Europe? How do clients change the
content of professionalism? And perhaps most importantly: what are the
interesting alternatives to improve the balance between professionals,
policy and clients? Are there, for instance, possibilities for a coalition
between professionals and clients to fight policymakers that want to con-
trol professionals – to fight policies that cause professionals to not be
accountable to clients but to bureaucrats and politicians (Trappenburg)?
Are clients interested in these sorts of coalitions, or are they just turning
their backs on professionals by using the exit option? Let’s start with the
policy side.
Policy
The first debate is about policy changes. The classic welfare state is a
thing of the past. In that welfare state, allocation took place via two
routes: bureaucracy, in which each client received the same treatment or
benefits, and professionalism, in which professionals owned the knowl-
edge and discretionary space to do what they thought was best for cli-
ents, patients and other vulnerable or dependent citizens. Today govern-
ments want to organise less and less themselves. The role of the state is
at stake, torn between reducing its governing power in the implementa-
tion of services and keeping control (‘steering, not rowing’, as the British
say). This role is becoming chiefly legislative, facilitative and sometimes
supervisory. Through monitoring and accounting, governments try to
keep professionals from crossing boundaries. The implementation of
services is increasingly contracted out to the market or to private non-
profit organisations. Political democratic control decreases, since ac-
counting and monitoring is put in the hands of quasi-autonomous non-
governmental organisations. This entails a significant shift in the public
responsibility for the common good and in the democratic control of
public services.
New concepts and trends have entered the policy arena. Besides con-
tractualisation we now have to add accountability, managerialism, mar-
ketisation, privatisation, bureaucratisation, and user-led services. These
concepts and trends have affected state policy towards social services,
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education and health care. Increasingly, welfare states stimulate compe-
tition and efficiency in public services via a ‘marketisation’ that has chan-
ged both the process and the culture of social and care services. Given
the fact that services are paid out of taxes, transparency has become im-
portant – not only because managers and politicians demand it: citizens
too urge for more accountability. Accountability is therefore crucial in
this process that inevitably limits the autonomy of professionals. Since
decision-makers still want to know what is going on at the level of imple-
mentation, accountability and marketisation have often gone along with
re-bureaucratisation (Exworthy & Halford 1999).
The chapter by Knijn and Selten shows the effects of contractualisa-
tion in the Netherlands. Looking at different sectors they conclude that
contractualisation has become a serious feature of social services, educa-
tion, health care, youth care and police work. It is not clear yet whether
this improves the quality of public services or clients’ satisfaction with
these services. What is clear is that contractualisation increases paper-
work, because a regulated market demands more transparency and
more accountability than hierarchically led organisations. In this context,
professionals experience a reduction of both their discretionary power
and the time they can spend on clients’ needs. They also experience dis-
trust from the side of politicians and managers. So far, they have not
succeeded in finding an alliance with clients, patients or other groups of
vulnerable citizens, which is a precondition for re-professionalisation on
behalf of the clients.
It is not without reason that welfare states have had to change. Demo-
cratisation has led to demands for greater transparency; service malfunc-
tioning and a lack of choice have inspired marketisation. The monopoly
of professionals has been intentionally dismantled. Professionals them-
selves, especially in care and welfare, partly agree with the focus on ac-
countability because they themselves feel they have to account for their
interventions, since their work is paid by public money. But the question
is whether there is a good balance between the need for accountability
and space for professionals, the need for innovation, and marketisation.
Trappenburg argues that the ‘correction’ has gone too far. She argues
that an ‘audit explosion’ has taken place in the Dutch health care system,
that has become a societal neurosis. This started with a call for patients’
rights and institutionalising democracy, moved to the quest for high-
quality care on the cheap, and has now reached a situation of hyper-con-
trol. So, societal neurosis starts with democratisation and then takes a
turn for the worse as a result of new public management reform invol-
ving bureaucratic marketisation. The new legislation on health insur-
ance very clearly shows this. Health insurers as well as patient organisa-
tions now have to monitor and control the performances of doctors.
Patient organisations also have the difficult task of controlling insurers.
In addition, five other boards and organisations will have to monitor the
insurance companies. Trappenburg sees three ways out: real marketisa-
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tion rather than bureaucratic marketisation, more trust in professionals
and a reduction of monitoring, and a new bond between professionals
and client organisations.
Accountability itself is not the problem, but the fact that it has become
a societal neurosis. Does this also apply to the trend of evidence-based
medicine or evidence-based social work, instruments that are increas-
ingly used by policymakers to select specific treatments for specific so-
cial, individual and medical needs? If it works, treatment will be paid for;
if there is no proof or if there are cheaper alternatives, professionals can-
not offer it to their patients, clients or communities. Speaking in a gen-
eral sense, it may be argued that many of the new developments can
have quite positive effects on the position of professionals as long as we
are not blind to the perverting side effects. The evidence-based mode of
work originated in England and the United States, and has been in use
for quite some time in health care. In introducing this kind of method,
the scientification of welfare work has recently been proposed. Evidence-
based social work is an intriguing combination of behaviourist, positivist
and empirical science with policy research (Jordan 2000).
Opinions differ as to the applicability and desirability of this strategy,
particularly in social work. Jordan observes that the notion of evidence-
based social work uses measurable changes in behaviour or outcomes
based on clear policy aims. In social work practice, this is extremely dif-
ficult. Policy aims are not always clear and measurable. How to measure
the growing involvement in a neighbourhood? Besides, it is not always
easy to ascribe behavioural changes to specific interventions. A beha-
viourist design is virtually impossible because other factors that can in-
fluence results cannot be excluded. Gradener and Spierts stress in their
chapter what many social scientists have argued that society is a poor
environment for controlled experiments, and in contrast to nursing or
teaching, social work is ‘work in context’, as the social worker often has
the task of creating his own context; to mobilise communities.
The question also remains as to whether evidence-based social work is
not diametrically opposed to customised care. Professionals claim that
each client, each patient is different. This requires constant adaptations
in the work process itself. Other social scientists have expressed a great
deal of appreciation for the strategy of evidence-based social work be-
cause transparency increases, and by applying approved techniques and
instruments, social professionals can finally prove the worth of their
work. What’s more, the quality of professional work will improve (see, e.
g., Scholte 2003).
In their chapter, Hutschemaekers and Tiemens rightly make a distinc-
tion between evidence-based work as an ideology and as a practice.
Whereas the first oversees all of the problems mentioned above, the lat-
ter might be useful in a tailor-made approach. In a non-dogmatic, prag-
matic way, evidence-based practices might help develop more effective
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interventions with respect to the positions of both professionals and pa-
tients.
As this book will show, the appreciation of new strategies not only
depends on the way they are implemented but also on the specific (coun-
try) context. In France, as noted by Body-Gendrot, there is a lot to say in
favour of more transparency and evidence-based accountability to reduce
the disciplinary power of professionals, for instance, while in other
countries such new strategies are misused and produce all kind of nega-
tive side effects. Moreover, whether these new developments ‘fit’ cannot
and should not be answered by generalising, sweeping statements.
There are enormous differences within and between (health) care and
welfare, for instance with regard to accountability and contractualisation.
Sometimes these are almost standard health care situations, whereas in
other domains of welfare, professionals have never even heard about
these new tendencies.
People
A second issue is the changing clientele of professionals. More than
many other occupations, the daily tasks of social professionals are di-
rectly related to social change. Two of the most striking changes are the
informed and well-voiced clients who are now gaining power as consu-
mers, and increasing population diversity. Although more clients are
well informed – proto-professionalisation, according to De Swaan et al.
(1979) – the fact that social diversity and even inequality have increased
implies that many citizens are poorly informed among whom, for in-
stance, many members of ethnic minorities. In addition, governments
label citizens as customers and consumers, and in doing so influence
the behaviour of people requesting services. If citizens get the message
that they have to become more personal responsible, they believe they
need more know-how to be in a better position to articulate their de-
mands and be more assertive about getting them (Van den Brink 2002).
What’s more, people are reinforced in the positions they can assume. In
the first instance, this entails the role of the individual as consumer, who
now has many more choices as a result of the marketing of care to such a
large extent and welfare to a lesser one (Clarke & Newman 1997; Knijn
1999, 2000; Tonkens 2003). Second, people are also encouraged to get
organised as citizens. In social movements, they make an effort to exert
an influence on political decisions (Stüssgen 1997; Duyvendak & Neder-
land 2006; Nederland, Duyvendak & Brugman 2003; Nederland & Duy-
vendak 2004). Third, people are expected to exert their influence as cli-
ents. With increased frequency, and often backed by legal stipulations,
they can exercise a voice in client organisations and participatory boards
(client councils) of service organisations; in addition, they are stimulated
to make use of their right to file a complaint.
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Kremer and Tonkens show in their chapter that not only the old role of
the client – the patient – but also the new roles of consumer and citizen
are problematic regarding four issues: development of knowledge, trust,
authority and the public good. Each issue is undermined when profes-
sional logic receives less space. They argue that a more suitable role for
clients is that of co-producers or participants. This provides an alterna-
tive to Freidson’s professional logic, market logic and bureaucratic logic.
When clients and professionals become co-producers in care and wel-
fare, one can then speak of a new logic, that of democratic professional-
ism in which clients have more of a voice and that both the knowledge of
professionals and their role as guardians of the public good are taken
seriously. This approach also repairs the wounds of trust in the relation-
ship between client and professional.
Not all citizens take the role of client or consumer passively, nor are
these roles the same for everyone. Well-educated people are often more
willing and able to actively take the role of consumer, citizen or client.
However, there is no way of knowing what the differences between them
are, i.e., the citizen or client role that individuals play. What we do know
is that society has become more diverse in terms of culture, ethnicity
and nationality. Some of these differences are closely linked to forms of
inequality. Colour and class divisions overlap, disempowering people of
colour who might have different needs and wants regarding care and
welfare. In a context in which professionals have to deal with increased
diversity, new strategies develop to solve or contain the most complex
problems, often geographically concentrated in certain neighbourhoods
of big cities. Relatively new topics become preponderant (safety, crime,
and ethnic bonding instead of multicultural bridging) for which profes-
sionals have to find new solutions.
Maarten Loopmans demonstrates that the Belgian case of Opsinjoren,
a community project, successfully changes indifferent citizens into com-
passionate neighbourhood residents. He shows that policymakers and
professionals are important in this creation of the new local citizen. At
the same time, new differences come to the fore. Professionals, it is ar-
gued, have played an important role in the ‘multicultural drama’, and
not always for the better. Since front-line workers allegedly had a cultural
relativistic approach, this has not helped people from migrant back-
grounds to adjust to – or integrate into – modern societies that demand
–as the dominant discourse nowadays claims - speaking the local lan-
guage and taking on modern values. The Norwegian anthropologist Wi-
kan (2002) has argued that professionals have not made it clear enough
what the values of Western societies are. Such a reproach to profes-
sionals is also visible in Dalrymple’s (2001) analysis: social professionals
– especially doctors – hardly confront their patients with the fact that
they are responsible for their own lives. They in fact do little to intervene.
Marleen van der Haar’s chapter opposes this position. Social workers
indeed struggle with diversity, but they do depart from the five anchors
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that are very much based on a Western European individualised society –
one of them being self-empowerment. Although social workers take into
account the social context of the individual, they try to move their clients
towards the direction of change in which self-reflection and self-empow-
erment are crucial. In that sense, a new kind of well-developed paternal-
ism may on its way back.
Professionalism
By the early 20th century, the sociologist Emile Durkheim has expressed
worries about professional ethics in relationship to civic morals. Be-
tween 1890 and 1912 he has given several lectures on the issue that
many years later – in 1957 – have been published. Later on, also the
sociologists Parsons (1968), Freidson (1986) and Abbott (1988) – have
been concerned about the content, power and meaning of professional-
ism. Durkheim was pleading for professionalism as the moral pillar of a
society that has lost its social cohesion because of European wars, migra-
tion and the domination of economic rationality. In this interpretation,
morality is central where professionals have a different moral position in
society than ‘ordinary citizens’ or the state technicians and bureaucrats.
Durkheim (1957) argued that professionals working for the state serve
the common good, which is why they should mediate between the state
and its citizens by setting a moral example. As ‘secondary groups’ they
could help improve social cohesion, based on peer groups in which they
develop and share professional knowledge and ethics. Late twentieth-
century sociologists, by contrast, instead of morality, put the accent on
power and expertise as the crucial aspects of professionalism. In Par-
sons’ functionalist approach, the client-professional relationship was
characterised by a division of knowledge and expertise in which the pro-
fessional had both and the client had little of either (Parsons 1968). For
Parsons, professional power was necessary for successful treatment.
Scholars like Freidson (1986) studied professional dominance and saw,
just as many others did, that it was power at another’s expense, while
Abbott (1988) showed how a profession constructs itself in modern so-
cieties, often in response and in contrast to other professions.
More recently, Freidson (2001) has supplied some key criteria of a
profession, distinguishing five characteristics that combine elements of
Durkheimian morality, Parsons’ expertise and knowledge, and Abott’s
notion of jurisdiction. This together creates a body of knowledge and
skills that is officially recognised as based on abstract concepts and the-
ories, and requiring the exercise of considerable discretion; an occupa-
tionally controlled division of labour; an occupationally controlled labour
market requiring training credentials for entry and career mobility; an
occupationally controlled training program associated with higher learn-
ing, providing opportunity for the development of new knowledge; and
an institution-based secular calling or vocation.
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Many of the professionals in this book are often not considered pro-
fessionals. The classic approaches to professionalism seldom refer to
professionals working in the care and welfare sectors, especially because
they do not live up to the explicit criteria of professionalism. The ideal
types of professionals are doctors – who are also dealt with in this book –
and lawyers. Their knowledge can be clearly distinguished, and they
have strong organisations as well as inclusion and exclusion rules. Social
workers, home care workers and nurses have different positions on the
professionalisation scale, which differs from country to country and are
often called ‘semi-professionals’. If we look at the Freidson’s five criteria,
it is professional organisation and an occupationally controlled division
of labour in particular which are often lacking. The problem is also that
the expertise and knowledge is not always acknowledged. Care and wel-
fare professionals struggle with the lack of recognition. This is partly due
to the fact that the tasks of these professionals are closely related to what
can be labelled as a fourth logic, which implies a family logic based on
kinship, reciprocity, normative claims and bonding. Consequently, this
family logic of care is per definition arbitrary, and in contrast to the logic
of the state and the market it is never indifferent, objective or imperso-
nal, and is still over-determined by gender, implying that moral impera-
tives result in unpaid care work by female kin (Knijn 1999, 2000). If the
distinction between professional and family logic in the fields of care
and welfare is diffuse, this will come at the expense of the status and
valuation of professional work. Authors like Schön (1983), and Celia Da-
vies in this book, show that we can describe specific skills and knowl-
edge in the social and care professions, even though they do not fit into
the dominant categories of knowledge. To regard social workers and care
workers as semi-professionals rather than as employees gives a new per-
spective to the development of this kind of work.
Since the 1970s, social professionals have struggled with the attack on
their intentions and its effects. The issue of power and abuse has also
emerged. What happened is that the assumption that clients and profes-
sionals were both aiming for a better world was dismantled. It was ar-
gued that professionals were following their own self-interests – they
just wanted to maintain their professional status – or merely disciplining
their clients. Their work was not beneficial to their clients; it was merely
done to control society’s deviants from which the professionals profited.
Surprisingly, many professionals agreed with this criticism on their posi-
tion in society.
Hard-core professionals take part in this too. Vogd in his chapter
shows how the medical profession is under siege. Based on a study of
German hospitals, he concludes that medical specialists are losing their
grip on the quality of their work, losing contact with their patients, and
experiencing a loss of discretionary power. Due to managerial reorgani-
sations, cutbacks and new work processes, professional dissatisfaction is
growing. According to the specialists, the main losers are the patients,
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who are often unaware of the backstage problems doctors are facing.
Interestingly, Celia Davies shows the contrary: de-professionalisation of
doctors is not the right way to frame the issue. Doctors are still ‘Heroes
of Healthcare’, who co-operate intensely with management in an attempt
to control treatment. The promise of better health puts doctors on a ped-
estal that obscures their uncertainty, their ambivalence, and also their
power. Davies pleads for new vocabularies to better understand the con-
struction of the hero identity of doctors.
Clearly, in this last part of the book, the debate is about professionali-
sation and de-professionalisation. Keeping many of these contributions
in perspective, we would prudently propose that re-professionalisation is
the dominant trend.
Gradener and Spierts, for instance, argue that professionals have to
regain their self-confidence by improving their professional knowledge
and skills. They plead for re-professionalisation via the use of a combina-
tion of formal knowledge and practice-based evidence (Van der Laan
2003), as well as creating a knowledge alliance with stakeholders such
as social scientists, managers, trainers, policymakers, and of course their
clients.
Noordegraaf most clearly supports this re-professionalisation perspec-
tive. In his analysis of the role of managers dealing with professionals,
he shows how their discretionary power has increased – often in interac-
tion with policymakers – mainly at the expense of executive profes-
sionals. He does however note that this re-professionalisation of some
social professionals (their managers) is not necessarily a zero-sum
game. Some managerial styles may increase the professionalisation of
all professionals in care and welfare. His general thesis that a re-profes-
sionalisation process is underway is partly corroborated by other articles
in this book. We say partly because in some professions, in some coun-
tries, de-professionalisation is still the dominant trend. But this trend
can be stopped almost everywhere. That is the positive conclusion of
this book.
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PART I
POLICY

The Rise of Contractualisation in Public
Services1
Trudie Knijn and Peter Selten
Contractual governance, a term introduced by Yeatman (1994), is gain-
ing ground in the social services. The concept refers to a fundamental
change in the governing of social services. Governance implies a new
way of directing and controlling the provision of services; the well-
known expression ‘steering, not rowing’ means that governments are
withdrawing from the direct responsibility of providing services them-
selves or from directly subsidising on an input basis non-profit organisa-
tions that are responsible for providing such services:
Complexity, dynamics and diversity has led to a shrinking external autono-
my of the nation state combined with a shrinking internal dominance vis-à-
vis social subsystems… Governing in modern society is predominantly a
process of coordination and influencing social, political and administrative
interactions, meaning that new forms of interactive management are neces-
sary. Governing in an interactive perspective is directed at the balancing of
social interests and creating the possibilities and limits of social actors and
systems to organise themselves. (Kooiman & Van Vliet 1993: 64)
Governments have changed governing services by splitting up purcha-
sers and providers, by output financing and by outsourcing services.
Consequently, new ways of control are needed to guarantee that public
means are used efficiently, effectively, and according to the policy objec-
tives that are set by the administration. One way to guarantee this is
through contractualisation. The assumption behind contractualisation is
threefold: reducing bureaucracy, improving quality and efficiency, and
increasing flexibility and diversity. Contracts replace former bureaucratic
hierarchical systems of control in order to guarantee that the partners
who get the responsibility of providing services of general interest will
actually fulfil this responsibility – regardless of whether these are pri-
vate, public, for profit or non-profit partners. This tendency takes a dif-
ferent shape depending on the welfare state, on very specific fabrics of
service systems, relations between governments, and the degree of cor-
poratism in the provision of services. Path dependency is important
here, as well as the political assumptions of the successive administra-
tions.
In this chapter we explore the theoretical assumptions as well as the
consequences of this trend towards contractual governance by analysing
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several domains of public services as well as the role of and effects on
professionals in the Netherlands.2 What are the consequences on the
way these domains function on behalf of common interests, what does
it mean for their identification with the public targets, and to what extent
does it influence their daily work practices?3 We explore whether a bal-
ance between an efficient use of collective means and high-quality ser-
vices can be reached via contracts. The question is whether contracting
partners – be it between the government and voluntary, non-profit or for-
profit organisations, or between social services and their clients – can
replace former bureaucratic hierarchies, input financing and profes-
sional discretion. The implications for the balance between quality of
services and cost efficiency also have to be considered.
Finally – and this is the aim of our contribution – we will elaborate on
what this new governance means for professionals working in organisa-
tions that have a contract in which performance indicators register out-
puts and outcomes. Does this happen at the cost of the quality of the
professional work and autonomy of professionals, or does it by contrast
support professionalisation and the visibility of professional work?
Catching Many Birds with One Stone
Contractual governance has many fathers; the tendency towards contrac-
tualisation can be attributed to the need to cut back welfare expenses and
to the political ideology of a small state. Still, it would be too simple to
explain the tendency towards contractualisation in the domain of public
services by pointing to the growing influence of a neo-liberal ideology
alone. It is also a reaction to claims of patient and client movements for
better services, of demanding a greater say and a better choice, as well as
distrust of (semi-)state service providers and their professionals. The pol-
icymakers’ recognition of the claims of service customers fits perfectly
with the overall tendency in the 1980s and 1990s to promote self-help,
shrink public services, and administer care and welfare more efficiently.
Many authors (Clarke & Newman 1997; Knijn 1999; Exworthy & Half-
ord 1999; Freidson 2001) signalled that the comments on the deteriorat-
ing, inefficient and expensive welfare state have gained ground since the
1980s, and cleared the way for the introduction of market-based princi-
ples in public provisions. Neo-liberalism by way of what Pierson calls
‘programmatic retrenchment’ (Pierson, 1994) found entry into the pub-
lic sector. According to Pierson, retrenchment is governments’ exercise
in blame-avoidance rather than in credit claiming. Clarke and Newman
(1997) and also Newman (2001) show that managerialism and new gov-
ernance accompany the process of retrenchment, finding expression in a
new rhetoric. Words like efficiency, consumer’s choice, business-like be-
haviour, client-oriented attitude, and competition became part of the vo-
cabulary of politicians from almost all of the parties, as well as civil ser-
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vants and public-service managers. Managerialism did prove to be more
than just rhetoric; in the name of competition and efficiency, the status
of professionalism changed and the staffing and governing of profes-
sional care institutions changed profoundly:
It is charged that professions have monopolies which they use primarily to
advance their selfish economic interests while failing to insure benefit to
consumers, that they are inefficient, their work unreliable and unnecessarily
costly. Strip away their protective licenses and credentials, urge some, and
let there be truly free competition. Open the market to all who wish to offer
their services. Consumers will separate the wheat from the chaff in such a
market so that the best services and products will emerge at the lowest cost.
(Freidson 2001: 3)
In addition to economic comments on the public services, moral argu-
ments arose that pointed to the paternalistic attitude of professionals to-
wards their clients and to the increasing power of professionals in the
public domain. By using terms like ‘expertocracy’ (Van Doorn & Schuyt
1978), ‘bio-politics or the disciplinary power of professionals’ (Foucault
1978) and ‘disabling professions’ (Illich 1977), social scientists and philo-
sophers4 set the tone for a decade-long debate about the power of profes-
sionals and their tendency to privilege their own interests above the
common good, display elitist behaviour by using professional jargon,
disrespect their clients, and deny their clients’ knowledge and needs.
These comments indeed hit professional specialists in the public do-
main – medical specialists, lawyers, and psychiatrists as well as teachers
and social workers – in their Achilles heel. Their professional ethics and
expertise was being contested in the name of the liberation and emanci-
pation of clients.
The critique of the bureaucratic-professional system of the welfare
state thus came from both sides, the right and the left. Whereas the so-
cio-economic comments on the welfare state were firmly formulated by
the (neo-)liberals, the socio-cultural comments have to be situated on the
left wing of the political spectrum. The anti-psychiatric movement (in
particular in the Netherlands and Italy), autonomous feminist healthcare
centres, and students protesting against university professors, all are ex-
pressions of the declining trust in and respect for the way professionals
serve public interests and, even more, professionalism itself.
Pleas for individual autonomy, community-based self-help, and cli-
ents’ free choice and responsibility – that is, new-communitarianism
and its belief in substitution to the lowest level of communities – mixed
up with neo-liberalism and its market beliefs has been a historical irony
since the 1980s. Together they led to a restructuring of the welfare state’s
public services by introducing market principles in these services5 (Duy-
vendak 1999; Knijn 1999, 2000). Indeed, neo-liberal and communitar-
ian assumptions about the position of the recipient, support-supplying
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mechanisms and how to meet demands differ fundamentally, but they
share an aversion for the welfare state and its professionals. This was
manifested in contractualisation, a new way of governance that orga-
nises state control on professional work through monitoring, auditing,
performance indicators, evaluation and benchmarking (Clarke & New-
man 1997).
Three Levels of Contractualisation
Contractualisation takes different shapes, and although we signal a gen-
eral tendency, it remains crucial to distinguish three types of contracts:
Between the government and providers of services that are in the gener-
al interest, between chain partners who co-operate in fulfilling a general
interest, and between organisations that provide public goods and their
individual clients.
Governments Contracting Service Organisations
National and local governments are increasingly outsourcing services to
private companies and changing their relationship with non-profit orga-
nisations. This involves hardcore organisations such as public transport
and electricity companies, as well as soft services of general interest such
as the police, schools, hospitals and homes for refugees. Such services
remain funded by collective means (with tax money). As governments
remain responsible for their accessibility and quality, they bind organisa-
tions by contracts to deliver services of general interests. Governing at a
distance by contract replaces the bureaucratic top-down hierarchy in
which politicians are directly accountable for reaching policy targets.
The expectation is that by contracting non-state organisations, expenses
can be controlled, competition increased and services innovated, diversi-
fied and improved (Smith & Lipsky 1994).
Three side effects have to be mentioned. First one must beware of the
risk of a democratic deficit, implying that the responsibility for public
services falls between two stools. In a recent report on investing in gov-
ernment, Kohnstamm (2004) signals that politics is losing its grip on
zelfstandige bestuursorganen (ZBOs/quangos: Quasi-Autonomous
Non-governmental Organisations) that became independent providers
of public services in fields such as immigration, refugee services, stu-
dent grants and social security. Given the common interest of these ser-
vices and because of citizens’ rights to primary goods, the author expli-
citly pleads for the return of responsibilities to the political level – the
government and its departments. The debate continues; some agree that
governments are accountable for public services, others argue that we
are facing an experiment that needs to fine-tune the contracts between
governments and the quangos and other contracted partners.
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A second side effect is that by splitting up purchasing and providing,
state institutions lose their grip on the process of delivery. Nuis (2004)
has pointed out this risk. The splitting up of purchasing and provision
responsibilities frees ministers and civil servants from the accountability
of the delivery process. However, Nuis found that courts and judges were
too easily accepting evidence collected by private security organisations
without checks and balances on the processes of evidence-collecting.
Moreover, judges and the courts seldom check the private interests of
those paying for the information. Citizenship rights as well as the con-
stitutional state are at stake here. The process of delivering is also under
discussion in the field of immigration policy. Democratic representatives
feel that, although they agree on the immigration policy assumptions,
the process of judging individual cases has been escaping from demo-
cratic control since it was outsourced to the quango, the Immigration
and Naturalisation Service (IND). The national ombudsman has held
the minister of immigration responsible for the IND’s refusal to make
juridical decisions in about 1100 individual cases.
Sennett (1998) puts the lack of responsibility for the delivery process
in a wider perspective by stressing that current ways of governing,
through both large corporations or state bureaucracies, are characterised
by a neglect of the complicated process of implementation and perfor-
mance. Though he may have too romantic an image of ‘good old leader-
ship’, it cannot be denied that in the past governments took more re-
sponsibility for the process of reaching the targets they set. At present,
policymakers are more focused on outcomes, leaving the complexities of
implementation to the service providers.
The third side effect, as De Bruijn (2001), Gilbert (2002) and Dahren-
dorf (2004) note, is that contracts only have meaning if they are made
operational by way of performance indicators. Contracts can have a per-
verse impact if they are either too detailed or too open. If they are too
detailed they result in managerial bureaucracy, undermine professional
discretion and neglect professional knowledge; if they are too open, the
purchasing state is unable to control the relationship between price,
quality, and outcomes of the services. There is also the risk of fixing in-
dicators in such a way that they can always be reached. We will turn to
this point later.
Given these comments, it remains uncertain whether programmatic
retrenchment by way of outsourcing public services to commercial and
non-profit organisations with contracts and leaving control of the imple-
mentation of social policy to such quangos will indeed result in more
efficient, cheaper, customer-oriented and tailor-made services. Blame
avoidance that results in a democratic deficit, and detailed performance
indicators that result in managerial bureaucracy and in strict control on
professional work do not exactly guarantee high-quality public services.
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Contracts between Chain Partners
When the central direction of public services declines and substitution
becomes a political target, local public and private partners have to co-
operate to avoid fragmentation. Partnerships are developed among chain
partners, for instance, in (health) care for the elderly between intramur-
al, extramural and voluntary organisations (transmuralisation), among
varied organisations that share a common interest, such as local housing
corporations, social work and home care organisations that develop ser-
vices together, or by way of multidisciplinary case management teams of
social workers, youth workers, the police, and schoolteachers that offer
guidance to pupils at risk.
Such networks and partnerships have grown in importance since the
late 1980s. The intentions and motives often are to improve the quality
of public services, to avoid fragmentation and overlap, to work more effi-
ciently, and to stimulate innovation. Contracts can contribute to the co-
operation of partners because they help clarify common targets, visibility
and accountability of the joint efforts. However, they will have the oppo-
site effect when they are too focused on outcomes and do not take into
account the complicated process of attaining trust, becoming familiar
with each other’s work culture and adjusting work practices. In the con-
text of a contract culture, there is the risk that each of the co-operating
organisations prioritises its own targets above those of the partnership.
Hence professionals participating in the partnership may be confronted
with contradictory performance indicators. Therefore, according to New-
man (2001), the contractualisation of partnerships demands accountabil-
ity, in particular by creating proper structures and transparency, focusing
on clear objectives, flexibility by adapting quickly to changing conditions,
pragmatism in meeting targets and delivering visible results, and sus-
tainability by fostering participation and building consensus. Newman
signals that the different imperatives for partnerships are not necessarily
reconcilable. Flexibility and pragmatism may obstruct accountability,
and the need to reach short-term targets may frustrate the long-term
process of sustainability.
Aside from these conditions, professional work in the context of the
contractualisation of partnerships is rather complex if ultimate responsi-
bilities remain fluid. Recent ‘accidents’ in the youth care sector in the
Netherlands, where children were killed by their parents while about ten
different youth care organisations were involved with the family, show
again that blame avoidance is a great risk if no one has the ultimate
responsibility. This is how the suggestion of introducing case managers
evolved, implying another risk – that of creating a new class of profes-
sionals, the managing professional who instead of helping clients di-
rectly is mainly showing them their way through the diffuse labyrinth of
chain partners.
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Contracts between Public Service Organisations and Individual
Clients
Former paternalistic or authoritarian relationships between doctors and
patients, teachers and pupils, or social workers and clients no longer
meet the demands of emancipated clients, nor are they a guarantee for
efficient support for those clients who are unwilling to make good use of
the services they need to become participating citizens. Hierarchical re-
lationships between professionals and clients are increasingly substi-
tuted by formal contracts. These contracts are used in youth care, for
instance, where delinquent boys are required to sign a contract that they
promise to take part in re-socialising projects in exchange for less pun-
ishment. Secondary schools have introduced so-called pest-contracten
(harassment contracts) to reduce harassment. Of course, interventions
on behalf of clients, pupils, or patients can only reach their objectives if
these subjects are motivated to follow the rules of the game and partici-
pate in lessons and treatments that do not always appear to be in ‘their
best interest’. Since public services cannot permit too many dropouts, do
not have time or fail to persuade clients, and have to account for their
results in terms of ‘production’, they can either refuse treatment to de-
motivated persons or bind them to contracts. Both strategies are applied.
Hence, many youngsters left school (64,000 in the Netherlands in
2004) without having any other options while psychiatric patients with
numerous problems are left in the middle. In these cases, contracts
seem to offer a better perspective though their meaning is mainly sym-
bolic. Problematic pupils, welfare clients, psychiatric patients and drug
addicts are often impressed by the signing of a formal document in
which their rights and obligations are detailed, and will be more aware
of the goals and implications of the project they are participating in.
Nevertheless, effectuation of the contracts remains difficult and sanc-
tions often consist only of exclusion. It is problematic that these con-
tracts suggest equality between the supplier and user of services even
though they are mostly one-sided; given the circumstances, the user is
basically compelled to sign the contract and sanctions for a service orga-
nisation that does not fulfil its part of the agreement are seldom in-
cluded. In addition, professionals often consider the contract as either
inadequate or too rigid. The contracts are mostly framed by a specific
category of professionals, the indicators, who are not the ones involved
in providing the service. Since social work, youth care, and therapy are
interactive processes, professionals working with clients experience a di-
lemma when their expertise tells them to deviate from the original con-
tract. Should they stick to the formal contract or quietly do what they
think is appropriate in that specific case?
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Contractualisation, Performance Indicators and
Professionalism
Contractualisation implies a shift in trust. It expresses that professionals
in the public sector can no longer be trusted simply because of their
training, expertise and professional ethics. These ‘street level bureau-
crats’ (Lipsky 1980) will have to prove loyalty to the public good as well
as the effective and efficient delivery of services. The trust in providers of
services is in need of a new foundation. Newman (2001) has noted a
shift from a society in which trust was based on (status-based) identity
towards a society that is characterised as a calculus-based trust. Tonkens
(2003), as well as the Dutch Advisory Council on Government Policy
(Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid/WRR, 2004), have
even spoken of an ‘organised distrust’ of social work professionals. An
identity-trust-based society assumes that those organisations and profes-
sionals who have a task in the delivery of public services identify with the
common interest to such an extent that they do their very best to devote
themselves to realise their public tasks and obligations. Shame and scan-
dal because someone has neglected one’s public duty are the sanctions.
Professional honour and ethics at one time worked as positive stimuli to
fulfil one’s task properly. Social controls by the public and fellow profes-
sionals were considered to be enough to maintain professional ethics
and commitment to the public good. A calculus-based trust assumes
that honour, shame and scandal have become less important. Profes-
sionals, like all other human beings, are motivated mainly by econom-
ics-based rational motives and can only be compelled to fulfil their re-
sponsibilities by way of the old stick-and-carrot method. This means that
it is wise to draw up a contract in which all of the tasks, goods, and
services are described, calculated, and settled.
What are the implications for professionals of vertical contractualisa-
tion between the government and services on behalf of the common in-
terest, and between service organisations and clients on the one hand,
and horizontal contractualisation between partners co-operating on be-
half of the general interest on the other? We have already observed that
contractualisation is founded on the premise of calculus-based trust, as-
suming that professionals are only motivated by rational motives and
can only be compelled to fulfil their responsibilities through a fear-and-
reward mechanism. Although performance contracts are formally drawn
up between organisations or between organisations and their clients –
not between the government and individual professionals – they have
repercussions on the relationship between the management of organisa-
tions and the professionals working in these organisations.
Given that the organisation has to meet the requirements of the con-
tract, it will also have to deliver an overview of its ‘products’. Reporting
on one’s performances, results and outcomes implies collecting indica-
tors from the organisation’s employees, so that professional workers will
26 the rise of contractualisation in public services
be confronted with performance indicators and this will result in man-
agerial bureaucratisation. Performance contracts often contain detailed
agreements about the services (‘products’) to be delivered. These agree-
ments also include figures of the number of clients, a detailed descrip-
tion of treatments, price or costs, and the time needed to provide such
services or treatments. A covenant between the Home Secretary and the
Police District of Zuid-Holland-Zuid, for instance, has demanded an in-
crease of 1000 reports over four years. The Dutch Federation of Hospi-
tals has contractually agreed to a 2.3% increase in ‘production’ between
2004 and 2007 (Groei door doelmatigheid [Growth by Efficiency] 2004).
Client managers (Personal Advisers) at social offices have to deliver an x-
number of welfare recipients to the contracted for-profit employment in-
tegration company per week, and, in the future, general practitioners
will have to present the DBCs (Diagnose Behandel Combinatie/Diagno-
sis-Treatment Combination) for each individual treatment to insurance
companies (see also Vogd in this volume regarding Germany).
The principle of the registration of results, performance and outcomes
is becoming a daily practice in many public service organisations. In
addition to the employment contract, professionals often have supple-
mentary agreements on the exact ‘products’ the individual employee
needs to deliver. Home care workers, guardians, client managers, uni-
versity teachers, general practitioners and psychotherapists also have a
caseload or a standard number of clients they have to help within a fixed
span of time. Police officers and academic researchers have to meet ‘tar-
gets’, such as certain number of tickets issued annually or articles pub-
lished in refereed journals. Their functioning is evaluated based on mea-
surable output. For managers as well as clients, and maybe even for
professionals themselves, this has the advantage of transparency; all par-
ticipants know what to expect. It also creates equality among profes-
sionals; the standard is well known and often clearly communicated
within an organisation, and professionals have to perform according to
these standards. Two comments can be made here. First, since these
professionals work with people who do not always fit the standards – in
particular those who need special attention – they often experience in-
creases in work pressure. Second, due to managerial bureaucratisation,
professionals often complain about how much more time they spend on
paperwork at the expense of the time they can spend on their clients.
Performance contracts not only set standards for outcomes, they also
concentrate on the process and procedures of delivering products:
Demands have also increased for programmatic accountability. As a condi-
tion of maintaining funding, public agencies and other sponsors insist that
contract agencies develop and keep track of indicators of program success.
(Smith & Lipsky 1994: 81)
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The aforementioned police contract thus contains detailed agreements
on better accessibility of police stations (in person and by phone). Hospi-
tals and home care organisations guarantee a reduction of waiting lists,
universities promise a minimum of contact hours between teachers and
students, and child welfare organisations have developed protocols on
the steps that have to be taken from admission to diagnosis and therapy.
At the level of the professional, this means that procedures are standar-
dised and appointments and results have to be recorded meticulously.
This produces no end of figures and other data that are not only used as
the accumulated results of the organisation as a whole, but can also
show the average performance per capita.
The question is what influence such procedures have on the work
ethic of the individual professional. A rehabilitation employee said that
the transition from input to output financing was the most important
change in working conditions during the last years:
Today we speak of delivering products instead of helping people... The intro-
duction of the CVS (a computerised protocol in which all appointments and
data about one particular client are registered) has brought about a more
uniform way of working. You have to follow all the steps in the system and
there is less freedom to make your own decisions.
This on-going standardisation of processes and procedures has a disci-
plining effect on the work of professionals. Whether it reduces their dis-
cretionary space remains to be seen. A police administrator and a school
policymaker both note that there is still enough room for individual de-
cision-making within the framework contradict the view of the rehabili-
tation employee. Despite strict procedures there were also large differ-
ences between probation officers regarding decisions that concern when
and how to formally end supervision when clients failed to comply with
the agreements.
The proponents suggest that contractual relations between organisa-
tions result in better products as well as more, quicker and cheaper out-
put. In almost all sectors of social work and public services, performance
indicators contain detailed prescriptions on how to act in given situa-
tions. Hence these performance instruments contain regulations on the
professional work itself as well as quantitative prescriptions concerning
managerial tools for the delivery of services, such as the caseload or ac-
cessibility. The Child Protection Agencies have developed the BARO (Ba-
sis Raadsonderzoek in Strafzaken/Basic Court Research in Penalty
Cases), a standard questionnaire that has to be used by all staff members
to make a diagnosis and to create a database for future treatments. This
instrument was explicitly introduced to prohibit interpretation differ-
ences between staff members. Risk-taxation instruments are prescribed
in mental hospitals where criminals are treated. Several measuring in-
struments and protocols according to which patients have to be exam-
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ined are being developed for the medical profession in particular. This
includes the DBCs (Diagnose Behandel Combinatie/Diagnosis-Treat-
ment Combination) and the Basisset Prestatie Indicatoren Ziekenhuizen
(Basic Inventory of Performance Targets for Hospitals). The develop-
ment and use of such qualitative performance indicators is often part of
the performance contracts organisations have with the government.
It is clear that these detailed prescriptions of how to deal with clients’
questions and problems do impose restraints on the autonomy of profes-
sionals. They not only have to comply with standard procedures, there is
also interference with their professional habits. Some professionals, like
psychiatrists, consider the regulation of having to indicate the specific
diagnostic instruments they have chosen as a violation of their profes-
sional and even personal integrity. This does not mean that they are not
willing to discuss these methods with colleagues, but they resist pre-
scription. On the other hand, this development is also outlined as an
improvement of the conditions of employment of professionals and
even as a way of reinforcing their professional standards. Two lines of
argument are being followed here. One argues that a detailed procedure
or protocol can be very helpful in providing a diagnosis or deciding on
the proper care. Alternatively, a standardised procedure is defended with
the argument that it protects the professional against unjust allegations.
After all, the records can now show when and by whom a mistake was
made, and who is responsible. We should therefore be careful with the
claim that performance targets simply undermine the professional’s
autonomy.
Interestingly, performance contracts not only take into account the
product and the way it is made, but also its reception among clients.
Market economy concepts and procedures have even found their way
into the area of client satisfaction, which has become an important indi-
cator of a service organisation’s quality. For this reason, almost all perfor-
mance contracts include commitments to measure the client’s opinion
(nowadays defined as ‘consumer’) on the services delivered. The afore-
mentioned Police Covenant, for instance, literally stipulates that ‘in
2006 the percentage of inhabitants that is “very content” with their con-
tact with the police has be substantially higher than in 2003 (67%)’. Pub-
lic service organisations are nowadays dealing with external audits that
include client satisfaction. This focuses managers on staff performance.
The (quasi-) contractualisation of the relationship between organisations
and consumers changes the relationship between professionals and pa-
tients/clients. When clients are continuously approached as if they are
autonomous consumers in the care market, one should not be surprised
if they begin considering the professional as a mere market vendor.
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Transparency, Performance Indicators and Professional
Discretion
Obviously, performance indicators play a crucial role in the improve-
ment of responsibility and accountability in public services (De Bruijn
2001). They improve the transparency of service organisations as well as
of the individual professionals working in these organisations. Organisa-
tions can also make use of performance indicators to start a process of
continuous learning. Performance indicators can contribute the overall
valuation of the quality of the organisation, its work processes and the
quality of the employees, and can subsequently be used to reward or
penalise good or poor performance. Among the organisations co-operat-
ing in partnerships, these indicators can form an additional basis for a
process of comparing tasks, activities and results (benchmarking), and
selecting ‘best values’. Finally, performance indicators can contribute to
a client’s informed free choice. If parents receive information about aver-
age school results, this can guide them in the selection of a school for
their children; when patients have transparent information about the
quality of hospitals, they can make an informed choice of where to go
for treatment.
Performance indicators may also have an adverse or even perverse ef-
fect, as De Bruijn (2001) argues. This goes for performance indicators
measuring results as well as for those that measure processes. Measur-
ing and rewarding output can encourage strategic behaviour, such as let-
ting as many students as possible pass their exams or refusing clients
with a low expectancy of treatment success. It can also slow down inno-
vation and discourage professional habits, because the exploration of
new subjects and methods takes time and does not produce immediate
results. This danger also exists if only the procedures are measured, for
instance, when a peer review is required as part of any course of action.
According to De Bruijn, professionals are mutually dependent and
therefore inclined to argue in favour of the familiar. Avoiding profes-
sional resistance demands combining output and process measurement
as well as professional involvement in the construction of the perfor-
mance indicators and in carrying out the evaluation process.
Gilbert (2002) on the one hand, makes it clear that performance indi-
cators will have to be very detailed to reach the maximum transparency
that the government and consumers expect. If the components of ser-
vices offered and the quality of the products are not tightly framed and
not well-described, providers will demand the highest price for a dimin-
ished quality of service (still under the condition of calculus-based trust).
On the other hand,
[i]f the administrators are able to break down each component into its smal-
lest segment, rationalizing services and leaving providers less room to man-
oeuvre… They also leave less room for professional discretion. Under this
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system, social care that heretofore involved in a holistic process informed by
professional values and expertise is transformed into a series of discrete pro-
cedures bridled by pressures to contain costs… (Gilbert 2002: 122)
How, then, does one improve the transparency of public services while
still respecting professional knowledge, skills and discretion? One condi-
tion for this – and Hutschemaekers (2001) stresses that it is a crucial one
– is that professionals envision directives, guidelines, and protocols that
include performance indicators as part of their tools and instruments.
Professionals own these instruments, and they should only use them to
improve the quality of their work, for instance by using evaluations and
scores in inter-professional discussions on how and why tasks are per-
formed and how to improve their quality. This condition is, however,
hard for all of the professions to fulfil, and contrasts with the goal of
reaching the highest quality for the lowest price, which is an explicit aim
of contractualisation. Our limited empirical evidence suggests differ-
ences between interlocutors. Members of the managerial staff envision
indicators as managerial instruments more than as instruments to em-
power professionals and improve professional quality, so they tend to be
more enthusiastic than members of the professional staff about this pro-
cess. We also have the impression that higher-educated professionals
such as medical doctors and university teachers are better equipped to
influence the content of the performance indicators than semi-profes-
sionals such as police agents, elementary school teachers and child wel-
fare workers are.
Another condition formulated by De Bruin (2001), based on the way
some companies in the United States use the instrument, is that a ‘cul-
ture of fear’ should be avoided when implementing performance indica-
tors. As long as fairness, justice, and protection are incorporated into the
relationship between managers and professionals, performance indica-
tors can result in an active evaluation of the work processes. The evalua-
tion processes should not only include the work of the professionals but
also commit managers to obligations and responsibilities. Reciprocity
and trust are crucial aspects of the process.
Conclusion
Back in 1994, Smith and Lipsky (1994: 110-111) wrote:
Over time, contracting may reward agencies that offer low costs when qual-
ity of service remain difficult to judge. European countries with extensive
government funding of nonprofit agencies, … such as Holland and Ger-
many, do not really have a contracting system. Instead, nonprofit agencies
have almost monopoly status within their service jurisdiction… As a result,
agencies in these countries do not experience the bidding and contract com-
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petition character of the United States, which places downward pressure on
agency costs and creates incentives for deprofessionalization.
In this chapter, we have shown that times have changed; contractualisa-
tion has become a serious feature of the relationship between managers
and professionals and between governments and non-profit organisa-
tions in the Netherlands as well. The tendency can be found in educa-
tion, social work, health care, youth care, home care and police work. We
have stated that this tendency has many fathers and we have explored
some of its merits and concerns. Blame avoidance by programmatic re-
trenchment is not only a cause but can also be the result of contractuali-
sation if the ultimate responsibilities of the contractual partners are not
strictly defined. This risk is already visible in the democratic deficit of
the quangos and in the malfunctioning of chain partners, for instance
in youth care, so an option would be to develop better contracts when a
hierarchical bureaucracy is set aside. On the other hand, contractualisa-
tion obviously has consequences for the character of professional work:
Transparency as well as perversity may increase, and excessively strict
performance indicators damage professional discretion and increase pa-
perwork, undermining professional standards for good services. Caught
between the demands of client movements’ for free choice and a greater
say on the one hand and governmental demand for reduced expendi-
tures, professionals in public services face a prisoner’s dilemma – an
exit option is not available. Raising their voice through self-confident re-
professionalisation may help reclaim professional discretion on behalf of
those clients who need their support.
Notes
1 We are grateful for Giel Hutschemaekers comments on the first draft of this
paper.
2 Although we realise that most social services employees are semi-profes-
sionals, according to the Freidson (2001) and Hutschemaekers (2001) stan-
dards for professionalism, for the sake of simplicity, we will categorise them
as professionals and pay attention to the vertical hierarchy of professional-
ism at the end of this article.
3 The chapter is based on theoretical and empirical material that we collected
during several years in which we taught a course on ‘Social policies and care
arrangements’ within a program of the Interdisciplinary Social Science De-
partment of Utrecht University. Students participating in this course sub-
mitted papers on the working of contractualisation in several social areas
and public services in which they describe the mechanisms of contractuali-
sation, such as the introduction of performance indicators and the way orga-
nisations and their professionals deal with new governance. For the empiri-
cal part of the chapter, we have selected some of these student papers,
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realising that they only represent a small selection of the experiences regard-
ing the issue at stake:
Bartray, Annemarie, ‘Kwaliteitszorg in het hoger onderwijs’.
Bolscher, Marieke, ‘De professional binnen de raad voor de Kinder-
bescherming’.
Burg, Jessica van der, ‘BPO en verschillende logica’s’.
Jansen, Floor, ‘Van helder naar transparant. Een onderzoek naar de effecten
van beleidsverandering bij de reclassering in Groningen’.
Ketelaar, Nicole, ‘Protocollen: controlemiddel of aantasting van de discretio-
naire ruimte van de professional?’
Konings, Tonnie, ‘UWV Gak: Aanbesteding in reïntegratie’.
Prickaerts, Judith, ‘Interventies voor ernstig delinquente jongeren’.
Renema, Lida, ‘Vastleggen of vrijlaten? Een case-study naar de implementa-
tie van vraaggericht werken en accountabality in de jeugdhulpverlening’.
Sijl, Liselore, ‘Verzakelijking in de welzijnssector’.
Terpstra, Oscar, ‘Politie en prestatie’.
4 In the Netherlands, the philosopher Hans Achterhuis (1979) played an im-
portant role in this debate; his book The market of welfare and happiness ac-
cused social workers of creating illusions about what social work could do
for individuals and communities in order to keep their business going. Ac-
cording to him, clients ended up even unhappier than before they were ‘sup-
ported’ by social workers. This book undermined the self-confidence of a
whole generation of social workers in the Netherlands.
5 For contractualisation of gender relations, see Gerhard, Knijn and Lewis
(2002).
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Evidence-Based Policy
From Answer to Question
Giel Hutschemaekers and Bea Tiemens
Between the years 1980-1990, the Osheroff case aroused the emotions
of many psychiatrists (Kaasenbrood 1995: 10-15). Osheroff suffered from
serious depression. Following the failure of treatment with medication,
he was admitted to Chestnut Lodge,1 where he was treated for seven
months using clinical psychotherapy without medication. His condition
deteriorated to such an extent that his family requested a different treat-
ment. When this request was not honoured, the family decided to have
Osheroff transferred to another clinic. Here he was treated with medica-
tion. Osheroff’s condition quickly improved, and after three months he
was discharged completely free of symptoms. However, this is the begin-
ning and not the end of the story.
Osheroff thought he had suffered injuries while at Chestnut Lodge
and decided to take them to court. The absence of efficacy studies on
psychotherapeutic treatment should have been reason enough for Chest-
nut Lodge to treat him with antidepressants. The effecacy of these drugs
is firmly established (Klerman 1990). The counsel for the Chestnut
Lodge defence argued that the claims of the efficacy of medication was
too limited. Clinical treatment should also be aimed at professional stan-
dards and the ‘collective sense of the profession’ (Stone 1990).
The Osheroff case illustrates in a nutshell the main aspects of the later
controversy on evidence-based policy. Evidence-based policy takes the
view that professional practice should be in concordance with scientific
evidence. This policy is widely accepted to the extent that it has reached
the characteristics of a paradigm. However, it is not clear what this para-
digm actually looks like (Sehon & Stanley 2003). Do we all consider the
same paradigm when we talk about evidence-based policy? Definitely
not. In this chapter we will describe two different, basically opposite,
views on evidence-based policy: one starts with the answers and the
other with the questions.
First Impressions of Evidence-Based Policy
The term evidence-based has become a familiar one over the last 15 years
or so. While in 1992, the reputed databank Medline contained only one
article on the subject, this number had risen to over 13,000 by February
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2004 (Strauss et al. 2005). In addition to evidence-based medicine,
many other variants on the term have been introduced in recent years.
Professionals in mental health care refer to ‘evidence-based mental
health’ and the nurses to ‘evidence-based nursing’ (Cox et al. 2004).
One characteristic of this evidence-based approach is the viewpoint
that care should be based on scientific research results (Offringa et al.
2000). An intervention is evidence-based if scientific research has
proved the intervention to be ‘effective’, and if as far as it is known there
is no alternative therapy that could lead to the same result. Scientific
research results are superior to the experiences found in daily practice.
This is true because statements on illness and health that derive from
strict and monitored conditions are far more solid than the judgements
of professionals, which are unintentionally but too often based on opi-
nions (Kaasenbrood 1995). In this respect, ‘evidence-based’ is preferable
to ‘practice-based’, ‘experience-based’, or ‘opinion-based’. These alterna-
tive working methods are based too much on coincidental traditions and
habits.
In general health care, evidence-based medicine is generally accepted
as a tool for professionals in order to provide better care (Haines & Do-
nald 1996). In mental health care the reactions are mixed. In addition to
unconditional support (Stout & Hayes 2005) there is also careful criti-
cism (Kaasenbrood et al. 2004; Mykhalovskiy & Weir 2004). Profes-
sionals often treat the paradigm as a straitjacket, claiming that indepen-
dent decision-making is the core business of professionals and that any
decisions those professionals make depend on much more than scienti-
fic knowledge alone.
The loudest criticism comes from the social work disciplines (Bruce &
Sanderson 2005; Gambrill 2005). According to Van der Laan (2003), evi-
dence-based working implies that the professional competence is neu-
tralised by rational operational management and is reduced to forms of
pre-structured working methods. Evidence-based policy leads to profes-
sionals being turned into robot-like implementers of diagnostic instru-
ments and interventions.
In the following sections we shall show that the controversies are re-
lated to the two different meanings evidence-based policy has for profes-
sionals in the health care sector (Sehon & Stanley 2003). First, we pre-
sent the policy of evidence-based practice that strictly adheres to
protocols and guidelines derived from science (the guideline approach).
This is the policy to which most of the above-mentioned criticism is di-
rected. Our case study analyses the new Dutch standards for good clin-
ical care for those with anxiety disorders. The second policy is based on a
method that enables professionals to work according to the latest scienti-
fic insights, independently weighing these insights in combination with
their own expertise. We have called this the heuristic approach.
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The Guideline Approach
In the guideline approach, evidence-based policy is seen as providing
care in accordance with guidelines based on existing scientific knowl-
edge (Timmerans & Kolker 2004). Guidelines are documents containing
recommendations published by professional organisations that can sup-
port professionals (and nowadays also clients) in decision-making on the
correct form of treatment (Eddy 1990). Up until the 1990s, these stan-
dards were mainly the result of intensive discussion between experts in
the field concerned, and later became known as consensus-based (Kaa-
senbrood 1995). Although these standards do contain the state of affairs
regarding knowledge, when used they often turned out to be the product
of compromises that were made from behind a desk, and therefore
hardly applicable in daily practice. The main feature that was lacking
was the criteria to determine who was right. This meant that on a regular
basis, the most tenacious and persevering expert would be able to push
his opinion through into the standards.
In the late 1990s, new standards in the US, UK, and Australia became
evidence-based, meaning that they were constructed on the basis of the
levels of evidence (Hutschemaekers 2003). The levels of evidence were
constructed by the Cochrane Association in the 1980s, and based on the
authoritative book of Archie Cochrane Effectiveness and Efficiency (1972).
Stated simply, these levels indicate the extent to which the effectiveness
of an intervention is empirically grounded. Figure 1 shows the five levels
of evidence that are currently distinguished:
Level of evidence
1a Systematic review with homogeneity of RCTs
1b Individual RCTwith narrow confidence interval
1c All or none*
2a Systematic review (with homogeneity) of cohort studies
2b Individual cohort study (including low-quality RCT)
3a Systematic review (with homogeneity) of case-control study
3b Individual case control study
4 Case series (and poor-quality cohort and case-control studies)
5 Expert opinion without explicit critical appraisal, or based on physiology,
bench research or ‘first principles’
* An all-or-none criterion is met when all of the patients die before the treatment becomes
available, but some now survive with available treatement; or when some patients die before
the treatment becomes available, but now none of them die with treatment.
Fig. 1 The levels of evidence (from Strauss et al. 2005: 169)
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At the top of the hierarchical list of scientific knowledge are the out-
comes from research according to the method of randomised clinical
trials (RCT). A systematic review with homogeneity means that this re-
view is free of worrisome variations in the directions and degrees of re-
sults between individual studies. The conclusion of such a review is
therefore unequivocal. Characteristic of the RCT is its controlled and ex-
perimental nature. The effectiveness of a new intervention (experimen-
tal condition) is determined by comparison with an existing intervention
or a placebo (control condition). Test subjects are randomly allocated to
one of the two (or more) conditions. The intention of randomisation is to
include patients in each condition who’s characteristics can only differ
by chance, because bias by patient or clinician selection has been ruled
out. When this procedure is successful, outcome differences between
patient groups can be assigned to differences between the treatment
conditions.
In all of the following levels, there is less control in the design than
the design of a RCT. The stricter the design and the smaller the chances
of disturbing factors lead to harder evidence and a higher place on the
ladder of evidence. Reliability and replication are more important ac-
cording to this hierarchy than validity and representativity of the re-
search results.
An Example: The Dutch Multidisciplinary Guideline for Anxiety
Disorders
The Dutch multidisciplinary guideline for the diagnosis and treatment
of anxiety disorders has been drawn up by experts from all the relevant
professional organisations in mental health care: general practitioners,
psychiatrists, psychotherapists, psychologists, nurses, social workers,
creative therapists and psychomotor therapists (LSR 2003). Clients also
participated in the creation of this guideline. All of the participating pro-
fessional organisations as well as all of the participating client organisa-
tions have approved this guideline. The most important conclusions are
summarised in flow charts. Here we present the chart for the treatment
of obsessive-compulsive disorders (fig. 2).
When there is no comorbid depression, client and therapist can
choose between two preferred treatment options: psychological treat-
ment (i.e., exposure with response prevention) or pharmacological treat-
ment (SSRI). Should the selected treatment not produce sufficient
effects within the suggested period, then a different option is recom-
mended. Should the effects of the treatment remain inferior, then a
combination of therapies is recommended, usually a cognitive behaviour
therapy plus a modern or classic antidepressant. Two further choices of
treatment should lead in the direction of a combination between medica-
tion and cognitive behaviour therapy. Thereafter, specialised treatment
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can be recommended or discontinuation of treatment and adoption of
the handicap model.
For the psychological treatment of anxiety disorders, there is no men-
tion whatsoever of the classic person-oriented psychotherapies. The
same holds true for more contextual social interventions, non-verbal
therapies, and specific nurse interventions. The arguments are clear:
‘The effectiveness of these interventions has not yet been systematically
studied to a sufficient extent to justify conclusions with regard to their
efficacy and the durability of the effects’ (LSR 2005: 82).
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Fig. 2 The treatment of obsessive-compulsive disorder (LSR, 2003)
Mixed reactions
The guideline approach has been seriously criticised (Hutschemaekers
& Smeets 2005). Here we will mention the most important criticisms of
this scientific theory and its content.
1. Unscientific – When translating the ‘evidence’ into standards, the re-
sults are weighed on the basis of their ‘levels of evidence’ and subse-
quently on the basis of the size of the effects. Following this, the
achieved sequence is put into the standards. The logic of this system
is as follows: start with the most effective intervention, and if this
does not work, choose an intervention for which the efficacy is a
little smaller. Such an interpretation is not evidence-based though;
there is not enough evidence to show that an intervention which has
been proved to be effective can still be effective once it has been pre-
ceded by another even more effective intervention (Kampman et al.
2002).
2. The dodo bird verdict – Our trust in the objectivity of scientific re-
search is too large: Research results on various therapies show that
there is a high degree of covariance with the beliefs of the leading
researcher (Luborsky et al. 1999). The dodo bird verdict essentially
states that interventions are more effective the more the researcher
expects from them. This outcome even applies to randomised dou-
ble-blind studies.
3. Effective is not the same as suitable – Solid research according to the
levels of evidence applies mostly to the effectivity of interventions
and not to their suitability. Efficacy concerns the effects of the inter-
vention under ideal circumstances, while suitability concerns the ef-
fects found in daily practice. It is mostly accepted that effective inter-
ventions are also suitable (Tanenbaum 2005). The little empirical
evidence that is available clearly shows a large chasm between effi-
cacy and suitability. For example: electroshock intervention is the
most effective treatment for depression, but the majority of patients
refuse this treatment option.
4. Care means more than just reducing the symptoms – RCT research (le-
vel 1) concentrates on the demand of reducing symptoms. However,
treatments entail more than just reducing symptoms. The goals that
have been set, for example, are concerned with the meaning that
people attach to their symptoms, or changes in the ways they cope
and manage their symptoms. Empowerment, for instance, tends to
be more appreciated by patients than medications for reducing
symptoms (Berg et al. 2001)
5. Care is more than just interventions by treating disciplines – Those dis-
ciplines not directly involved with the treatment (psychiatric nurses,
social workers, vocational therapists, etc.) also have a role in mental
health care, but are at a disadvantage as far as effectivity research is
concerned. Aspects such as respect and dignity for clients during an
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admission period or the increased value of a clinical department
without a separation area are not easy to study with the RCT design.
When standards are limited to the highest level of evidence, the va-
lue of these aspects will remain underexposed (Hutschemaekers &
Smeets 2005).
6. The added value of experience-based knowledge – The last argument we
will tackle here is that of the added value of experience-based knowl-
edge (knowledge resulting from patient experiences). Experience-
based knowledge is particularly valuable for questions concerning if
and how an intervention should be recommended for specific client
groups, or which possible relevant but not-yet charted side effects
there are (Hutschemaekers 2001). This knowledge does not come to
the fore as long as the focus remains on hard evidence.
Passive Roles
In light of this criticism, the results of this guideline approach of evi-
dence-based policy are far-reaching: mental health care ends up gov-
erned by a ‘positivistic’ ideology that reduces care to symptom reduction.
More implicit but probably even more dramatic is its vision of the roles
of the professional and the client, which are reduced to an implementer
of guidelines or to a receiver of care for whom certain interventions take
place. Because information is available on which intervention in which
setting leads to the largest reduction in symptoms, the caregiver is ex-
pected to adhere completely to the standard information. Every personal
addition potentially spoils the effect. An ideal therapist therefore acts like
a computer; he performs what is expected of him in an extremely com-
petent manner. In this model, he becomes a competent implementer of
procedures that have been developed by others and to which no indivi-
dual clinical expertise can be added. The client is in exactly the same
position because the ideal client is the one who is prepared to act accord-
ing to the standard. This means no extra questions, no personal contri-
butions, and certainly no personal opinion on what is happening. This
process links up with the dominant medical perspective where clients’
problems are translated into disorders that occur inside the client with-
out him having any direct influence on the process.
Appealing Power
Despite the strong criticism on the new standard for anxiety disorders,
all clients and professional organisations involved have subscribed to
them. We have to ask ourselves why this is so. What has prompted pro-
fessionals and patient organisations to adopt these standards? The litera-
ture suggests that normative and power elements may account for the
popularity of the guideline approach (Vos et al. 2003).
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First there is the clients’ consent. The new standards may provide
more insight into effective interventions and offer clients more opportu-
nities to be well-prepared when entering into negotiations with their
caregivers. In addition, clients may be seeing a kind of recognition in
the medical approach adhered to in the standards concerning their suf-
fering and illness. This argument has in its favour the fact that those
patient organisations that are diagnosis-oriented have reacted more en-
thusiastically than patient organisations with a more general orientation
(LSR 2005).
Equally striking is the approval by all of the professional organisa-
tions. This may have come primarily from professional societies, which
are responsible for the development of these guidelines and may have
strengthened their own role in the process. The position of professional
societies has changed together with the new guidelines as they are now
in a position to determine which interventions can be offered. In other
words, part of the professional autonomy of the individual lies in their
hands, and guidelines provide them with the opportunity to discipline
members.
As far as the separate professional groups are concerned, there may be
different arguments that play a role in each individual case. The view-
points of psychiatrists and psychologists are the easiest to understand.
Their interventions are the most prominent ones mentioned in the
guidelines. Also, the dominant medical specialist perspective links up
well with the dominant views within both professional groups. In this
way, the guideline approach and the standards that result from this
further strengthen their positions. Moreover, their professions have
been now completely rehabilitated from the detrimental effects of the
1960s antipsychiatric movement. Back then, these two professional
groups were by far the biggest losers in the fight for professionalisation
(Hutschemaekers & Neijmeijer 1998).
The same cannot be said for psychotherapists and social workers,
however. Their interventions have not been included in the standards,
meaning that they are now the biggest losers and their position is being
crushed ever further (Hutschemaekers & Van den Staak, in press). It is
not purely by chance that both these professional groups, as proponents
of the process approach in mental health care rather than adherents of
the medical model, were previously (at the time of the antipsychiatric
movement) the bigger winners in the fight between these professions
(Blok 2004). Why, then, did they approve the new standards? Was this
due to a lack of knowledge on their part, or to an extreme state of demor-
alisation that resulted in an insufficient restoration of critical abilities?
Apparently, the new standards include a number of positive incentives
for these professionals. The introduction of the standards allows for the
development of different relationships between professionals, the politi-
cal world, and the general public (Timmerans & Kolker 2004). Accord-
ing to Freidson, it could be argued that the standards are a weapon used
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in the fight for professional autonomy and against the first (market) and
second (bureaucratic) logic (Freidson 2001). In that case, the guideline
approach of evidence-based policy could also help in the fight for the
power of professionals.
The question remains whether the price paid for the guideline ap-
proach is not excessively high. Our viewpoint is that this is indeed the
case. This is even more true when considering that evidence-based pol-
icy used in a heuristic way could offer professionals many opportunities
for taking their own professional responsibility.
The Heuristic Approach
The meaning of the term ‘evidence-based’ described above is completely
contrary to the roots of the concept. The term originally comes from the
field of education. In the mid-1980s, evidence-based medicine (EBM)
was introduced at the McMaster Medical School (Canada) as the name
for a new educational method (EBM working group 1992). According to
its developers, EBM is a learning method that enables doctors-in-train-
ing to work according to the latest scientific insights without having to
delve into scientific journals for hours every day. Reading article after
article too easily leads to the idea that science only deals with large
groups of patients and does not include specific information for the one
patient they are treating at present. EBM was developed in order to en-
courage caregivers to take a more active approach towards attaining
knowledge (Sackett et al. 2000).
This didactic or heuristic evidence-based approach is an elaboration of
the principles that have been described in the authoritative standard
work ‘Clinical Epidemiology’ (Fletcher et al. 1991). The most accepted
definition of evidence-based medicine stems from this work and dates
from 2000: ‘EBM is the integration of [the] best research evidence with
clinical expertise and patient values’ (Sackett et al. 2000: 1). Above all,
EBM is a practice whereby professionals search and consider various
sorts of knowledge, subsequently applying what they have learned in
specific situations and finally evaluating the results. EBM is thus merely
a heuristic tool that can help combine different sources of knowledge.
The EBM heuristic is divided into five steps. In the first step, the pro-
blem that has been found in daily practice is formulated into an answer-
able question according to a fixed system. The second step consists of
searching out and selecting the relevant knowledge. The results of this
search operation are then considered for their scientific value, impact
and applicability in daily practice. In step four, the decision is taken of
whether or not to apply the measures in light of the clinical expertise and
the applicability for this particular patient, taking into account his perso-
nal wishes. In step five, the results of the treatment steps taken are eval-
uated. We will now explain these steps in more detail:
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1. EBM starts with a problem that occurs in daily practice, mostly in the
diagnosis or treatment of a specific patient. EBM provides a sort of
helping hand to translate the problem at stake into an answerable
question. In other words, a general problem is turned into a case
study. This appears to be simple in theory, but it is not. Inexperienced
caregivers turn out to mostly formulate general questions. Sackett re-
fers to these as background questions (Sackett et al. 2000). These
concern, for example, general symptoms of a disease or therapy, e.g.,
how often does depression go hand in hand with diabetes. While it is
true that these questions are important, they are not specific to the
patient for whom the question was formulated. The more the care-
giver gains clinical experience, the more he is able to formulate ‘fore-
ground questions’ (Sackett et al. 2000). These questions are quite fo-
cused on the treatment details of the particular patient. For example:
is cognitive behavioural therapy more effective thanmedication in re-
ducing symptoms in the long term in a diabetic patient with depres-
sion? A well-formulated foreground question will lead to an answer
that has direct consequences on the treatment.
Foreground questions are arranged according to the PICO system
(which stands for patient population, intervention, comparison, and
outcome). Adhering to a PICO system enables professionals to
clearly define what they want to know: formulation of relevant pa-
tient characteristics, the intervention, any possible alternative treat-
ment methods and desired outcomes. These outcomes may be a re-
duction in the number and seriousness of the symptoms, or they
may relate to such concepts as empowerment or a person’s ability to
cope with daily activities, etc. The PICO system enables a unique
problem to be described in such a way that it is possible to subse-
quently search the literature.
2. Searching and selecting existing knowledge. The starting point of
EBM is that the (mostly published) knowledge of others can contri-
bute to the solution of the formulated problem.Within the EBM tradi-
tion, the answer is usually first searched for in the jungle of the litera-
ture, and mostly in large databases such as Medline, Psychlite, or the
Cochrane library. The question does not usually concern whether or
not there is information on the problem concerned but how this can
be retrieved. The PICO system described above can offer a helping
hand in this process. The four elements included in the question of
patient population, intervention, alternative intervention, and out-
comes are all items that can be used as search terms in an existing
database. The four components can be looked for separately by doing
a broad search and the results subsequently linked up. The PICO sys-
tem, as it were, is a cross-section of four collections.
In theory, it is possible that the literature does not provide the an-
swers to the questions that have been posed. This is more often the
case when the ‘body of evidence’ within a specific area is more lim-
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ited. In this case, other resources will have to be consulted, such as a
colleague with more experience on the matter. However, the develo-
pers of EBM argue that the main reason for not being able to find
answers in the literature is that a question has been either too
broadly or too narrowly formulated.
3. Evaluating the information and checking for applicability. The EBM
method requires a lot of time to evaluate the information found.
This reminds us of the old adage: just because something has been
written down and published does not mean it is true. The found
evidence is analysed and evaluated according to very precise criteria.
Finally, the level of evidence is determined. Attention is paid to dates
and the prioritising of the latest information. Manuals and guide-
lines are by definition out of date. Sackett et al. (2000) provide the
following important advice: ‘burn your textbooks’.
During the process of analysis and evaluation, the results that have
been found are translated so that they can be used for the original
problem. A number of statistical techniques are used in order to
determine the chances for effective intervention that has been exam-
ined and chosen for this specific client.
4. Deciding on the application by integrating the newly acquired knowl-
edge with the professional’s own clinical expertise (experience in dai-
ly practice) and the values and/or experiences of the client (patient’s
experience). The caregiver makes an estimate of the applicability of
the intervention for a particular patient on the basis of his own clinical
expertise. He does this by explicitly stating his expertise and opinions.
Sackett then proposes that individual clinical expertise and patient
values and experiences be translated in terms of chances. These
chances should be brought together and reported in one coefficient
(Sackett et al. 2000: 123-129). There are still a few snags as far as the
actual implementation is concerned, but the underlying principle is
clear: scientific evidence, experience-based knowledge and clinical ex-
pertise should be joined to support the decision that always falls un-
der the responsibility of the professional caregiver.
5. Evaluation of the results. PICO helps to explain the aim of the inter-
vention, and explicit treatment goals are essential in order to deter-
mine the result. Ideally, on the basis of the collected evidence, it
should become clear which results can be expected within which
period of time, as well as the measuring instruments used. These
are the most important parameters for measuring the results. One
characteristic for a good EBM approach is that the caregiver ensures
this result is achieved. In turn, this provides leads that can be used
in evaluating the intervention, and if necessary show the way to
adaptations in the treatment.
In sum, EBM is a heuristic that professionals can use in order to tackle
clinical problems via the systematic integration of scientific evidence, in-
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dividual clinical expertise, and patients’ values and experiences.
Although it is true that EBM does make a statement on the scientific
merits of interventions based on the criteria for the level of evidence,
the scientific evidence is only one of the aspects involved in the decision
that ultimately lies with the individual professional.
Learning Professionals
The EBM heuristic is widely applicable for various questions and prob-
lems that occur in the day-to-day treatment and care of patients. While
searching for and using scientific evidence is, at first glance, more suita-
ble for use with professions holding a sizeable ‘body of evidence’, it is
clear from daily practice that other professional groups such as social
workers and nurses also benefit from this concept (Geddes & Harrison
1997; Scholte & Hutschemaekers 2004; Cox et al. 2004). This is in fact
logical, because EBM is primarily a practice of the systematic analysis of
problems that occur in daily clinical practice.
The evidence-based heuristic and guideline approaches do agree on
several points. They are congruent on the point of creating a distance
from a care practice that is dominated by an attitude of ‘just carrying
on’, intuition, power by force of habit, or hierarchy. In both approaches,
the intention is to improve care by using scientific evidence. Their analy-
sis of scientific evidence is also identical in terms of levels of evidence.
In both approaches, the main concern is with care that is evidence-based
as much as possible.
However, in anumber of aspects, the heuristic approach is directly oppo-
site to the evidence-based guideline approach. The departure point of the
heuristic approach lies in a problem occurring in daily practice (bottom-
up), whereas the guideline approach begins with the evidence itself and
moves from that point towards practice (top-down). The value of the ‘evi-
dence’ is more absolute in the guideline approach than in the heuristic ap-
proach. In the latter, research evidence is integrated into the individual ex-
pertise of the professional involved and the personal experience of the
client. In the heuristic approach the professional is primarily seeking a so-
lution to a problem, in the guideline approachhe is just the implementer.
This difference is fundamental when looked at from the perspective of
professionalisation (Hutschemaekers 2001). The quality of professional
performance is not only better when new skills are learned and adopted,
but also and perhaps even more so, by reflection and awareness of one’s
own performance. According to Schön (1983: 49-69), the simple ques-
tion ‘Why am I doing this?’ encourages explanation and a systematic
approach to existing practices. The following question would be, ‘Am I
doing what is best?’ This process is characterised by the fact that the
caregiver formulates both the questions and answers himself. This indi-
vidual activity is typical for each experience relating to ‘sense of mastery’.
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This vision of the individual activity links up directly with a report
made by the Dutch Health Council (Gezondheidsraad 2000) on the im-
plementation of standards. At the request of the Minister of Health, the
council concentrated on the question of how the implementation of stan-
dards could be improved. The answer was: ‘Minister, you are really ask-
ing the wrong question’. The implementation of standards suggests that
professionals should change their behaviour through specific top-down
activities. This will not work. Instead, the following question should be
asked: ‘How do professionals learn?’As soon as professionals learn, they
search out available knowledge and consequently arrive at the existing
evidence.
From Answer to Question
Evidence-based policy often takes the form of a set of rules, giving the
primacy of the science. Care improves as professionals adhere more
strictly to the guidelines of the science. The result is that professionals
change into honest implementers of evidence-based interventions.
Everything that the professional does on his own initiative should be
seen as a disturbance. In an ideal future, the computer and the robot
will have taken over all of the tasks from the professional.
The heuristic perspective on evidence-based policy is very different
from the above. Here too, much value is attached to scientific evidence,
although the relationship between professional and science is defined
differently. Care improves as soon as professionals ask questions more
often on the ‘why’ of their interventions. The more they ask why, the
more often they find possible alternatives. The evidence-based approach
offers a helping hand so that the questions can be asked in such a way
that three sources of knowledge can be consulted: scientific knowledge,
clinical experience of the professional and personal experience of the
client. Ultimately, it is again the professional who has to decide what
happens. The choice belongs to his core competences, for which he car-
ries responsibility and which he must account for.
Evidence-based heuristics link up well with modern learning theories
and opinions on the subject of professionalisation. However, this does
not distract from the fact that the heuristic approach too has limitations.
The approach is stronger as goals and intervention are explained better.
It is also true that the heuristic approach works best for those interven-
tions that are not very strongly connected to their socio-cultural context,
i.e., those interventions that can been studied under experimental condi-
tions (according to the RCT design). The more the effectiveness of an
intervention is restricted to a specific context, the less that intervention
can help to solve problems in other contexts. The EBM heuristic also has
limitations for the assessment of practice knowledge and experience-
based knowledge. These sources of knowledge are explicitly conceptua-
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lised by Sackett et al. (2000), but the way in which this knowledge
should be evaluated and used within the EBM heuristic is too vague and
so complicated that it is hard to perform in daily practice. We therefore
believe that the EBM heuristic should further elaborate on this point.
In our opinion, the warnings the literature has given on the possible
harmful effects of this ideology for professionals and clients are right.
Whether the consequences will be as far-reaching as has been suggested
is questionable. Criticism on the guideline approach is widespread
(Hutschemaekers & Smeets 2005). Some even talk of a new value-based
approach emerging (Fulford 2003). Evidence on its own cannot possibly
steer the care practice; first and foremost, the values of different treat-
ment goals have to be made more explicit. This point concerns such
questions as: do we want to achieve a minimum chance of failure or a
maximum chance of success? (Berg et al. 2001)
Does the same judgement apply to the products of the evidence-based
guideline approach, and will the guidelines always be at odds with the
evidence-based method? Strictly and theoretically speaking, this will be
the case, according to Sackett et al. (2000). This is due to the fact that
guidelines are already out of date as soon they appear, and could give the
impression that the professional is merely an implementer. In reality, a
guideline can be used reliably. As soon as a caregiver and a client come
to the conclusion that the solution to a specific problem should be trans-
lated into a reduction of symptoms, the guideline can be a valuable in-
strument in determining which interventions should be applied and in
which order. In this case, the guideline is used heuristically. The devel-
opers of the multidisciplinary standard for anxiety disorders discussed in
this chapter argue explicitly for such a well-reasoned use (Hutschemae-
kers & Smeets 2005).
Our conclusion is that, in the end, the evidence-based guideline ideol-
ogy is perhaps the biggest danger when placed in the hands of those
professionals who are the least prepared to discuss their performance.
The professional who is unable to question his clinical practice cannot
benefit from knowledge and experience that has been derived and col-
lected from others. From this perspective, we may be able to redefine
the main problem with the professionals of Chestnut Lodge in the
Osheroff case. Their real problem was not that they did not treat their
patient with medication, but that they did not raise any questions about
the efficacy of their own psychotherapeutic treatment.
Note
1. Chestnut Lodge was the home of the antipsychiatric movement in the US in
the 1960s. On the basis of his experiences there, Foudraine wrote the best-
seller Not Made of Wood (1971).
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Societal Neurosis in Health Care
Margo Trappenburg
In 1994, Michael Power, a chartered accountant and lecturer in account-
ing and finance at the London School of Economics, published an intri-
guing essay, entitled The Audit Explosion. Power argued that the grow-
ing multitude of audit procedures had changed the nature of service
delivery. People and organisations that were consistently being audited –
such as hospitals, schools, water companies, laboratories, and various
industries – start thinking differently about their own activities; they
start looking at their work from an auditor’s point of view. They focus on
the measurable and quantifiable aspects of their work. Auditors gener-
ally do not see what is going on in daily practice, they do not sit in the
class room, do not visit hospital wards, and do not read master theses
written by students. Instead they evaluate the organisation’s plans, pro-
grams, and evaluations; they tend to monitor systems of control, they
look at the paper world created by the organisation for auditing pur-
poses.
Auditing, according to Power, has developed into ‘policing of policing’.
An organisation that wants to survive an audit has to invest in reporting,
monitoring, and policing, rather than in improving performance. Unfor-
tunately, the audit explosion has not led to more trust in service delivery.
Instead, there seems to be a ‘regress of mistrust’. If those engaged in
service delivery cannot be trusted, why should one trust the experts,
managers, and accountants involved in policing them? Ultimately “the
performances of auditors and inspectors will themselves be subjected to
audit” (Power 1994: 13). This regress of mistrust may have something to
do with the fact that the audit explosion has brought about “a shift from
professions the public trusts more – such as doctors, police and teachers,
to a profession the public trusts less (the accountants) at the instigation
of a profession the public trusts least (the politicians)”. (Power 1994: 35).
Onora O’Neill has made similar observations and complaints in her
BBC lectures on trust (O’Neill 2002). Similar observations were also
made by the British political philosopher Grahame Lock in an essay
about the demise of the Netherlands. In Locke’s phraseology the quest
for ever more audits, control, and accountability has turned into some
sort of disease, that can be called societal neurosis or hyper-rationality.
Lock describes the phenomenon as follows:
Just like the neurotic who washes his hands a thousand times a day, our
hyperrational society, under the political disguise of so-called responsibility,
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cannot stop producing ever more refined instruments to measure and con-
trol itself a thousand times a day. (Lock 2005: 207)
Power, O’Neill, and Lock seem to have discovered an important insight.
However, they tend to focus on general trends in society. In this chapter
I would like to investigate this phenomenon close up by focusing on one
particular policy sector, i.e., health care in one specific country, i.e., the
Netherlands. By doing so, I hope to achieve a better understanding of the
underlying logic that leads to societal neurosis or the audit explosion. I
also hope that an in-depth analysis may give us some clues to how to put
a stop to this audit explosion, or – put more appropriately in this chapter
on health care – whether and how societal neurosis can ever be cured.
Building on the work by Tonkens (Tonkens 1999 and 2003), I will de-
scribe the developments in Dutch health care, starting with the democra-
tisation movement in the 1970s and concluding in the full-blown socie-
tal neurosis of the 21st century. In the last section of this chapter, I will
reflect on a possible cure for this (hopefully not lethal) disease.
The First Stage of Societal Neurosis: A Call for Patient
Rights and Institutional Democracy
The seeds of societal neurosis can probably be traced back to the 1960s
and 1970s, an era in which a large part of the population turned against
authority figures representing “the establishment” including teachers,
mayors, policemen, politicians, and doctors. It remains an open ques-
tion whether the seeds of democratisation could have evolved into some-
thing other than an audit explosion, hyper-rationality, or societal neuro-
sis. I would like to think that they could have, but social scientists cannot
turn back the clock and start their social experiments afresh.
In health care, the revolution of the 1960s started in psychiatric
wards. You may remember the movie ONE FLEW OVER THE CUCK-
OO’S NEST (1975), based on the 1962 novel by Ken Kesey. Former pris-
on inmate, Randle P. McMurphy, as played by Jack Nicholson enters a
psychiatric ward and challenges the authority of Nurse Ratched. Health
care social movements have questioned medical authority, either be-
cause they did not respect authority in general or because they had wit-
nessed various forms of abuse of that authority, such as corporate doc-
tors who hide information regarding conditions in the asbestos industry,
or medical researchers who conduct dangerous medical experiments in-
volving unsuspecting patients (Brown & Zavestoski 2005). Despite this
origin of resistance against medical authority there has also always been
a close, almost natural alliance between patients and doctors. Patients
who want to be cured need doctors, doctors have been trained to take
their patients’ interests seriously and generally earn an income by doing
so. Governments who establish a goal of reducing medical resources
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usually meet with fierce resistance from both patients and doctors
(Blank & Burau 2004; cf. also Freeman 2000).
Oudenampsen (1999), Rijkschroeff (1989), Stüssgen (1997) and Ver-
kaar (1991) have analysed the origins of the patient movement in the
Netherlands. According to Verkaar, patient organisations in those days
employed four strategies:
1. the substitute care strategy, directed at the replacement of regular
care by other forms of treatment offered by the patient organisation
(think of Alcoholics Anonymous which organises group sessions
and group support as an alternative to the regular counselling agen-
cies for substance abuse, or of patient groups that favour alternative
treatment);
2. the protest strategy, aimed at the abolition of certain parts of the
health care system (e.g., the Dutch organisation for psychiatric pa-
tients, the Cliëntenbond, was opposed to psychiatric care in general
and electroshock therapy in particular; following the ideology of the
anti-psychiatry movement they argued that many mental patients
should not be viewed as patients in the first place because their con-
ditions could be viewed as an appropriate response to a sick society);
3. the improvement strategy, aimed at transforming the regular health
care system; and
4. the additional care strategy, which – as the word suggests – was
meant to supplement the regular care offered by the medical system.
The government, almost from the very beginning, looked upon the pa-
tient movement favourably (Nederland and Duyvendak 2004; Neder-
land, Duyvendak and Brugman 2003). Of course, this warm welcome
may have been due to a true commitment to the goals and interests of
the patient movement. However, it may also have had something to do
with the fact that the government had been engaged in a frustrating bat-
tle with medical specialists over their incomes (Trappenburg & De Groot
2001). Politicians may have seen the patient movement as a possible ally
against the medical elite. The first two strategies employed by the patient
movement seemed truly promising in this respect.
The first strategy (opting out of the health care system and turning to
self-help instead) seemed to concur with money-saving government con-
cepts such as ‘family care’ and ‘neighbourhood care’ instead of more ex-
pensive professional help. This may have been one of the reasons why
patient organisations were readily included in the policy-making pro-
cess. Patient organisations were granted representation in the sickness
fund council and the National Council for Public Health. They were
asked to regroup in regional platforms, which were to be paid by the
provinces. These regional platforms could delegate patient representa-
tives to meetings with the local governments in which matters such as
provisions for the handicapped and community care were being dis-
cussed (Oudenampsen 1999). Rijkschroeff describes how representa-
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tives of the patient movement were overwhelmed by government re-
quests to participate in all sorts of advisory bodies, councils, committees,
and advisory meetings with the government. ‘Once you get in, it seems
that one participation activity leads to another’. (Rijkschroeff 1989: 13).
The second strategy employed by patient organisations (which aims to
redefine the status of patients and the abolition of certain kinds of treat-
ments) may have contributed to the introduction of legislation about pa-
tient rights, such as the Law on the Medical Treatment Contract (the
WGBO, which codified principles such as the right to be informed about
one’s medical treatment, the principle of consent and the right to refuse
consent) and the Law on Forced Admittance to Pyschiatric Hospitals, the
BOPZ. The BOPZ replaced the former law on the mentally insane,
which had stated that psychiatric patients could be put away against their
wishes if this was for their own good. Under the BOPZ regime, patients
could not be locked up in a psychiatric ward unless they were a danger to
themselves or others.
Those patients who were still committed to a psychiatric hospital
(against their wishes or voluntarily, because their conditions were too
serious to live outside the confines of a hospital ward) strove for institu-
tional democracy. Client and patient councils were installed, at first in
mental health care, but later also in homes for the elderly and homes for
the mentally disabled (usually the mentally retarded inmates of these
homes were represented by their parents).
In 1996, a law that forced health care institutions to establish a client
council strengthened the position of these client councils. Institutions
that had never had a client council before (hospitals and organisations
for short-term out-patient psychiatric care) were required to establish
one as well. The client councils were given a voice in important issues
concerning care. They went beyond merely dealing with the daily lives of
patients within the facility (food, atmosphere, outings, parties and so
on), they also became involved in discussions concerning such compli-
cated issues as mergers with other institutions, management’s vision on
the future, new building projects, complicated financial reports, and so
on.
In addition to the law on institutional democracy in health care (the
WMCZ), patients were given the legal right to complain about their
health care professionals to a complaints committee.
All these laws emphasise that patients have rights and claims against
their doctors, nurses, care institutions, and hospitals, thus picturing pro-
fessionals and professional institutions not as allies in a common fight
against disease, but as actors who have their own interests and their own
agendas, who must be compelled to listen to their patients and clients.
All these measures (the codification of patient rights, the representation
of patients in advisory councils and institutional councils and the right to
complain) seemed to turn patients against health care professionals.
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Many political scientists have described the phenomenon of ‘iron tri-
angles’ or ‘policy networks’. Decisions with regard to certain policy areas
are often taken in ‘policy communities’ consisting of powerful pressure
groups, advisory councils, civil servants and politicians who feel close to
the involved pressure groups. Thus, in many countries, agricultural pol-
icy used to be made in a policy community dominated by farmer pres-
sure groups, and civil servants and politicians with agricultural back-
grounds. Social security policy was made in policy communities
dominated by unions, employers associations and civil servants and po-
liticians with a background in either one of these two groups. Likewise,
health policy used to be made in a policy community dominated by
health professionals’ interest groups (cf. Van den Berg & Molleman
1977, Smith 1993, Rhodes 1997, Marsh 1998). Politicians have not lim-
ited themselves to reserved participation in these policy communities.
They have time and again also tried to undermine these communities
by employing other types of civil servants (cf. De Haan & Duyvendak
2002) or by recruiting and appointing other politicians (who would not
feel any connection to the department they were chairing, because they
did not have a background in farming, the workers’ movement or the
health sector), for instance. Politicians have also managed to undermine
policy communities by opening them up for other interest groups by, for
example, inviting consumer interest groups in the agricultural commu-
nity. Thus patient-consumer groups were invited into the health policy
community, on the implicit condition that they would not serve as allies
to the medical profession (Kjaer 2004). This seems to have been the case
in the Dutch health care sector.
As noted above, the Dutch patient movement (or rather: the patient
organisations) did not just employ negative strategies against the medi-
cal profession, but they also sought to improve, supplement, and sup-
port current health care, and these strategies (in terms of the aforemen-
tioned analysis by Verkaar involving the improvement and additional
care strategies) seemed to warrant much more co-operation with health
care professionals. However, during the 1990s, these strategies would
gradually be curbed and forced to go in another direction. Instead of
fostering the natural coalition between patients and professionals, these
two strategies (like the oppositional strategies discussed before) would
be turned into weapons against professionals as well. An early sign of
this phenomenon was the so-called Quality Law, introduced in 1996.
This law required that care providers develop a quality system and pro-
duce annual quality reports, which were to be submitted to patient orga-
nisations and health insurers, who would then have to judge the care
providers’ attempts to improve the quality of care (cf. Casparie et al.
2001).
The alleged conflict of interests between professionals on the one
hand, and patients and their organisations on the other, was only exacer-
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bated with the new plans for the marketisation of health care, which will
be discussed in the next section.
The Second Stage of Societal Neurosis: The Quest for
High-Quality Care on the Cheap
During the 1980s and early 1990s, politicians in European countries
interested in health care were mostly busy finding ways to contain costs.
In the words of health care policy expert Richard Freeman: ‘Beginning at
the end of the 1970s, an epidemic of reform swept the health systems of
Western Europe’. (Freeman 2000: 66). In the past, health care policy
had been very consensual. Equal and universal access suited both doc-
tors, patients, employers and taxpayers, that is “both users and providers
and those who ultimately paid for it.” (Freeman 2000: 77). Since the
1980s, however, all this has changed. The downward pressure on fees
and other health expenses led to the introduction of managers in hospi-
tals, who would try to meet targets, cut back on resources, and interfere
with clinical autonomy. Of course, there had been health care managers
in the past, but their powers were always limited. Traditional health care
managers were inclined to solve problems and maintain their organisa-
tions, rather than institute major changes (Harrison 1999). But with the
introduction of ‘the cost containment imperative’, managers were given
much more influence in the goings on of health care organisations.
Similarly, the impact of politics in the health care systems grew sub-
stantially. Politicians consciously aimed to reform their health care sys-
tems. Since it did not seem politically viable to boldly announce that
health care was just going to get for the worse, for both doctors and
patients alike, governments in many countries tried to depict their re-
form policy as essentially motivated by the patient interests (Freeman
2000). Hence, the cutbacks in health care were accompanied by the in-
troduction of patient councils, patient charters, and endless procedures
for quality control and cost containment under the heading of New Pub-
lic Management. Patient advocacy groups seem to have been manipu-
lated to foist health care reforms on an unwilling public (Dibben & Hig-
gins 2004, also Freeman 2000).
Let us take a closer look at what happened in the Netherlands.
The health care system in the Netherlands was neither a tax-financed
national health service (as in the UK or Scandinavian countries) nor an
outright, premium-based social insurance system (as the Belgian or Ger-
man systems). Until 2006 the Dutch health care system consisted of
three layers. Long-term institutional care (in a psychiatric hospital, a ger-
iatric ward, or an institute for the mentally disabled) was financed by
means of a social insurance system, which covered the entire popula-
tion. Less-expensive care for chronically ill, elderly, or handicapped pa-
margo trappenburg 53
tients was also included here. ‘Ordinary’ hospital care, visits to general
practitioners, midwives, and various other provisions broadly classified
as ‘cures’, were financed differently for different segments of the popula-
tion. This second layer of the Dutch health care system consisted of two
parts. Roughly two-thirds of the population was legally obliged to pay
income-based health care premiums. Health care funds provided cures
or care in kind for these citizens. The remaining one-third of the popula-
tion (mostly those with higher incomes) could choose a private health
insurer. There were some elements of solidarity built into the private
insurance section of the second layer. Private insurers had to offer less-
healthy clients whom they might otherwise refuse a so-called standard
package. These high-risk clients were required to pay high premiums
for this standard package, but these premiums in no way fully covered
their health care costs. The healthier privately insured clients had to pay
a solidarity bonus on top of their premiums to make up for the losses
incurred by private insurers as a result of their chronically ill or other-
wise extremely expensive clients. The third layer in the Dutch health care
system was very small and consisted mostly of non-essential medical
provisions, which people could do without or might choose to pay out of
pocket, should they desire to.
How could one reduce expenses in this kind of a system?
In actual political practice, three different policy instruments were
employed to reduce health care costs, all of which could be classified as
supply-side instruments.
1. Everything that could be budgeted was budgeted (hospital budgets,
budgets for certain operations, macro health care budgets).
2. Medical doctors were strongly encouraged to make and follow pro-
fessional guidelines. Following a 1991 report by the Health Care
Council, in which the council argued that there were far too many
differences between doctors about what kind of treatment or medi-
cine should be prescribed under what conditions, the profession was
asked to make medical practice more ‘evidence-based’.
3. Certain provisions were taken from the collective insurance health
care packages because they were not considered to be evidence-
based, or because they were not meant to remedy a truly pathological
condition (e.g., physiotherapy was deemed to be not evidence-based
and involuntary infertility, albeit it very tragic, was not considered a
handicap or a disease, hence fertility treatments were largely thrown
out of the collective insurance packages).
These three policy instruments were very effective; the percentage of the
gross national product spent on health care rose from 7.0% in 1975 to
8.7% in 1998 (Blank & Burau 2004), which was a very moderate in-
crease, for example, compared to the US (from 7.2% to 12.9% in the
same period).
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However, despite this apparent success in actual policy, and despite
the fact that the OECD considers supply-side measures a much more
effective way of cost containment than demand-side measures (Blank &
Burau 2004), the political rhetoric tended to move in another direction.
In 1986, the Dutch government had installed an ad hoc committee
chaired by Philips business tycoon Wisse Dekker to consider the future
of the health care system. The Dekker Committee in its 1987 report ar-
gued that Dutch health care could benefit from a system of managed
competition, in which health care insurers would have to play an impor-
tant role in guarding the quality of care by deciding whether or not to
include one or another health care provider in the insurance packages
they offered. Thus, health care providers who did not meet professional
standards or who charged too much for their services, would be disqua-
lified by the insurers and lose their clientele. The idea of making (mildly)
profit-oriented insurers assume the health care costs has never really left
the political agenda since the Dekker Committee’s reports, although
their plans were not implemented as such.
In addition to the Dekker proposals, government ministers felt that, if
a system of managed competition were adopted, there had to be a larger
role not just for the insurers but also for the various patient organisa-
tions. They should be allowed to evaluate medical performance and ad-
vise insurers about whom to contract under what conditions. However,
in order to be up to this particular task, patient organisations first had to
be strengthened and professionalised. Patient advocacy groups have
been explicitly encouraged to merge with consumer groups and to be-
have as consumers, in order to perform the role they should play under
a new public management regime. Patient organisations were invited to
participate in top conferences on the quality of medical care, they were
asked to reflect about and discuss reform plans with the government. In
order to be able to fulfil this task patient organisations were heavily sub-
sidised by the so-called Patient Fund (introduced in 1996). Many organi-
sations were newly created, while many other organisations could afford
to hire professional staff. At the national level, the NPCF (the National
Platform for Patient and Consumer Organisations) developed into a
large organisation, staffed by a number of employees.
Patient organisations were strongly encouraged to fall back on two
strategies that they were familiar with: Focus on the improvement and
possible expansion of regular medical care. However, they were no long-
er allowed to use these strategies in close collaboration with medical pro-
fessionals. It was somehow taken for granted that medical professionals
would not be willing to think about alternative treatments or improved
care on their own. It was accepted that they very much needed material
incentives and external controls. Patient organisations and insurers were
the ones who could provide this, according to the government. The on-
going development towards evidence-based medicine and the traditional
forms of disciplinary control within the medical profession (disciplinary
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law and the health care inspection) were deemed to be not enough to
guarantee quality care.
Henceforth, professionals would have to become more open and
transparent regarding their actions, they would have to admit mistakes,
register their every move, and cluster their movements into a multitude
of indicators involving, for instance, the number of patients suffering
from decubitus in their hospital, the number of operations which went
slightly wrong, the amount of pain suffered by patients after their opera-
tions, the number of high-tech medical instruments in their hospitals
and so on and so forth. Representatives of patient organisations and
health insurers would then compare the scores of hospitals, hospital de-
partments or even individual doctors and judge performance based on
these comparisons.
The almost infinite amount of storage space on the Internet has made
it possible to save a multitude of lists of performance indicators and the
professional scores given these indicators. Not only patient organisations
and health insurers can use this information; individual patients can
also access it as well.
Many professionals obviously end up complaining about the adminis-
trative and bureaucratic overloads thrust upon them, but these com-
plaints always sound slightly suspicious because a professional who
does not want transparency obviously has something hide.
Recent (2004-2005) reform plans, launched by Health Minister Hoo-
gervorst, but still very much inspired by the Dekker report, expected a
scenario of health care providers continuously busy delivering data on
the quality of care they provide, and a coalition of eager insurers and
well-informed patient organisations who decide whom to contract at
what price for what kind of services (cf. TK 27807, no. 22 and TK
28439, no. 7). Moreover, Hoogervorst emphasised that the Quality Law
will be further amended in the future, to make it even stricter on care
providers (EK 29 763, no. 22).
Societal neurosis thus starts with democratisation and then takes a
turn for the worse via new public management reforms that involve bu-
reaucratic marketisation.
The Third Stage of Societal Neurosis: Hyper-Control
Under the new health care system, health insurers and patient organisa-
tions will have to monitor and control the performance of doctors and
other medical professionals. However, individual patients (or, as the
market rhetoric would prefer: individual consumers or clients) will basi-
cally not choose doctors or hospitals. They will instead have to first
choose a health insurer. This means that they will have to be able to
compare the insurance packages offered by the various health insurers.
Ideally they should be able to compare the prices, the quality of the total
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package, and the insurance conditions of different insurers such as the
percentage of co-payments. Hence, it is paramount that the insurers pro-
vide information about their performance histories and their future poli-
cies, like medical professionals had to do before. These data will have to
be evaluated – like the medical performance data – by patient organisa-
tions, but they are certainly not the only ones who will be called upon to
monitor the insurers. The Dutch Senate recently organised a meeting
with relevant actors involved in the implementation of the new health
insurance system. During this meeting Rogier van Boxtel, chairman of
the board of directors of a large health insurance company, neatly
summed up the institutions that will monitor his organisation in the
future: monitoring by patient organisations, but also supervision by the
Financial Market’s Authority (AFM), the Dutch central bank (DNB), the
Dutch Authority on Competition (NMA), and the future Health Care
Authority (Zorgautoriteit, the present CTG).
Eric Fischer, of the Insurers Federation, expressed his concern about
all these monitoring and control authorities. In his opinion, these orga-
nisations were staffed by policymakers, that is by creative people who
continuously need to demonstrate their worth and thus continue to in-
vent ever better, more advanced, and more refined monitoring methods.
Fischer believes that there should at least be some time left to actually do
one’s work (EK 29762/29763, proceedings of a hearing, 29 April 2005,
12).
There does not seem to be much chance that these complaints will be
resolved, however. Hoogervorst has emphasised that the health insurers
definitely have to be controlled and monitored by these various authori-
ties (EK 29763, 90). Moreover, they will have to provide data to the In-
stitute for Public Health and Environment (the RIVM), which will orga-
nise surveys in order to acquire data on patient satisfaction, that can
subsequently be published on the internet so that it can be used by (po-
tential) clients (EK 29763, 95).
Given the fact that they were the ones who advocated transparency
and comparable data with regard to medical practices, it would be incon-
sistent for insurers to argue that insurers themselves should not have to
conform to the same types of rules and regulations.
Meanwhile, we can sum up an impressive list of tasks for the patient
organisations:
– they must staff client councils if the patients of homes and hospitals
do not volunteer for these councils (staffing these councils has been a
problem almost from the beginning and still is, cf. Rijkschroeff
1989; Casparie et al. 2001);
– they must monitor the quality reports of the health care organisations
and must continue to do so in the future when the law will become
even more exacting;
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– they must participate in all sorts of meetings with policy makers on
the local, regional and national level;
– they must monitor the performance of care providers (nursing
homes, hospitals, homes for the mentally retarded, general practi-
tioners), and discuss what to do with this information with health
insurers;
– they must monitor the performance of health insurers, in order to be
able to advise their members and other patients on insurance
packages and optimum treatments.
It is not surprising that the representatives of patient organisations in-
variably react to new proposals by demanding extra money from the gov-
ernment. They cannot perform all these tasks with a bunch of volun-
teers, they need a highly educated, trained and paid staff to meet all
these demands. Hence, an important element in the Minister of
Health’s new plans is the empowerment of patient organisations in or-
der to enable them to perform their ever-expanding roles (EK 29 763, 13;
TK 27 807 no. 22). The special fund which distributes subsidy money to
patient organisations (the former Patient fund) will receive a large bud-
get. However, this money does not come cost-free – there are strings
attached to this subsidy package. Patient organisations will have to show
how they intend to perform their new tasks and will have to prove that
they actually did so afterwards. The minister intends to produce “as
much results as possible for care users”. And here we definitely enter
the phase of hyper-control. The patient organisations will not only have
to spend a huge amount of time, money and effort monitoring the qual-
ity of care, and evaluating professionals’ and insurers’ performances,
they will have to become equally transparent themselves about their
own plans and performances. The special fund that distributes the gov-
ernment’s money to patient advocacy groups has drawn up a compli-
cated set of rules and guidelines involving performance areas and indi-
cators for patient organisations (cf. for the new rules and regulations).
And there is no escaping it. If a patient organisation decides to disre-
gard the special fund and the government’s stipulations and look for
money elsewhere, for example, in the pharmaceutical industry, it would
be suspected of having compromised its objectivity and of being ‘unduly
influenced’ by the industry. Recently, the special patient organisation
subsidy fund organised research concerning money flows between the
pharmaceutical industry and patient organisations (DGV 2005). The re-
searchers found that a lot of patient organisations had indeed received
money from the pharmaceutical industry in one form or another, and
they were appalled by the absence of policies in many patient organisa-
tions that dealt with this subject. Some patient organisations were totally
opposed to pharmaceutical industry sponsorship. Others saw no pro-
blem whatsoever with any form of sponsorship. The vast majority
thought sponsorship was potentially warranted under certain conditions,
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which many of them apparently tried to formulate on a case by case basis
(Shall we ask pharmaceutical company X to donate money for our con-
ference? What if they want to be present then and distribute leaflets or
gadgets? Do you think it would be all right to have an article written by a
researcher connected to the pharmaceutical industry in our journal? Do
you think we should charge them for that? Or shall we send the article to
our advisory board and let a doctor referee it? And so on.) Most patient
organisations prefer this modus operandi. They want to remain autono-
mous and make their own policies in this area, as in many others as
well. The researchers are highly suspicious of this approach, however.
They argue that patient organisations should come together and work
out one code of conduct concerning sponsorship. This ought to be a
code with strict conditions, in order to minimise the chances that indivi-
dual organisations interpret the code as they see fit. This code should at
the very least apply to all organisations receiving public money from the
special fund. The researchers add ominously: “A code of behaviour with-
out active supervision on compliance is mere window dressing. There-
fore, conditions should be created and a means should be developed to
monitor pharmaceutical companies and patient organisations to ensure
they abide by their code of conduct. It must also be possible to impose
sanctions, preferably performed by an existing organisation” (DGV
2005, 37).
The director of the special fund thought it might be a good idea if the
pharmaceutical industry simply donated a lump sum of money, which
could then be redistributed to the patient organisations by an indepen-
dent organisation (Bouma & Brandt 2005).
No doubt the day will come when someone will suggest that we moni-
tor the performance of the special fund that distributes the money to
patient organisations, and then yet another organisation that evaluates
the way the special fund is being monitored by its supervising agency
and at some point or other, as Grahame Lock writes, we will realise that
we are like the neurotic, checking and monitoring, washing our hands a
thousand times a day (cf. also Engelen 2005).
Societal Neurosis: Can It Be Cured?
It is not easy to develop a cure for societal neurosis. Every individual
actor who protests against transparency, performance indicators and
close supervision is thus immediately under suspicion. Probably he or
she has something to hide, he or she cannot live up to the performance
criteria, is ashamed, and therefore does not want to confront a supervis-
ing authority.
An organisation that protests against supervision and transparency
will not only have to face potentially angry policy makers and controllers,
it will also risk a lot of negative publicity, because many journalists will
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sense a cover up and will do an investigation to unearth the organisa-
tion’s secrets. Such journalistic scrutiny might even be worse than the
controlling procedure by a regular supervising agency. Hence, an organi-
sation that wants to address the ongoing societal neurosis would have to
orchestrate its own publicity, it would have to invest a lot of time in talk-
ing to journalists, explaining how the administrative burdens are piling
up and then hoping that journalists understand and sympathise with
their stories. This is a risky strategy indeed because inevitably things do
go wrong in every organisation. People are fallible, mistakes and acci-
dents happen and the seemingly sympathetic journalist might decide to
change his story and investigate further. It is not surprising that many
organisations simply go along with the demands of modern times. Ima-
gine a modern hospital or health insurance director confronting his
staff: ‘We have to be open, transparent, and accountable, folks, and we
are going to employ two new administrative policymakers who will see
to it that we are; but they cannot do it alone! They will need your help.
Please register and monitor your every move; make a daily routine of it.
Fill in your blue forms, and don’t ever forget to submit the pink forms
on time. It is paramount that we survive the upcoming supervision and
quality control procedures’.
In fact, the only individuals and organisations who could actually
make a formidable stand against societal neurosis would be people and
organisations that are totally above suspicion, that is, people who have
invested a huge amount of time and effort surviving various quality con-
trol procedures. One cannot blame them for thinking, ‘Well, I have bent
over backwards to live up to all the crazy benchmarks, performance in-
dicators and the like. Why should others have it easier?’
Organisations and individuals who are controllers themselves such as
health insurers and patient organisations have a difficult time when pol-
icymakers or policy-friendly researchers suggest that they should be
watched and monitored as well. You cannot preach transparency and
performance standards if you do not practice what you preach.
So what can be done? I believe there are three treatments for societal
neurosis to choose from. This may sound reassuring, but these treat-
ments are very much like medical treatments for serious diseases. The
first one has severe side effects, much like chemotherapy. The second
one requires that politicians, policymakers, and managers commit to a
drastic change in behaviour (compare the patient who is suffering from
a cardiovascular ailment who has to quit smoking, change his diet dras-
tically, and exercise daily; it can be done, but it is certainly not an easy
job). The third one requires the courage and collective action of both
professionals and patients. This is probably the most promising treat-
ment, but collective action – as the sociological literature has shown
time and again – can be hard to organise, and courage to defy a domi-
nant policy rhetoric and the accompanying instructions to comply is a
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rare quality in a consensual, corporatist country like the Netherlands.
Personally I prefer a combination of the second and the third prescrip-
tions.
The first prescription would be real marketisation instead of bureau-
cratic marketisation. Let private health insurers try to strike cheaper bar-
gains with hospitals, let them merge with whomever they like, do not ask
yourself whether this will interfere with healthy competition, do not wor-
ry about insurers who want to select a healthy and youthful clientele, do
not discuss the premiums or the differences in premiums for the var-
ious categories of patients. In short, if you want to have a market, then
have a market. Think about health care the way you think about haircuts.
Some people get them regularly, others visit their hairdressers once a
year, while others cut their own hair as they see fit. Some have their hair
dyed blond, darker, blue, or purple, while others choose perms or an
elegant bob. Eccentric individuals want triangles shaved into their heads.
Here it is unnecessary to engage in an intricate system of quality control:
If people feel their hair has been messed up, they will choose a different
hairdresser next time.
Of course, a government cannot abandon health care altogether, there
should probably be some emergency care for uninsured people who
would otherwise bleed to death in the street, but one could probably
stop there and leave the rest up to the people, their insurers, and the
health providers.
This prescription of total marketisation might cure societal neurosis,
but the treatment may be worse than the disease itself. Health care is not
like a haircut; we care whether people are suffering when they could be
cured, in a dramatically different way than caring whether people dye
their hair a hideous green. Of course, we might organise fund raising
events to cough up money to help deserving patients who cannot pay,
but we would probably keep having doubts about all the others that we
knew nothing about.
The second recipe would consist of the government listening to sensible
policy experts who now and then argue that one can definitely have too
much of a good thing such as control or accountability. The Dutch scien-
tific council for government policy recently published a report in which
they argued that the public service sector was plagued by a huge number
of monitoring, checking, and controlling agencies, watching their every
move and discouraging all professional initiatives (WRR 2004). The
council argued that the government should try to get rid of a lot of these
monitoring agencies, learn to trust professionals to do their job on their
own and search for different forms of accountability, such as more qua-
litative reports on what happened and how professionals dealt with it (in
fact, very much like Tonkens, cf. her contribution to this volume and
Tonkens 2003). The government could also read the chapter by Bovens
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and ’t Hart in an edited volume on public accountability, who argue that
too much accountability can be paralysing, time consuming, and frus-
trating (Bovens & ’t Hart 2005). Acting on those insights, however, is
terribly difficult. It requires a drastic change of behaviour, which could
perhaps only be realised if someone (preferably an economist) could
convincingly point out that societal neurosis will in the end stifle eco-
nomic growth and devour huge amounts of money which might have
been spent on real work in health care such as on nurses, nursing home
staff, doctors and so on. Paul de Beer’s analysis of managerial work
(2001) as some kind of non-productive but highly paid activity (not un-
like the fake jobs we tend to give to retarded people who cannot hold a
proper job because they lack the capacities for that) might be a promis-
ing start.
The third prescription is based on the fact that many health care profes-
sionals still try to perform their jobs more or less alongside or in disre-
gard of managerial objectives. They care for their patients whether or not
this results in a higher score on a balanced score card of performance
indicators. Of course this may change in the future. Professionals may
become cynical under the weight of an ever larger control structure that
forces them to spend ever-increasing amounts of time making plans,
writing them down, and evaluating them instead of dealing with patients
directly. But at present, although there are probably some professionals
who have turned cynical, many have not. And many patients still trust
their doctors to help them as best they can; they do not seem eager to
engage in a time consuming internet search for the best general practi-
tioner, the best surgeon, or the best hospital (cf. Trappenburg 2005).
They visit their family doctor, they know how hard she or he has to work
and they can understand their doctor’s resistance to increased bureau-
cratic control.
In 2005, the Dutch general practice doctors decided to go on strike
after the government announced its intentions to transfer a substantial
sum of money from the incomes of these doctors to that of the health
insurers. The rationale behind this was that insurers could then ask
them to draw up plans to improve their practices and then reward those
who came up with the most promising or original improvements. It was
clear that this plan would cut their incomes while placing increased ad-
ministrative burdens on their backs. A strike might be interpreted as a
fight of narrow selfish interests at the cost of patients who were unable
to consult their GPs for several days. Dutch GPs are definitely not poor;
they earn substantial incomes, so if the strike ended up being perceived
as a fight for a few extra euros this could damage their reputations con-
siderably. Despite this, they decided to go on strike and many patients
seemed to sympathise with them. In fact, even the media were rather
positive about their strike. Unfortunately, in the end, the doctors settled
for financial compensation and dropped their other demands, which
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contributed to the view that they were just in it for the money after all.
Still, this strategy of the bonding of professionals and their clients in the
primary process may end up being a promising strategy. If professionals
engaged in primary care attempt to establish coalitions with their pa-
tients (and with those patient organisations who still prefer professionals
to insurers, managers, and politicians), if they stick together and simply
disregard the tangle of planning and control boards all around them for
a while, then common sense may get the upper hand and the protracted
process of societal neurosis can ultimately be defeated.
This third treatment might work as a form of shock therapy.
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When Ideologies Bounce Back
The Problematic Translation of Post-Multicultural
Ideologies and Policies into Professional Practices
Jan Willem Duyvendak and Justus Uitermark
Since the days (1917) that Calvinists and Catholics were allowed to man-
age their own schools with full funding by the central government,
Dutch society has valued the relative autonomy of ethnic and religious
groups. The accommodation of immigrant cultures and religions fits
with this picture, so it is not surprising that many commentators have
labelled the Netherlands a multicultural society (Favell 1998; Joppke
2004; Koopmans & Statham 2000; Koopmans et al. 2005; Soysal 1994;
De Zwart 2005). However, developments in recent years have cast
doubts upon this image of the Netherlands as a ‘multicultural paradise’
(Duyvendak et al. 2005; Uitermark 2005). It seems increasingly proble-
matic to label Dutch policies as multicultural, but it would also be mis-
leading to define them as assimilationist. Recent policies seem to com-
bine the two extremes: The push for assimilation is probably stronger in
the Netherlands than in many other countries, but at the same time it is
clear that policies take into account migrant identities to quite a high
degree. In order to solve this paradox, we need to unpack the notion of
‘multicultural society’.
In the Dutch debate about the multicultural society, it is striking that
little distinction is made between the ethnic-cultural diversity in society
as it is in practice, ‘multicultural’ government policy and multicultural-
ism as an ideal. Leading critics assume a strong link between the ideal of
multiculturalism, the integration policy pursued until recently with re-
spect to migrants, and actual practices at the local level (Scheffer 2000,
Schnabel 2000, Van den Brink 2004). On the basis of their observations
of unacceptable forms of segregation in cities and institutions, they
quickly draw the conclusion that the ideal of cultural diversity is no long-
er satisfactory and should be replaced by alternative ideals such as
‘shared citizenship’ and ‘national cohesion’.
Historical research (Duyvendak & Rijkschroeff 2004; Fermin 1997;
Prins 2000 [2004]; Rijkschroeff, Duyvendak & Pels 2004) has demon-
strated that over the last decades, much of the integration policymaking
has been driven by pragmatic considerations rather than principles.
Moreover, one and the same policy instrument seems to have been ap-
plied over time for different reasons, either pragmatic or principle-re-
lated (Lucassen & Köbben 1992). To put it another way, policy does not
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have a one-to-one relationship with ideals; it is based on a variety of mo-
tives and justifications as well as principles, and cannot be reduced sim-
ply to the implementation of an ideal. An idea that commonly crops up
in the public and political debates is that the ideal of a multicultural so-
ciety permeates all phases of policymaking, including the results, but the
literature reveals serious doubts about whether there is a direct relation-
ship between ideas and the actual results of policies (Lipsky 1980; Wil-
son 1989; Pressman & Wildavsky 1984).
In many studies on multiculturalism, the ‘black box’ of public admin-
istration and how policies are executed remains closed. People assume
that there is a close link between the policy pursued and what profes-
sionals do in practice. In the Netherlands, policies were multicultural in
the sense that they recognised the right of ethnic self-organisation, and
due to the religiously ‘pillarised’ past there was a legal framework that
provided rights to minorities (and to other citizens) to follow their own
cultural and religious identities. Whether this indeed led to a lot of mul-
ticultural practices is an entirely different question – one we want to
answer in this chapter on professional practices.
Due to space considerations, however, we cannot investigate the com-
plex relationship between ideals, policies, and practices in detail. What
we can do is shed some light on how recent shifts in public debates and
the political climate have affected professional practices by briefly dis-
cussing two cases.1 The first concerns the Neighbourhood Alliance, an
organisation that shares many of the criticisms that are now often made
against multiculturalism. We show that this organisation attempts to
translate an ideological critique of multiculturalism into a concrete pro-
gram. At the same time, we see that there are powerful forces at play on
a local level that make it difficult to effectively implement this program.
The second case concerns recent reforms of Rotterdam’s local right-wing
government in which the party of the late Pim Fortuyn is quite hegemo-
nic. This government’s mission was to create and implement policies
that departed radically from those of the left-wing governments that had
ruled Rotterdam for decades. In this case too, we find that the translation
of an anti-multicultural ideal into policy practice is not straightforward.
Both cases highlight that there are many obstacles that frustrate the
translation of ideals into policy and the implementation of policies into
practice. These obstacles play their part even when the ideals themselves
are hegemonic in the public debate.
The notion that ideals and policies on the one hand and professional
practices on the other are closely linked is also a fundamental assump-
tion in the debate on (de) professionalisation: new neo-liberal policies
are blamed for limiting the manoeuvring space of professionals (see the
many examples in this book). By reconstructing the empirical effects of
an ideological shift – and the debate on the integration of ethnic mino-
rities in the Netherlands provides a rather strong example of such a
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shift – we want to criticise those who suggest a direct relation between
policy shifts and professional practices.
A Multicultural Tragedy
It is difficult to overestimate the intensity and scope of the integration
debate in the Netherlands. The Dutch have a long and uneasy history
with ethnic diversity (Vuijsje 1997). Here we shall only discuss the shifts
and developments in the debate since 2000, when Paul Scheffer pub-
lished his essay on the ‘multicultural tragedy’. A quick look at Scheffer’s
article immediately identifies it as the kind of presentation that became
typical of the integration debate. Scheffer uses dramatic and dramaturgi-
cal metaphors, saying, for instance, that a multicultural tragedy is un-
folding in the big cities in the Netherlands. He also pinpoints the guilty
party:
We are now living with the third generation of immigrants and the prob-
lems have only gotten larger. Whether the successful immigrants will play
their envisaged role of pioneers remains uncertain, as they usually want to
cut loose from their supposed supporters. It is not a sign of open-minded-
ness to put these observations aside with an easy plea for a multicultural
society. All those apologists of diversity do not care what is taking place in
the big cities in the Netherlands. (Scheffer 2000)
The heroes in this story are the people who have the courage to break the
taboo and talk about the problems of the multicultural society.2 Scheffer
suggested that the Dutch have avoided any serious discussion of the
problems associated with migration and the growing ethnic diversity
that comes along with it. He warned of the possible formation of an
underclass, an ethnic sub-proletariat that lacked both cognitive and eco-
nomic relations with Dutch society. Arguing that a misplaced sense of
political correctness had resulted in the gratuitous embrace of a relati-
vist, multiculturalist ideal, he wanted the Dutch elite to change its atti-
tude. Ethnic minorities should not be encouraged to cultivate their va-
lues in their own separate institutions but should instead integrate into
society with the full awareness that, in this process, they would lose
some of their cultural particularities. Scheffer’s argument revolves
around the central idea that a diverse and cohesive society can only exist
if groups integrate with each other on the basis of widely shared Dutch
values. Whereas according to Scheffer policies in the past had been
based on the cultivation and separation of ethnic groups (the multicul-
turalist ideal), he wanted to see the promotion of both ethnic mixing and
Dutch values.
This particular discourse on mixing and values was much more
widely and strongly held than Scheffer realised when he presented his
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argument, and this became even more so after his article was published
(Prins 2004). Although the debate is extremely complex and wide-ran-
ging, it is not difficult to see that one view is shared by most of the parti-
cipants: the various ethnic groups had been living too far apart from
each other and should now integrate (Entzinger 2003; Ireland 2004; Ui-
termark & Duyvendak 2004). However, differences arise as soon as the
reasons for this situation are discussed. Some blame the intolerance of
the Dutch population; others argue that some cultures or religious
groups are just not inclined to integrate into any modern society. The
first viewpoint is popular among some groups of immigrants (such as
the Arabic European League) but it is not very often expressed in public.
The latter viewpoint is supported by some of the best-known participants
in the debate (like Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Afshin Ellian), but is certainly not
hegemonic. The most popular argument is that segregation has been
caused by the multicultural ideal of the politically correct elite, an ideal
that was not aimed at mixing but at cultivating cultural identities. Over-
all, we observe a consensus on four points:
1. The government has relied too much and for too long on spokesper-
sons of the various ethnic groups. Since these groups are internally
heterogeneous, the legitimacy and usefulness of such spokesper-
sons is by definition questionable;
2. A culture of political correctness among the elite, and in particular
integration experts and professionals working with immigrants, has
for too long cultivated ethnic differences and made it impossible to
discuss the problems of ethnic diversity;
3. Interethnic dialogue is crucial for creating the cognitive and social
cohesion that is necessary for collective action and shared responsi-
bility;
4. Migrants in particular, and Dutch citizens in general, can and
should develop responsibility for the public good (defined as an eth-
nically diverse society with basic Dutch values), which is possible if
their initiatives are not mothballed by those mentioned under (1)
and (2). Showing this responsibility implies that they develop a
Dutch identity; double (national) identities are considered an expres-
sion of defective loyalty to the host society.
Case 1: The Neighbourhood Alliance
The Neighbourhood Alliance, an Amsterdam-based organisation with
local branches, has as its statutory mission to ‘(further) strengthen live-
ability in multicultural neighbourhoods and areas’. Its main tool for
achieving this goal is creating and supporting ‘neighbourhood panels’, i.
e., ‘intercultural resident networks’ that develop ‘citizen initiatives re-
lated to intercultural liveability’ (SWA 2004: 21). Such panels are consid-
ered important in solving ‘a problem in Dutch society: we are living se-
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parate lives in isolation from each other, as individuals and as (ethnic)
groups’ (Ibid: 7). Using the concepts coined by Putnam, the Neighbour-
hood Alliance argues that there is ‘not enough bonding within groups or
bridging between groups’ (Ibid: 7; compare Putnam 2000). Because of
this, the ‘public space is at risk of turning into a no-man’s land’, which
will lead to ‘a negative spiral’ (Ibid.: 7). However, the Neighbourhood
Alliance feels that there is an ‘immense willingness’ to be more involved
with each other, on the part of ‘both the new and the old Dutch’. The
organisation wants to cultivate initiatives that stimulate intercultural
communication. ‘The use of the word “intercultural” is deliberate. The
goal is not a more or less peaceful coexistence of different cultures
(known as multiculturalism). Between all residents – including people
from different countries – positive social interaction should be created
on the basis of a universal Dutch, cosmopolitan identity’ (Ibid: 7).
The idea that ‘Dutch norms and values’ should be promoted through
interventions is recent, but it is not unique to the Neighbourhood Alli-
ance. The first Balkenende government (a coalition of the Christian De-
mocratic CDA, the VVD conservative liberals and the LPF, which had
become the second largest party even though its leader, Pim Fortuyn,
had been assassinated just before the elections) had started a discussion
on the nature and significance of social norms in the public sphere and
collectively or individually held moral values (see WRR 2003)3. The pre-
sent government, Balkenende II (a coalition of the CDA, the VVD and
the social liberals of D66), continues to promote this public discussion.
The importance attributed to norms and values has resulted in several
policy adjustments and initiatives. For instance, citizenship courses for
immigrants no longer contain only practical information and language
lessons but also explain to immigrants that the Dutch uphold the separa-
tion of Church and state, the acceptance of homosexuality and equality
between adults and children of both sexes. Curricula for both elementary
and high schools are also being amended to teach pupils the history and
importance of Dutch institutions.
The Neighbourhood Alliance – small as it is with an office in Amster-
dam where some six professionals work along with dozens of volunteers
in urban neighbourhoods – presents itself as an institutional extension
of a citizens’ movement. Quoting research commissioned by the Neigh-
bourhood Alliance, the organisation suggests that both ethnic Dutch and
ethnic minorities are concerned about ethnic segregation and yearn for
friendly contacts with neighbours; both ethnic Dutch and ethnic minori-
ties want shared norms and values in their neighbourhoods; more than
75% of the respondents feel that more people should do something and
about 50% are conditionally prepared to participate in all kinds of neigh-
bourhood activities (SWA 2004: 16). For the Neighbourhood Alliance,
this research raises two questions: Why are there still so many multicul-
tural tensions in neighbourhoods? Why has so little come of these de-
sires and ideals? Their answer is as follows:
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1. The countless initiatives on a local level operate in isolation. They
emerge, blossom… and fade when the momentum is gone. This
makes it a huge burden to participate…;
2. The government mothballs spontaneous initiatives because it has
stringent requirements regarding representativity and accountabil-
ity…;
3. The government and welfare professionals have a blind spot for the
optimism of residents about intercultural co-operation… They focus
on problems and appropriate initiatives and thereby fail to appeal to
residents' capacity for self-organisation;
4. There is no ‘ideology’ for neighbourhood residents… Residents (who
want) to contribute to their living environment lack a platform that
supports them and protects their interests… (SWA 2004: 16)
This is how the Neighbourhood Alliance defines its position: in opposi-
tion to those who frustrate the ‘countless’ spontaneous initiatives and in
support of residents who are prepared to commit to intercultural co-op-
eration. Anti-professionalism and ethnic diversity play a key role here.
The discourse of the Neighbourhood Alliance concerning ethnicity
and citizenship is as complex and ambivalent as the integration debate
itself. On the one hand, there is a general idea that all citizens should
share a common frame of reference and adhere to certain basic values
(values which are variously labelled as Dutch, universal, or cosmopolitan
– the words are used interchangeably). Cultivating ethnic identities is
considered detrimental to social cohesion in disadvantaged neighbour-
hoods and the organisation regularly deplores the neighbourhood coun-
cils for minority organisations, like those in the Transvaal neighbour-
hood in Amsterdam, where the Neighbourhood Alliance is also active.
The Neighbourhood Alliance wants to recruit members to its panel who
do not speak on behalf of a specific ethnic group. On the other hand,
ethnicity is a constant cause of concern and the growth of ethnic diver-
sity resulting from immigration is considered to be the main problem of
disadvantaged neighbourhoods. This makes it very difficult to think of
residents simply as inhabitants of a neighbourhood and not also as
members of an ethnic group. The solution to this problem, on a discur-
sive level, is to create supra-ethnic identities, to find people who are able
to bridge divisions between different ethnic groups and individuals. The
discourse of the Neighbourhood Alliance is emblematic of a wider trend
towards what we may call post-multicultural policy philosophies (Uiter-
mark et al. 2005). These are regarded as an alternative to the assimila-
tionism promoted in France or Germany. In contrast to assimilationism,
post-multicultural policies explicitly take ethnic identities into account.
Ethnic identities are constantly evoked and problematised, not neglected
or denied.4 The Neighbourhood Alliance does not seek to give a voice or
specific rights to groups, it seeks to negate and negotiate rather than
confirm or reproduce group identities.
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While dissatisfaction with multicultural policies is now widespread,
the Neighbourhood Alliance is one of the few organisations that have
translated these criticisms against multiculturalism into a concrete pro-
gram for social interventions. It should be emphasised that this is quite
exceptional in itself. Professional organisations are not often guided by a
philosophy but instead operate according to an organisational logic,
using professional routines to reach short-term goals. Normally, reorga-
nisations are inspired more by financial considerations or bureaucratic
politics than by a reconsideration of policy philosophies or ideologies.
The Neighbourhood Alliance is at least a partial exception as it actively
draws inspiration from the public debate and tries to turn the debate into
practice. It seems to support the idea that there is a direct relation be-
tween philosophies and professional practices. But does this policy
translate into practice?
When discourse meets practice
We can answer this question by analysing how two different aspects of
the Neighbourhood Alliance’s discourse play out in the institutional rea-
lity of some of the neighbourhoods where it is active: spontaneity versus
planning, and ideology versus interest.
Spontaneity versus planning
A feature that is increasingly typical of the contemporary organisations
involved in social interventions is the desire to ‘help people help them-
selves’, i.e., to undertake one strong intervention in the hope of generat-
ing a process of self-organisation. The Neighbourhood Alliance is no ex-
ception, since it presents itself as the result of a widely felt desire among
residents to participate in the public life of the neighbourhood and to
help cultivate positive inter-ethnic relationships through useful and en-
joyable activities. This is also the title of a newspaper article on a national
meeting organised by the Neighbourhood Alliance for its volunteers:
‘The magic of a good neighbourhood lies in spontaneity.’ The reality in
the neighbourhoods we studied is that citizen initiatives are far from
spontaneous and that enduring professional support seems to be a nec-
essary (but not sufficient) condition for achieving sustained activity.
Neighbourhood 8 in Geuzenveld, for which we have the most detailed
data, presents a sort of worst-case scenario in the sense that in the end,
extended efforts did not result in the establishment of a permanent pa-
nel – a stable group of citizens from different ethnic backgrounds that
would organise all kinds of activities in the neighbourhood, targeting all
residents. Perhaps this case is not typical but it does illustrate the diffi-
culty of organising ‘spontaneous’ participation. The involvement of the
Neighbourhood Alliance in Geuzenveld started in December 2001,
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when the organisation contacted some neighbourhood agencies and re-
sidents. From December 2001 to April 2002, one community worker of
the Neighbourhood Alliance worked part-time to organise a meeting to
set up the panel. The method was very intensive: she approached people
in the street and went door to door. The community workers of the gov-
ernment-funded Buurtbelangen (Community Interests Committee) sup-
ported her in her efforts. Roughly 40 people attended the meeting,
which took place on 8 April 2002.
The first meeting of the panel was held on 23 April and attended by
eight residents, the consultant of the Neighbourhood Alliance and a
community worker from Buurtbelangen. A group of Moroccan girls and
young women formed the core of the panel. At least one consultant from
the Neighbourhood Alliance was always present at the meetings. Other
professionals in the neighbourhood, in particular youth workers, also
attended subsequent meetings. Debated topics included language
courses, a neighbourhood party, the design of (defensible) public space,
a self-help group for Moroccan and Dutch women, a party for girls, the
maintenance of a playground and a Moroccan fashion show. Some of
these activities were carried out successfully but others were not. Here
we are not so concerned with the success or scope of the activities but
only with the input of professionals. Our research shows that this was
very high and that resident participation was low. Professionals were pre-
sent at all meetings and were sometimes in the majority. Both the Neigh-
bourhood Alliance and the local authorities invested large amounts of
professional energy in order to get the panel started. The professionals
who were involved with the panel, both on the part of the Neighbour-
hood Alliance and the local authorities, did attempt for a long time to
keep the panel alive, but to no avail. This does not mean that the panel
was entirely unsuccessful – it did organise activities, and some of the
first residents to get involved in the panel have taken up other tasks in
the neighbourhood.
However, all those involved agree that professional input was high
throughout the period but that residents only occasionally developed
minimal levels of self-organisation. The constant investment of profes-
sional energy is strongly at variance with idea that, after initial help with
the start-up, residents would be able to self-organise. Anti-professional-
ism, a core of the Neighbourhoods Alliance’s ideology, could not be
translated into practice at all.
Ideology versus interest
Even if it is possible to recruit people into an organisation, actually mak-
ing sure that they do what they are supposed to do is quite another thing.
This is especially problematic for an organisation that has a strong ideol-
ogy, like the Neighbourhood Alliance, but does not want to serve any
particular interests or groups. In fact, the organisation wants to bring
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together people with very different interests. This creates a situation that
is intrinsically difficult to maintain for at least three reasons.
Firstly, any group that claims to serve the general interest is bound to
have conflicts with other organisations that have a similar claim and
share the same working area. In the case of the Neighbourhood Alliance,
these are residents’ committees, government agencies, housing corpora-
tions, and other organisations. Residents’ organisations tend to be domi-
nated by older native Dutch residents. One panel member of Moroccan
descent observes that it was a
missed opportunity. It is a shame since people from so many cultures were
involved in the panel… a group of older native Dutch residents felt threa-
tened by the youth. They are still living in the 1960s. They immediately felt
they were in conflict with the panel because of the other cultures… They had
a ‘meetings culture’, unlike the minorities who do not know anything about
minutes, mailings and so on… They are united in a so-called multicultural
residents’ group, but in reality it is only native Dutch people who are the
ears and eyes of the neighbourhood council.
Conflicts like these often arise as soon as two or more organisations op-
erate on the same turf. The government usually enters as a third party
since it has resources, status and influence to allocate. The employees
and the director of the Neighbourhood Alliance are normally directly in-
volved in these conflicts and try to protect the interests of the panel. As a
consequence, the panel easily becomes a vehicle in a conflict between
the Neighbourhood Alliance and a local institutional actor that does not
appreciate or acknowledge the role of the panel. Needless to say, these
conflicts and competitions for status and resources are not very motivat-
ing for members of the panel and tend to have a destabilising effect.
Secondly, co-operation between the Neighbourhood Alliance and local
institutional actors may proceed smoothly, as in the case we discussed
above, where professionals from the panel and the neighbourhood
worked side-by-side. Such a situation may persist for some time but in the
long run it is likely that the relationships among different parties will un-
dermine the autonomy of the panel. Since members of the panel ideally
share only good qualities (active, open, independent) and lack any clear
group membership, they are an asset for any other organisation or group
of people who wants to organise activities in the neighbourhood. The girls
who formed the core of the panel in Geuzenveld, for example, have now
become active in other organisations. There is thus a strong ‘pull factor’
and there is very little that binds the members of the panel together, since
they are selected on the basis of not having strong and durable loyalties.
Thirdly, it must be said that most of the panel members were not di-
rectly aware of the ideology of the neighbourhood panel. Sometimes it is
explained that the Neighbourhood Alliance does not support activities
that do not conform to Dutch standards, like a dance night exclusively for
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Moroccan girls (which was then arranged through another organisation).
The contact person for the Neighbourhood Alliance is also likely to have
some idea of what the organisation stands for. But at a further remove,
awareness about the ideology is low. Especially after the initial period of
intensive supervision, members are likely to go to other organisations,
leave the panel or, if they are not aware of the ideology, support activities
that run counter to the principles of the organisation. This was most ap-
parent in The Hague, where members of the Moerwijk neighbourhood
panel are presently setting up a special society for Turkish men and an-
other for Turkish women. This goes completely against the philosophy of
the Neighbourhood Alliance, but for themembers of the panel it is simply
onemore way to organise activities in the neighbourhood. Since residents
who want to get involved in the neighbourhood do not usually support
coherent ideologies, they instead pragmatically adjust to whatever cir-
cumstances may arise. And since the Neighbourhood Alliance cannot
control those circumstances, especially after the period of intense super-
vision, it is quite likely that the panel ends up merging with other organi-
sations or that its ideology gets watered down.
What can we conclude from this discussion of the Neighbourhood
Alliance? The most important observation is simply that there is a world
of difference between the national debate and the reality of policymaking
in neighbourhoods. The concerns of local actors are not necessarily the
same as those expressed in the public sphere. While commentators who
participate in the national debate may be concerned about Dutch norms
and values or the (lack of) compatibility between Islamic and Western
civilisations, most organisations in disadvantaged neighbourhoods sim-
ply want to reach their target groups in order to develop and maintain
policy interventions. As a consequence, they sometimes end up acting
against the very beliefs that are promoted in the public sphere. This is
most apparent with the issue of political and administrative organisation
along ethnic lines. In the Dutch case, such a constellation is normally
not defended on ideological grounds (‘each ethnic group should have a
seat at the table!’) but on pragmatic grounds (‘we can only reach immi-
grants through immigrant organisations’). In a sense, then, examining
the exceptional position of the Neighbourhood Alliance helps us under-
stand that most of the time ideology does not find its way into profes-
sional practice. When an organisation like the Neighbourhood Alliance
explicitly scrutinises professional practices from an ideological view-
point, it becomes apparent that almost all professional practices fall
short of addressing public concerns (as manifested by the public
sphere). Interestingly, this is also the case for the Neighbourhood Alli-
ance itself: on the basis of the research we have carried out so far, we
conclude that only under very specific conditions (high involvement of
headquarters with the panel, high level of professional support, co-op-
erative attitude of other local stakeholders) does its program actually
translate somewhat into practice.
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Case 2: Rotterdam
Rotterdam is the city in the Netherlands with the most severe urban
problems, and it is the only municipality where the populist politician
Fortuyn ran for (and won) local elections and where his party became
part of the local coalition government. While we can see experiments
with post-multiculturalist policies in every major city in the Netherlands,
and indeed in Europe, we focus on Rotterdam because this case might
show us in an undisguised form the kinds of policies that result when
one treats urban ethnic minorities as a new ‘dangerous class’ (Morris
1994). The discourse on the city by the current local government betrays
a strong distrust towards the present residents and a desire to reinstate
middle-class norms and values. In line with these new beliefs, numer-
ous policy measures have been implemented in order to make sure that
potentially dangerous groups are carefully monitored and disciplined.
Zero-tolerance policing is now commonplace and high demands are put
on new immigrants to the city; they not only have to learn the Dutch
language but are also expected to learn Dutch norms and values. While
it was not very difficult to formulate new policy measures, existing pro-
fessional routines turned out to be remarkably resilient. We illustrate
this through a discussion of Rotterdam’s social policies, where new
ideals slightly altered policies but hardly affected the professional prac-
tices at all.
The first example is the so-called ‘street etiquette’. The idea for this
program was first raised in 1999 by a GroenLinks (Green Left) aldermen
who was responding to a growing concern about the manners and beha-
viour of youths in parts of disadvantaged neighbourhoods. During a city
debate, some active residents suggested that the program should be de-
veloped for all age groups. The original formulation of the project does
not mention ethnicity or crime (Diekstra et al. 2002), it emphasises that
street etiquette may reinforce ‘liveability’. Citizens needed to become
more aware of the consequences of their actions and that the govern-
ment needed to involve citizens at the neighbourhood level. Street eti-
quette basically means that residents of a street meet and discuss what
they think is ‘normal’ public behaviour. As a consequence, street eti-
quette has become a device that is increasingly employed to regulate or
test relationships between different groups in disadvantaged neighbour-
hoods. The current mayor, however, now frames street etiquette as part
of a strategy that helps prevent undesirable behaviour – the ambition of
creating a positive atmosphere and promoting friendliness seems to
have been dropped. At the same time, the agenda is more ambitious
since it now appears that street etiquette might even help prevent ser-
ious crimes like stabbings:
The main problems of the city concern safety and filth. The political party
programs and the election results show this. These are problems that Rotter-
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dammers inflict upon each other. Someone is throwing garbage on the
street, someone is walking their dog and someone is holding the knife. The
most important question in this city is how we deal with each other.
Whether we want to take each other into account, whether we agree on rules
of communication and conduct. (Opstelten cited in Diekstra et al. 2002: 5)
Thus, the call for a discussion on norms and values is now translated
into a call for promoting those kinds of social projects that reduce the
levels of insecurity. While the goals here are defined more narrowly and
reveal a mistrust of certain groups, the means remain largely the same.
A second example concerns Opzoomeren. This was originally part of
the social renewal policy that was formulated in Rotterdam and then
transformed into national policy. The basic goal of social renewal was to
increase the quality of social relations in disadvantaged neighbourhoods
and to promote citizens’ initiatives in the voluntary sector. Opzoomeren
is perhaps the most famous part of this program: Citizens were mobi-
lised to clean their streets, organise youth and sport activities, and have
street barbecues in order to come into contact with each other (Duyven-
dak & Van der Graaf 2001). Opzoomeren fits in with a more general
tendency to empower citizens in order to make them govern themselves
and each other. As such, it tends to look for solutions at the community
or individual levels rather than the society level. However, at least in its
original formulation, it also tried to capitalise on latent citizen qualities:
it valued the people living in these neighbourhoods. Opzoomeren, along
with a range of other programs, constitutes the cement that needs to
bind the different ethnic communities, socio-economic classes and age
groups together into a territorial community that has some significance
for its members. Thus, while initially the policy was chiefly intended to
show some tangible social results for the coalition Christian Democrats,
Labour and the Green-Left city government, it is now used in a far more
instrumental way for a more specific purpose:
People do not feel safe and do not feel connected to each other and their
environment. There is no longer a broad sense of ‘us’. There is often distrust
among each other and, consequently, in the government. This is indeed the
social clash: a contemporary social question. We are confronted with an ex-
traordinary challenge of social integration. (Gemeente Rotterdam 2003: 3)
The new government clearly feels that Opzoomeren can play a pivotal
role in meeting this challenge. It has set itself as a target of increasing
the number of participating streets from the current 900 to 1,600 in
2006 (that is about half of Rotterdam’s streets). It has become part of
the new city government’s Mensen Maken de Stad (People make the
city), a program, which not only encourages residents to undertake activ-
ities but also stimulates them to make informal rules as part of street
etiquette and to develop an agenda for their own streets: how can the
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current social situation be improved? This program had been implemen-
ted by some 60 to 70 streets at the time of writing (October 2005).
We carried out exploratory research in two of Rotterdam’s neighbour-
hoods (Hoogvliet and Spangen) which revealed that, on the ground,
changes were not that significant. In some instances, professionals re-
luctantly co-operated, but in most cases they considered the new pro-
gram to be an unwelcome government intrusion. Some professionals
even boldly declared that, as far as they were concerned, the city govern-
ment shouldn’t mingle in their business to start with. Most strikingly,
was the fact that some of the professionals did not even know there had
been a shift in policy. The net result of the policy change is first and
foremost an administrative affair, since in many cases, professionals
simply continued the same activities as before (Radstaeke 2005).
In conclusion, it is important to note that many policy measures pro-
moting contacts, citizen participation and political inclusion that have
already been in place for a long time continue to be supported by the
new government. In fact, these programs seem to enjoy even more poli-
tical support than they did under the previous, social democratic govern-
ment. In practice, it has been proven very difficult to develop new pro-
grams that are a direct response to the call for tougher policies, or even
to redesign existing social programs.
Conclusion
Many professionals are concerned that the emergence of anti-profes-
sional ideologies constitutes a serious threat to their own practices. For
instance, critics of neo-liberalism fear that a belief in the market system
undermines their professional discretion. We would suggest that all
ideologies are intrinsically difficult to translate into practices.
The difficulty of implementing new philosophies was confirmed by
the two cases we examined. In the first, that of the Neighbourhood Alli-
ance, a rather dramatic shift in discourse indeed produced strong but
quite unexpected changes in professional practices. Only under very spe-
cific conditions (a high level of involvement by the headquarters with the
panel, a high level of professional support, a co-operative local stake-
holder attitude) was its program somewhat translated into practice. But
this comes at a price. While the spontaneity of citizens’ initiatives
formed a constitutive part of the Neighbourhood Alliance’s post-multi-
culturalist and intrinsically anti-professional philosophy, paradoxically
its aims could only be realised in a highly professionalised context (and
even then, just partially). The second case, that of Opzoomeren, exhib-
ited an even wider gap between public philosophy and professional prac-
tice. Community workers in Rotterdam either resisted, considered the
policy change as an administrative burden, or were totally unaware that
they were supposed to alter their practices.
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In any event, ideology bounced back in both cases. In the first case,
residents of neighbourhoods obstructed a direct translation of policies
into practices; therefore professionals were forced to adopt the very
(dominant) role they abhorred theoretically. Professionals knew what
they wanted, but the level of inertia and the complexity of professional
practices precluded any direct translation of ideals into reality. In the
second case, professionals were either intentionally non-co-operative
since they disagreed with the new government, or were unaware of pol-
icy shifts – let alone their translation into actual practices in the neigh-
bourhood. This latter form of non-co-operation is quite a surprising re-
sult, considering our expectation that the heated public and political
debate in Rotterdam would influence professionals, even without direct
orders from politicians.
We suspect that what happened (and what did not) in these two cases
in a post-multiculturalist Netherlands also applies in other contexts. We
obtained interesting insights by looking at the (lack of) professional
translation of post-multiculturalist policies into practices, even though
the new public philosophy was so overwhelmingly present. If, in this
case, policymakers were already experiencing so many hurdles, is it not
be plausible to expect an even wider gap between public philosophies
and professional practices in situations where public philosophies are
more ambivalent or couscious? If so, is this not enough reason to recon-
sider the general claim in the debate on professionalism that new philo-
sophies and policies are the primary causes of the erosion of profes-
sional practices?
Notes
1. The case studies are drawn from Uitermark & Duyvendak 2005a and 2005b,
respectively.
2. Fortuyn also presented himself as a rebel who gave politics back to the peo-
ple by disturbing the political correctness of the governing elites. We can
only begin to understand his emergence if we take into account the high
profile of the integration issue in the Netherlands and the nature of the poli-
tical environment (Duyvendak, 2004).
3. Even a superficial discussion on the origins and evolution of the debate on
Dutch values and norms would require much more space than is available
here. See Duyvendak et al. (2005).
4. The diversity policy is also not an example of old (multiculturalist) wine in
new bottles. In contrast to the minority policy previously adopted in the
Netherlands, the diversity policy stresses that identities are highly complex
and contentious, constantly changing and vary from one individual to an-
other.
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PART II
PEOPLE

Safe Neighbourhoods1
Sophie Body-Gendrot
Picture this: An elderly police inspector who knows the tricks of his
trade. Serial killers, ordinary murderers, drug dealers, rapists, and
thieves will no longer walk free as long as he is around to catch them.
Accompanied by one or two faithful assistants, he visits crime scenes,
interviews witnesses, looks for clues, studies his files, and hunts down
the villains until they are safely behind bars. That is, if it is up to him,
but usually it isn’t. The elderly police inspector whom we know from so
many police series on television is very often pestered by the high and
mighty, often slightly corrupt politicians, by managers who have never
caught a villain in their lives, and by lawyers who see to it that the police
abide by all sorts of silly rules. The police inspector is drowned in paper
work, has to meet arbitrary targets, has to account for his whereabouts,
has to do public relations in the local community and even go to recep-
tions to shake hands with politicians. This is the script of many episodes
of many television police series. In this chapter, I intend to show that
things are not as simple as that. In fact, I will argue that the politicians,
lawyers and managers, and the values they represent can change the cul-
ture of professional policing for the better.
All across Europe, the flux of immigrants from developing and for-
merly colonised countries who are settling with their families in rich
European countries, are triggering negative stereotypes in times of
macro-mutations and uncertainty. International tensions in the Middle
East, concerns about external and internal security, and the blurring of
frontiers lead to easy dichotomies of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in democracies of
opinion, influenced by the media.
In France, formerly thought to be a homogeneous society with now
and then invisible flux immigrants irrupting and quietly melting in, the
development of more individualistic and culturally diversified society
has left national elites and professionals obviously confused, since equal
treatment for all does not meet immigrants’ special needs. Because for-
mer mechanisms of social integration have been eroding throughout the
second half of the 20th century and social exclusion has taken new eth-
nicised forms, current second- and third-generation males often have
the feeling they are not fully accepted in the mainstream, and that their
trajectories of upward social mobility look dimmer. Having failed at
school, and being more or less jobless (with an unemployment rate of
40%, three times higher than that of the general French population) and
visibly idle in the public space, collective groups of male youth belonging
to ‘visible minorities’ are frequently perceived and categorised as risks to
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public safety by large majorities of citizens and the police are required to
control their behaviours. In the field, rank-and-file policemen have a
large leverage of action that is sometimes labelled as a ‘hierarchical in-
version’ (Salas 2005: 204). Their professional culture leads them to see
these youths as ‘enemies’ even if the latter’s potential for violence is of
low-intensity. In a mimetic posture, these youths also perceive the police
as a rival gang trying to control the public spaces that they have some-
what colonised. They complain of ethnic profiling and of discrimination
when they are stopped and frisked.
Similar problems characterise the United States, where the racial is-
sue is more ingrained in the formation of the nation (Dawson 1994).
Because the fate of racial minorities has been so singular and their inter-
actions with the police sometimes lethal, until 9/11 immigrants seemed
to experience less police abuse in the cities where they settled than his-
torical minorities.
In the Western world, different ways of perceiving and defining situa-
tions result in different policies and organisational practices. These per-
ceptions emanate from what could be considered as two contrasting
‘models’ regarding the justice and fairness for minorities. In France, the
essence of the Republican model obeys a logic of equality and not a logic
of minorities. The principles of identity and equality are ‘founded on the
equality of individuals before the law, whatever their origin, race, religion…
to the exclusion of an institutional recognition of minorities’ (HCI 1991:
19; italics in original). Consequently, as institutions do not recognise
‘ethnic minorities’, it is against the law to include any ethnic or religious
characterisation in public statistics.2 The public debate ignores racism,
including institutional racism.
By contrast, since the 1960s, following the civil rights’ movement and
the rise of Black Power, American institutions have acknowledged the
existence of identifiable skin markers, of religious, cultural and national
differences, of racism, and of institutional racism experienced by ‘visible
minorities’. American social policies of affirmative action and judicial
decisions in favour of minorities have led to the creation of anti-discri-
minatory apparatuses based on the rule of law. A major difference with
France is that when American local institutions such as the police pro-
ceed with reforms, the change is frequently snatched by pressures ex-
erted by organised minority groups acting bottom-up and by legitimised
anti-discriminatory organisations which, under favourable circum-
stances, find political allies in the system of decision-making. By com-
parison, the French national police are insulated from third-party and
mainstream political parties pressures and, as there is no political recog-
nition of the problem, the status quo persists.
Reconciliation of differences may be found in the dilemmas and con-
tradictory injunctions that police forces face in most developed coun-
tries. They concern fairness and efficiency. When efficient, the police
are accused of ethnic profiling or harassment by those stopped and
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searched; when fair, they are reproached by conservatives for being ‘soft’
(‘What are the police doing?’).
The case of the USA offers a clear illustration of:
1. How and why place matters in a federal and decentralised structure.
Two major incidents triggered by the excessive behaviour of local
police – the Rodney King and the Amadou Diallo cases – were pro-
cessed differently by various minority organisations and by the local
leadership in Los Angeles and New York and led to different out-
comes.
2. The persistence of racial constructions in the attitudes people have,
and how they plague minorities and police interactions. Two current
issues – racial profiling and police abuse towards minorities – reveal
patterns of racial prejudice among police forces (Harris 2003).
3. Justice as it attempts to redress the harm caused to minorities as a
category for violating their constitutional rights. When required by
judges to stop their discriminatory behaviour after signing a consent
decree, police forces in a number of cases have made their files
more transparent as a result of litigation. Such bottom-up mobilisa-
tions from civil society compel police forces to be more accountable.
The second part shows that in France by contrast:
1. Centralised policies influence the behaviours of national policemen,
who are accountable to the government.
2. The official ignoring of race by the French police and a general lack
of management of and sensitivity to the issue do not prevent the
profiling of immigrant youth, although it cannot be said to what de-
gree the factors of ethnicity, youth and poverty are decisive.
3. Justice’s involvement remains marginal on such issues, despite Eur-
ope’s highlighting of the serious misconduct of the French police.
The reluctance of both the government and parliament to document
this issue and to improve ethnic diversification in the French police
force makes France an anomaly in Europe in terms of institutional
accountability.
Concluding remarks argue that transparency and accountability, which
are missing in French institutions, are somewhat more easily obtained
in the US via strong judicial mechanisms of control, institutional ac-
countability, and decentralised modes of governance. Whenever bottom-
up mobilisations defending the improvement of a minorities’ treatment
by the police are successful, reforms are enforced under judicial or other
parties’ decisions, but usually only last for a certain number of years –
after that, more mobilisations are needed.
In France, timid steps indicate that there is an awareness of the dys-
function of a model based on a logic of equal treatment which is be-
trayed by institutional practices. Isolated initiatives in some police acade-
mies as well as experiments launched by localities to improve police-
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citizen organisational interactions result in successful partnerships. But
as long as society remains indifferent or unwilling to seriously solve the
problems giving rise to disorders occurring at its margins, institutions
are unlikely to embrace vigorous reforms.
The Police in Problem Neighbourhoods in the US
Policing of US territory is decentralised and comprised of 17,000 local
police forces as well as state and county forces.3 Mayors or commissions
appoint police chiefs (in some areas, sheriffs are elected). While, accord-
ing to the ‘broken windows’ theory, the police are expected to support
citizens’ mobilisations in securing their neighbourhoods (Wilson & Kel-
ling 1982), in multicultural cities, the police frequently respond to de-
mands for law and order by frisking the minorities of poor neighbour-
hoods.
Historically, the relationship between police departments and racial
minorities is based on a long series of discrimination, abuse and racial
profiling, with the police rarely being sanctioned by their white majori-
ties. According to a 1968 report by Human Rights Watch, the ratio of
blacks vs. whites killed by the police in 14 large cities was six to one. In
the following decade, minorities mobilised around police brutality issues
and racial discrimination, and reforms were observed in a number of
police departments. Mayors appointed more minority police officers,
and in large cities affirmative action measures boosted the number of
minorities in the police forces, before a white-male backlash movement
protesting reverse discrimination abated the process. Most large law en-
forcement agencies have given training in racial and cultural awareness
for years. In some departments it is minimal, but in others it serves as
an important piece of the puzzle in helping officers understand how race
may play a subtle and insidious role in their actions, and how they can
become better officers by moving away from profiling (Harris 2003: 171).
Some police departments have particularly brutal reputations. This
has been the case of the Los Angeles police department (LAPD), with a
record of aggressive law enforcement actions and raids in minority
neighbourhoods causing suspicious deaths. The Watts riots in 1965
were triggered by an event that highlighted conflicts between the LAPD
and a minority community (Body-Gendrot 1993). In March 1991, an
African-American, Rodney King, was brutally kicked out of his car, bea-
ten and badly injured by the LAPD. This time, the episode was recorded
by amateur video, and so minority leaders from various organisations
had hoped that abusive police officers would be heavily reprimanded by
the criminal justice system. Nothing of the kind occurred due to a popu-
lar jury in Orange county, where class loyalty towards police officers who
tend to live in similar areas was strong. Because there was no justice,
there could be no peace for the outraged minority groups. Disorders
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and riots then erupted in neighbourhoods around South Central, caus-
ing 58 deaths and 2300 injured (mostly among African-Americans) as
well as 5500 arrests (illegal Latinos were deported). This cost the city an
estimated 785 million dollars in damages (Saint-Upéry 1997: V). Minor-
ity neighbourhoods paid a heavy price for the riots, while Beverly Hills
and other affluent areas remained intact. A federal investigation com-
mission pointed out LAPD ‘racism’ and imposed reforms. A Republican
mayor replaced the black mayor of Los Angeles in the following elec-
tions. The chief of police was fired, and the new chief promised to
mend the damaged relationship between the LAPD and the minority
community. By 2000, the LAPD included 13.6% African-Americans
(from 9.4% in 1983) and 33.1% Latinos (from 13.6% in 1983). But persis-
tent problems have continued to plague police and minority relation-
ships in Los Angeles since then. Accountability and transparency are ba-
sically absent when it comes to the way the police force functions, unless
major turmoil or a scandal turns up in the media and leading voices of
public opinion force the LAPD to perform more fairly and lawfully.
The New York Police Department (NYPD) also experimented with ag-
gressive law enforcement (‘zero tolerance’) at the demand of New York
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, a former federal prosecutor. A large-scale ex-
periment that began in the mid 1990s led to numerous stops and
searches of usual suspects as a way of pre-empting and predicting crime.
Race emerged as part of the profile. In minority communities, residents
felt that the NYPD’s tactics were unfair and racially motivated. In this
context, one would expect that a similar case of police abuse against an
African immigrant – Amadou Diallo, killed by mistake after 41 bullets
were shot at him by a street crime police unit in February 1999 – would
have generated massive riots protesting biased treatment. Why this did
not occur is intriguing. One of several explanations concerns the leader-
ship exerted by black organisations' leaders and local authorities: both
managed to contain disorders in the city and converted them into ac-
tions of civil disobedience. The tradition of progressive politics that char-
acterises New York thus led more than 2000 residents of all races, ages,
and social status to demonstrate on the streets demanding police re-
forms. The NYPD was subjected to state and federal investigations, the
policemen involved in the shooting were sanctioned, ethical codes were
reinforced, street crime units dismantled, and more ethnic and racial
recruiting took place. Popular mobilisations combined with the Federal
Department of Justice intervention were determinant factors in the en-
forcement of reforms. Former incidents of NYPD police brutality had
already been exposed, but it was their cumulative effect and the mayor’s
vulnerability at that time that forced the institution to bend to new forms
of accountability.
The 150-year history of the NYPD, as analysed by Johnson (2003),
reveals cycles of approximately ten years between reforms against police
brutality. For instance, clubbing was a routine practice of patrolmen in
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the 19th century, bludgeoning citizens with nightsticks or blackjacks.
After the first state committee, the Lexow Commission, exposed police
corruption and misconduct in 1894, a police reformer, Theodore Roose-
velt, was nominated and he implemented stricter disciplinary practices.
The following period, 1900-1911, reveals a typical feature of New York,
the capacity of its racial and ethnic groups to organise, which corrobo-
rates the ideas developed by Katznelson in ‘City Trenches’ (1981) relative
to a dual mode of organization: a working class unitary one in the fac-
tories and an ethnic and racial one at the neighbourhood level. Typically,
police issues reveal that new immigrants and racial minorities are sub-
jected to hostility from settled white populations when they cluster in
specific neighbourhoods. The level of brutality or protection they receive
marks their changing positions on the scale of power. It was only after
1905 that a patrolman was successfully found guilty of the murder of an
African-American, and in 1911 the first black officer was hired by the
NYPD. The progressive era showed that stopping police brutality and
reducing the number of arrests could become a political priority. But
reformers become vulnerable when crime rises, which was the case dur-
ing the early 1900s. Although the goal was praiseworthy and prominent
judges sided with him, New York Mayor Gaynor had to abandon his ef-
forts. It was only in 1931 that the 11th clause of the Wickersham Com-
mission report condemned lawlessness in law enforcement, especially
the ‘third degree’ applied to indigent, non-influential suspects and mino-
rities as a particular discipline meant to force them to conform to the law
without consent. Again, efforts to create a civilian review board were
marred by police interest groups, claiming as usual that this would tie
the hands of police officers while giving more power to the criminals. A
cyclical pattern emerged that expressed itself as the swing of a pendulum
between repression and reforms. Citizens, the judicial system, city
authorities, federal initiatives, or even the global context generates these
processes. For instance, the Vietnam War and 9/11 have both had an
impact on NYPD practices and priorities.
A more recent case has drawn attention to local police forces. Racial
profiling is defined as a highly discretionary police tactic that activates
the police suspicion of minorities and turning profiles into police inves-
tigations (Harris 2003). The police justify these actions as an effective
crime-fighting tool. But this selective orientation goes against the Consti-
tution, which offers equal protection to all and protects citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures. Minorities who have been stopped
and frisked based on profiling often know that they have been singled
out because of ‘race-making situations’ (Fagan 2002: 150 n. 47). Not
only does this profiling hurt them emotionally, but also these situations
can escalate into violent encounters, a situation similar to that experi-
enced in France’s problem areas. Minority residents thus feel that they
share a linked fate of submission to police relations of domination, and
that it is in their interest to respond collectively.
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In the case of racial profiling along New Jersey Turnpike, minority
drivers complained about being stopped in far greater numbers to their
presence on the road to the point that the highest court had to restrict
the use of consent searches in New Jersey in 2002. They found that
these searches played a major role in racial profiling. Blacks comprised
13.6% of road users but 73% of those being stopped. Two troopers in-
volved in the shooting of four young unarmed black athletes after they
were pulled over freely admitted that they had resorted to racial profiling.
They added that they had been trained to do so (Harris 2003: 55, 240).
The consent decree signed subsequently between the state police and the
US Department of Justice not only prohibited racial profiling in most
circumstances except specific ones, it requested troopers to base every
consent search on the written consent of the driver. A dozen other states
have followed suit.4
In the above cases, the institutions have since learned their lessons
and trained their forces better. Accountability in the American tradition
has served here to reveal brutal police practices, which are less and less
tolerated by better-organised minorities and which force institutions to
reform themselves. But it goes without saying that minorities are not so
well organized in numerous cities and that place matters. The behaviour
of the police in New Orleans after the hurricane of 2005 is an example.
Even in large cities where minorities act as watchdogs on police actions,
the struggle has to be continuous due to the cycles between reform and
brutality already described. The context of the time such as the aftermath
of 9/11 also has an impact, jeopardizing already gained civil rights' vic-
tories. However, even if it is fragile, the notion of institutional account-
ability is ingrained in the U.S. This is not the case of France, where in-
stitutions and their elites are almost never sanctioned and where
accountability is unknown due to historical circumstances. The State
made the nation, patiently under the monarchy, then under the Repub-
lic. The French tradition is to rely less on justice and more on internal
inspection corps (some dating back to the monarchy) to sanction delin-
quent police officers.
The Police in Problem Neighbourhoods in France
How different is the French posture from that of the American? To begin
with, France has a national police force, accountable to a centralised
Ministry of Interior, or in the case of gendarmes, to the Ministry of Ar-
mies, and not to the citizens of France. Top-down policies regarding po-
lice missions have changed a lot over the last years, and policemen com-
plain about constant reforms and the instrumentalisation of their work
by the political elites for electoral gains. In the 1980s, efforts were made
to create a form of community policing, establishing more trust between
the police and citizens. Policemen were to be partners in the elaboration
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of crime prevention schemes and to act moderately in terms of repres-
sion. (The police were, however, seen walking the beat less often than
they were seen patrolling problem areas by car, and they saw their role
more as conveying the grievances of crime victims to the justice system
than developing better relations with multicultural populations.)
Although the Council of Europe has since 1994 required that the police
develop a more accurate, respectful and sensitive vision of various ethnic
and racial groups (Conseil de l’Europe 1994: 15, 19) and in spite of the
injunction of the French Ministry of Interior in 1999 that the police
should better reflect the populations they serve, the institution has pro-
ven resistant to performing social missions instead of mere order main-
tenance. It has been equally reluctant to open its ranks to second- and
third-generation immigrants, and it has chosen to assign this task to pri-
vate security agencies and municipal local forces.
In the mid-1990s, when fear of crime was a serious French middle-
class concern, more repression and risk management methods were in-
troduced in police departments by the ruling Left government, a trend
which culminated in 2002, during a time when crime was the major
concern of the French. Since then, a new policy focussed on zero toler-
ance for delinquents has given more leverage to policemen and prosecu-
tors as it is done in the U.S. Stricter measures for the judicial treatment
of youths at risk were elaborated (Body-Gendrot 2005), and a new puni-
tive populism was said to have been politically stimulated by a Minister
of Interior with Presidential ambitions (elections are to take place in
2007).
French policemen are often beholden to contradictory injunctions
from their superiors: On the one hand, they are expected to control and
instil social discipline among the marginalised, idle, and visible male
youths whose very profile is perceived as a risk and who are thus under
control of different police forces constantly patrolling their neighbour-
hoods. Police are graded on the number of stops and searches that they
carry out. On the other hand, they are also required not to inflame the
neighbourhoods where they operate for fear of hostile media coverage,
and are asked to maintain social peace – a rather difficult task in areas
largely deserted by other social institutions. This posture partly explains
why disorders in November 2005 after two purportedly fleeing the police
were accidently electrocuted lasted three weeks. The police showed re-
straint in many cases, preferring insurances to pay for the 8 700 torched
cars, 255 schools, 233 public buildings, 51 post offices vandalized or
burnt in 300 neighborhoods rather than hurting lethally some youth. As
a consequence, only one death was reported (for the other death, it is
unclear).
A second difference between the French and American police involves
the official ignoring of race, a term that cannot be easily translated from
one country to another. Histories and structures vary, semantic spaces
and social traditions differ. Race is a construction marking boundaries.
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Few statistical tools allow French researchers to document racist attacks,
cases of ethnic discriminations and ethnic profiling. How many second-
or third-generation French citizens have been stopped and searched?
How many are imprisoned? Do these questions matter? The fact that
more than half of the prison population in the US is African-American
male allows anti-discrimination organisations to build their cases hoping
that under favourable political and economic circumstances at the states'
level, they will push the repressive pendulum back in favour of preventa-
tive measures. But in France, such a case cannot even be made.5
That some policemen are racists and act accordingly is not acknowl-
edged as such by the police institution, which on the whole is not ac-
countable to citizens. However, this institutional ignoring of race takes
place in a context marked by the phenomenon the ethnicisation of social
relations. Using the rhetoric of the extreme right, the transformation of
former ‘dangerous classes’ (the working class) during the first half of the
20th century (self-labelled Apaches, zulus or black jackets) into males of
immigrant origin concentrated in large public housing projects clearly
shows that similar processes of externalization continue to operate un-
der different forms. From a law-and-order point of view, ‘otherness’ re-
mains situated at the economic and spatial margins and the usual sus-
pects are found in the same decaying urban areas. Policemen reflect the
stereotypes of mainstream society, a society in which 40% of the popula-
tion claims "understanding" for extreme right, racist and xenophobic
ideas. ‘Judging individuals according to their supposed ethnic character-
istics occurs during the professional socialisation of the police. Racist
representations have an instrumental function in order to differentiate
individuals’ (Zauberman & Levy 2003). French policemen deny racial
profiling but admit that due to the logics of context, some policemen
may overreact in situations of stress, when outnumbered.
The question of space is an important issue here. In marginalised
neighbourhoods, youth’s spatial identities are established in and
through relations of domination and subordination. Distinctions do not
emanate from essentialised identities as they do in the US, but from
territorial coalitions formed in early youth (Body-Gendrot 2002). Reli-
gious, racial and ethnic differences are thus perceived by French and
immigrant youth as secondary to an identity of belonging to the collec-
tive space of the banlieues. Space as well as respect are important to
them because they own so little. The very fact that the youths, many of
them of Arab-Muslim origin, want to control and almost privatize this
collective space is what troubles the police. Youths’ conception of the
ownership of space (no-go areas) indeed contradicts the generally shared
vision of public space and is perceived as ‘uncivil’ and threatening.
As for policemen, the interviews we carried out during our two-year
investigation display a large range of opinions, attitudes, and judge-
ments (Body-Gendrot & De Wenden 2003). Among rank-and-file police-
men, some discard all immigrant residents as troublemakers, drug
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users, and fundamentalists, while some who reluctantly avow having ra-
cist biases claim they would never engage in discriminatory behaviour (it
was impossible to find any policeman who had been sanctioned to talk
or to find colleagues of such a policeman who would speak out). Still,
many admitted that, after being subjected to continuous provocations by
a number of well-organised troublemakers, now and then they ‘blow a
fuse’ and overreact. On the whole, most of them, already serious family
men, noted that in the deprived neighbourhoods they felt despised by
the population who spit on them, stone their cars, insult them – all this
plus a general indifference from mainstream society, except when disor-
ders last over three weeks and when threats of contagion are feared as
was the case in November 2005. There is no relationship between the
officers and the districts in which they work. They are recruited from
throughout the country and assigned according to needs; many end up
in a city they don’t know very well, and they spend the better part of their
careers attempting to return to their own region through a series of
transfers (Zauberman & Levy 2003). Policemen often experience fear,
either of being injured or cause an injury. In our interviews, they all
complained about a lack of training, contradictory missions, and a lack
of support from their superiors.
The third major difference between French and American police de-
partments concerns the weak position of the French department of jus-
tice to redress institutional discrimination. As is the case in numerous
countries and in the US as well, judges are reluctant to condemn police-
men for their misbehaviour. In 1995, only 21 out of 253 complaints led to
the convictions of police officers, and in 1996 12 out of 166 (Jobard
2002). If internal sanctions do occur (between 250 and 350 each year),
the public is not informed, which confirms the lack of transparency. In
2002, only 2% of French policemen were sanctioned by police inspec-
tors, while police violence has shown a 6% increase over the past few
years (and even more than 6% of registered violence in 2003), according
to official reports of the Inspection Generale des Services (IGS).6
A culture of denial thus characterises the French police department,
and its standard line of defence is that police abuse is an exception.
Moreover, in those cases where abuse cannot be ignored, the public ser-
vice system shields policemen from the legal sanctions that apply to or-
dinary citizens, again a pattern also observed in the US. An episode
documented in detail by French researcher Fabien Jobard illustrates
these points (2002: 3). It opposed the European Committee for the Pre-
vention of Torture (CPT)7 created by the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHHR) and France on the use of torture by the French police,
for which they were convicted twice – in 1999 (Selmouni case) and in
2002 (Mouisel case).
The racist dimension of urban disturbances is rarely acknowledged
and is never used as evidence in the response of state authorities to the
CPT accusation. After seven visits to France, the commission pointed to
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‘a non-negligible risk of being mistreated’ at police stations. The Euro-
pean conviction of the French police, who are already perceived as brutal
and cynical, came as no surprise to observers. The surprise came from
elsewhere. The government mobilised to defend its police force, making
efforts to require proof of abuse and making a distinction between well-
grounded accusations and slanderous charges. The government asserted
that the ‘guarantees surrounding the use of force by the police in France
and the code of ethics of the National Police were enough to reduce the
risk of mistreatment’. The commission emphasised the fact that it was a
small sample of allegations of violence that was monitored by disciplin-
ary and control commissions within the police. In other words, the gov-
ernment played down the charge: police transgressions were rare and
allegations were not considered valid evidence. It is unusual for French
judges to side with vulnerable categories against policemen, anyway.
Judges have much difficulty leading inquiries involving the police and
the obtaining complete police files and this is not unique to France, it
also happens in the US. The cases frequently end up being closed for
lack of evidence, even more so on appeal.
Inquiries involving the police meet numerous obstacles, cases drag on
forever due to police reluctance to forward documents to judges, and
cases are frequently closed for lack of evidence. Policemen are cynical
about the impunity their status grants them. Sometimes judges get tired
of having to face the same policemen who are repeatedly charges of re-
bellion, and choose to dismiss the cases on the spot.
Fabien Jobard and Marta Zimolag (2006) have studied the decisions
of a French district court involving cases against policemen holding pub-
lic authority between 1965 and 2003.8 The issue was whether ethnic dis-
crimination had occurred, based on the ethnicities of individuals ar-
rested and convicted because of their contempt towards a policeman.
Contempt in France is punishable by a six-month prison term and a
7,500 euros fine. It consists of ‘any words, gestures or threats… ad-
dressed to persons in charge of a public service mission... liable to un-
dermine their dignity or the respect owed to the office they hold’ (art.
433-5 of the Criminal Code). Obstruction is defined as ‘displaying violent
resistance to a person holding public authority’ (art. 433-6 of the Crim-
inal Code). It receives the same punishment as contempt. The third of-
fence is assaulting an officer, which is always a misdemeanour.9 Over
1,500 cases were judged between 1965 and 2003 in one specific district
court, located in the Paris periphery. The period reveals an increase in
cases of outrage and rebellion in that court, which are not just the result
of an increase in population. The number of actual delinquents rose only
slightly. The explanation can also not be the growing level of ‘roughness’
observed in social relations in French urban life since the mid-1980s.
The reason can mostly be attributed to changes in the criminal justice
system that has encouraged the police to classify an entire series of acts
as misdemeanours, requiring that the person be taken in and placed in
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custody. The main correlation between these cases and violent-offence
measures, then, is that the new micro-sociological infrastructure of in-
teractions (in terms of duration and intensity) between offenders and the
police has been the result of changes in the criminal legal provisions in
France. This in-depth reform is noteworthy and is bound to have an im-
pact on the rioters arrested during the autumn disorders of 2005.
Between 1960 and 1980, few cases were taken to court, and the police
only processed the cases they felt were the most serious. Today, quite the
opposite is occurring: The police now send all their cases to court. What
is even more noteworthy is that police officers tend to add the charge of
obstruction to their contempt cases to make sure that the offenders will
be prosecuted – as proof of their discretionary powers. Another explana-
tion assumes that the public prosecutor has taken the initiative and
asked the police to show preference for obstruction cases, since they are
deemed to be more ‘serious’ than mere contempt charges, despite the
fact that they receive equal sentencing.
What is interesting in this study concerns the profiles of the offen-
ders. A very large proportion of the youthful defendants are North Afri-
can and strikingly young (for the period in question, 50% are under 22
and 25% under 18). The types of offences prosecuted vary according to
the various groups. North Africans are prosecuted less often for con-
tempt alone and more often for assaulting a police officer or for con-
tempt plus obstruction than defendants in ‘other’ categories. 24% of the
North Africans judged as repeat offenders in real-time case processing
are given unsuspended sentences versus 7% of those in other categories
of offenders.
It should also be noted that unemployment is highest among youths
of North African origin. Given the role played by social discrimination,
the judicial system automatically sanctions those not offering guarantees
of social conformity. Although generalisations cannot be drawn from a
single district court, Jobard and Zimolag (forthcoming) conclude that
‘court decisions pitilessly echo and multiply the singularities of a popula-
tion which differs both in its origins and in its relations with the crim-
inal justice system in that it is more wont than any other group to be in
contact with the judicial system’.
The same anomaly of unsanctioned ethnic discrimination is found
among the administrative review boards and various other commissions
handling infringements by security or police officers. Whereas in other
countries (Canada, the US, the UK), citizens’ grievances relative to police
misbehaviour are recorded, in France citizens can only summon the Na-
tional Commission on Ethics via a member of parliament. In the first
year of operation of that Commission (2001), there were only 13 court
cases against the police, by the second year this number was 100. While
the commission makes no judgements or decisions, it does have investi-
gative and interviewing powers and does issue recommendations, thus
giving visibility to cases of misconduct. However, a strategy of the cur-
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rent government (in 2005) is to systematically deprive the commission
of the most elementary material resources to conduct its investigations.
Conclusion
In both the US and France, the lack of appropriate training and super-
vision of rookies is noticeable. Low-status policemen end up dealing
with low-status ‘clients’ with a large level of personal discretion – called
an ‘inversion hierarchy’ by Salas (2005). It may be assumed that one way
these rank-and-file policemen mark their distinction is to resort to a
‘confined violence’, which is made possible by its covert nature and by
the fact that it occurs in grey areas where there are often no witnesses.
This is especially true in France, where few citizens in problem neigh-
bourhoods are ready to come forward to the courts, due to the fact that
these ‘usual suspects’ find it impossible to file legal complaints as well as
to the absence of third parties (such as public prosecutors) and anti-dis-
criminatory organisations to monitor and control the abuse. In other
words, both the delinquent policemen and the delinquent youths are the
leftovers of indifferent mainstream societies, political representations,
and institutions that choose to ignore what is going on at their margins
(Ocqueteau 2002: 210). Rank-and-file policemen often have the feeling
that they are enforcing the ‘dirty work’ of control, surveillance, and ar-
rests in marginalized urban areas because other integrative institutions
(family, educational, social, occupational) have neglected their missions.
A proof of this neglect was revealed not only by the three weeks of dis-
turbances in November 2005 but by the astounding silence of the state,
months after they took place. The heart of the matter is that the state
does not know what to do: it only acts on the long-term, while the media
impose more and more short-term visions and it only knows how to act
technocratically and mechanically while local à la carte solutions would
be appropriate.
In the US, the fact that police abuse and its dysfunctions are now
monitored as discussed earlier does not mean that the brutal practices
are coming to an end. As long as they are not caught, some police offi-
cers may still be tempted to exert their monopoly of violence in harmful
ways, until bottom-up initiatives supported by organised minority leader-
ships, the media and/or political reformers call for justice that imposes
new regulations. Most of these regulations are only temporary, as the
aforementioned case in New York demonstrates. This does not apply to
the entire nation, however, as law and order remains the most important
local issue. The US appears to have a toolkit with various modes of ac-
countability and transparency emanating from its 17,000 police forces.
In France, the fact that police are being less brutal with citizens than
in the past can be somewhat measured by the decreasing numbers of
civilians killed by police officers (although police brutality in general
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continues to rise), thus supporting the observation that European socie-
ties are in general less prone to violence than American society. Self-de-
fence is not legitimate. But the impunity with which some policemen
interact with ethnic and racial minorities damages French democratic
ideals. Recently, during the disorders, a resident formulated his grie-
vance as such: local policemen know the bad apples, they know the drug
dealers and the thugs as we do. But the swat police (CRS) treat us all
without distinction, with the same utter lack of respect. A study con-
ducted by Wieviorka and his team, and subsequently corroborated by
numerous other researchers, concludes that for the French police, a per-
vasive racist discourse is a reality and constitutes an actual norm, which
is extremely difficult to escape, not to speak of opposing if you are a
rank-and-file officer (1992: 261). That functional racism is part of police
culture and has a reactive character is a remark that also applies to the
American situation. But the French system in particular lacks the initial
and on-going training of policemen, and the lack of accountability to
anyone other than headquarters (Zauberman & Levy 2003). The ac-
countability to the citizenry of France remains an unfamiliar concept
that is seldom discussed. This is one of the reasons why community
policing did not last long and why evaluations of public policies remain
so uncommon.
The entire elite culture that was inherited from the monarchy has en-
ough resources to resist demands for democratisation, and in the case of
the police, very strong police unions buttress the institution, which has
isolated it from third-party pressures.10 Now and then, the media evoke
police reforms that have taken place abroad, but mostly as something
exotic. A sort of cultural fatalism11 prevails, actively supported by self-
interested elite groups, echoing the ‘nothing works’ lament that charac-
terised the American justice system back in 1996.
Nevertheless, in a few police academies, such as the one in Marseilles,
reforms concerning more transparency have taken place. The syllabus
has been modified and it now includes training courses focussed on po-
lice interactions with residents. The location of the police academy in a
problem area facilitates a partnership with local community organisa-
tions eager to improve the quality of public services and to introduce
future policemen into residents’ perceptions about conflictual issues.
These innovations remain the exception, however. It is as if the Minister
of the Interior is afraid of losing control if policemen are allowed to ex-
press their fears and resentments too openly. Other experiments have
been initiated by local professionals involved in youth services who often
reach out to policemen and organise forums between obvious conten-
ders. They are noteworthy but remain isolated exceptions.
Most societies offer few incentives to convince experienced educators,
police officers, and judges to accept assignments in the troubled areas in
order to give these residents the same chances as the rest of society. It is
easier to ignore and suppress the violence at the margins. This political
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and social short-sightedness may explain why governments so fre-
quently bow to police authorities and their unions when these tend to
minimise or deny any wrongdoing. This phenomenon is even more pro-
nounced in a centralised country like France, which has a national police
force.
Notes
1. This article is based on a two-year seminary conducted with Catherine de
Wenden under the auspices of the Group for Study and Struggle Against
Discrimination in France (Geld) in 2000-2002 and on field work on police
issues in sensitive neighbourhoods carried out in both France and the Uni-
ted States between 1997 and 2004.
2. After France suffered from terrorist attacks, the Commission monitoring
the processing of personal data (CNIL) agreed that ‘objective, unalterable
distinguishing physical marks’ could be included in the police database.
This concession was done despite loud protests by civil rights advocates as
well as by right-wing conservatives. But later on, when police tried to use a
suspects’ skin colour after their participation in collective urban violence,
the Socialist Minister of Interior stated that it was against ‘the values of the
Republic’ to do so and the matter was not pursued (Le Monde, July 8 and 11,
1997; Zauberman & Levy 2002).
3. There is a complex division between them and an overlapping of authorities,
although in special cases, the FBI may legally take over a local police force’s
fields of intervention. For a description of the fragmentation of police forces
in a city like New York, cf. E. Conlon 2004: 12.
4. In 2000, investigations led by Attorney General White and New York State
Prosecutor Spitzer showed that ethnic profiling was pervasive. Half the Afri-
can-Americans (25% of the population) were stopped and searched, which
was more than Latinos (one-third had stopped and searched) and whites
(13%). In the State of New York, one and a half million dollars were spent to
address the situation, creating files on police activities that were being mon-
itored for ethnicity and race (like in the UK).
5. A study indicates that 43% of those under judicial supervision are the off-
spring of two foreign-born parents (Choquet 2000). Khosrokhavar estimates
that in the 18 to 24-year-old group, those with a North African father are
9.27 times more likely to be arrested than those whose father was born in
France (2004: 280). That the judicial system convicts immigrant children
more often (due to poverty, racism, multiple acts of delinquency) is not sur-
prising.
6. Most of the sanctions are summons. Fewer than 200 policemen were fired
in 1999 (Jobard 2006).
7. Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
passed in 1950: ‘No one may be subjected to torture or to inhuman or de-
grading punishment or treatment’. The CPT is an independent organisation
that is allowed to visit prisons, police stations, psychiatric institutions, etc. at
any time and without warning if there is suspicion of mistreatment.
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8. This section draws on a chapter to be published in Comparative Perspectives
on Legitimacy and the Criminal Justice System, Sampson et al. (eds.), New
York: Russell Sage (forthcoming).
9. The English translation of article 111-1 of the French Penal Code states that
criminal offences are categorised according to their seriousness as felonies,
misdemeanours or petty offences. Felonies are serious crimes and are
judged by popular juries, misdemeanours are offences judged by penal
courts, and petty offences calling for fines are judged by police courts.
10. On November 14 2005, a national police union called on its members in the
Parisian banlieues to engage in a work slow down in protest of sanctions
ordered by the Minister of Interior on few officers involved in the beating of
a few youth during the disorders.
11. To echo a Minister from the French Fourth Republic, “there is no serious
problem that a lack of action will not solve”.
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When Diversity Matters1
Marleen van der Haar
Lately I have had a lot of Turkish clients, a lot of Turkish women… and that is
strenuous in a completely different way than working with Dutch women.
There is a very big difference indeed… I think because of culture… there are
many stress complaints and also little self-reflection, at least with the wo-
men I have seen up till now.
(Interview with social worker, 7 October 2003)
Introduction
Human service organisations are confronted with a culturally plural cli-
entele. This study intends to unravel the everyday practices of social
workers in dealing with cultural diversity. Assuming diversity has an im-
pact on both the general repertoire and the everyday work of profes-
sionals, the question of this chapter is: How do professionals deal with
diversity? I will focus mainly on what social workers experience in the
providing of social services to a culturally diversified clientele: How do
social workers talk about cultural diversity and how do they relate these
issues to their professional attitude and competence in their own words?
Following Hall, Sarangi and Slembrouck (1997; 1999), I will describe
the professional activity of social workers as a discourse practice. Accord-
ingly, I assume that social work practices do relate to ‘general’ or ‘socie-
tal’ discourses (Foucault in Blommaert & Bulcaen 2000) provided by so-
ciety at large, by the profession or by the organisation at hand.
Furthermore, I assume that their everyday interactions on the work floor
are influenced by these general discourses, however much these local
interactions should also be seen as local discourses in the sense of local
‘processes of mutual sense-making’ on their own behalf.2 Accordingly, I
intend to demonstrate how in the interview accounts perceptions on ‘cul-
ture’ are, at least partly, framed by the focus on individualisation and
empowerment that appears to dominate the current social work dis-
course.
Dealing with Migrants in the Social Sector
In the Netherlands, roughly half a million people (about 3% of the Dutch
population) contact the social services office annually (VWS 2004). Of
those contacting a social worker, the percentage of clients with a country
of origin other than the Netherlands fluctuated from 16% in 2000 to
97
23% in 2002 (NIVEL 2004: 134). These data largely correspond with
those of the studied organisation.3
Nevertheless, the starting point of this chapter lays not so much in a
rapid or sudden increase in the number of migrant clients with appoint-
ments with Dutch social workers. This chapter is motivated by the fact
that dealing with immigrants4 in Dutch professional settings is generally
perceived as difficult and is often problematised by means of ‘culture’.
Referring primarily to the mental health care sector in the Netherlands,
Van Dijk and Van Dongen (2000) declare that nowadays ‘culture’ is fre-
quently perceived as the main reason and explanation for the labelling of
immigrant clients as a ‘problematic group’. In the case of social work, De
Vries (2000: 109) points to a similar tendency of reducing all problems
to single aspects, like cultural differences and traumas (in the case of
refugees).
Obviously, culture can be used as an instrument to mark boundaries
between the imagined yet experienced ‘us’ and ‘them’. An accent on dif-
ferences in an interaction with ‘cultural others’ can often be perceived, as
knowing one belongs to something that is not part of the ‘other’ creates a
feeling of order and safety. Bulcaen and Blommaert show that social
work practitioners in Belgian urban shelters for migrant women have
incorporated rather fixed black-and-white schemes ‘that identify “cul-
tures” and put them in opposition to each other’ into their professional
repertoire, pre-structuring the actual path of assistance (1999: 7). They
also find that professionals often use culture both as a descriptive cate-
gory (used to describe the client’s context) and as an explanatory category
(used as an all-determining factor and explanation of the client’s pro-
blem). A Finnish study (Anis 2005) of social work encounters with im-
migrant families also reveals problems in terms of culture. This study
provides a more nuanced insight into the complexities of everyday prac-
tice by identifying three ways of using ‘culture’ as a resource: culture is
used to explain the ‘normal’ as opposed to the ‘otherness’ presented by
migrant clients, as an indication and an explanation of the ‘difficulty’ one
encounters, and as a methodological tool in creating dialogue (Anis
2005).
Simultaneously, in society at large – at least in most European coun-
tries – the multicultural society is a contested issue in political and pub-
lic debate. Again, the concept of culture plays a significant role. To illus-
trate, in her book Generous Betrayal Wikan (2002) discusses the
sometimes unbearable consequences of a culturalist perspective and
shows how in everyday life excessive respect for ‘their culture’ blinded
the Norwegian government (here she also refers to social workers and
other professionals in human services) even to the point of ‘betraying’
help-seeking Norwegian citizens with immigrant backgrounds, because
of a widespread conviction that the problems of immigrants are best
solved ‘within their own group’. She emphasises the issue of individual
and collective identity: ‘Whereas Norwegians generally regard other Nor-
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wegians as individuals with a different character and ability and will to
think for themselves, immigrants are largely perceived as products of
culture’ (Wikan 2002: 81). Wikan points out a double standard, which
means that ‘culture’ is applied to immigrants and not to ‘ourselves’ (in
this case Norwegians). She argues that culture has become a holy cow
that breeds impotence, intolerance and irresponsibility (Wikan 2002:
83). Benhabib (2002) in her book The Claims of Culture also speaks of
the use and abuse of culture.
Besides Wikan and Benhabib’s criticisms, Struijs and Brinkman, in
their book Clashing Values (original title Botsende Waarden) that offers
guidelines for the Dutch social sector on ethical issues in multi-ethnic
client situations, point out the fact that culture should first and foremost
be treated as a necessary ‘context of choice’ for the individual, instead of
it being understood as a fixed identity that evidently belongs to and fits
all of its ‘members’. That is to say, this perspective takes culture as het-
erogeneous and emphasises that it provides individuals with a range of
options out of which they can construct their own lives (Ibid).
Additionally Baumann’s (1999) idea of a dual discursiveness of the
positions of essentialism and constructivism is a central stance. Hereby
one acknowledges that, in everyday life, people also make use of essenti-
alism and reification while making sense of the world around them.
That is, meanings are continuously constructed and reconstructed, and
therefore can also be produced as static and fixed within a situated pro-
cess of sense-making – or better yet, as Gastelaars and Vermeulen argue,
‘their reification is a fact insofar as it is continuously produced locally’
(2000: 10).
Research Material
This chapter presents the results of an ethnographic study in the social
work department of a social services organisation in a medium-sized
Dutch city. The social work department provides first-line psychosocial
help and employs about thirty social workers, including two trainees.
The fieldwork consisted of a three-month period of full-time research on
location in 2003. Some additional research was conducted in 2004.
The main research material consists of interviews with social workers
and observations of interactions between the professionals and their cli-
ents, both native and migrant, and observations of meetings between
social workers (like team and inter-vision meetings), and between social
workers and other professionals. The material additionally includes
documents, client files and interviews with management and other sig-
nificant organisational members.
The interview material on which this chapter is based consists of
semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 16 social workers.5 Eleven in-
terviewees were female, five male (this corresponds roughly with the
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composition of the social work team). The age of the social workers var-
ied between 23 and 55 (with an average age of 37). The interviewees also
varied in work experience in the organisation (from about a year to over
24). Three interviewees could be categorised as having non-Western im-
migrant backgrounds (including one trainee), with the rest of the social
workers having an ethnically Dutch background.
A Diverse Clientele: From a Categorical to an Integral Approach
More than 20 years ago, the Dutch government introduced a policy to
incorporate specialised organisations for immigrants into general social
services agencies (Goewie 1986; Hueting & Neij 1991: 193). The policy
aimed particularly at a categorical approach within general human ser-
vice organisations. This means that social services organisations were
expected to appoint a specific employee in order to develop programs
for their migrant clients (Goewie 1986: 13). Accordingly, the organisation
studied employed professionals who specialised in social work for speci-
fic immigrant groups like Turks, Antilleans and Surinamese.
Currently, the organisation’s policy towards clients is based on an in-
tegral approach, which in Dutch social-work jargon implies that all cli-
ents are approached in a similar manner and that professional categori-
cal treatment was no longer permitted; every single professional is
expected to be able to help every single client according to his or her
individual needs. This new policy put an end to the organisation’s offer
of categorical assistance to the aforementioned migrant groups as well as
to the numerous mobile-home dwellers who also live in that region.
Nevertheless, some categorical assistance continues to exist. The orga-
nisation still benefits from the specialisations of some of its social work-
ers (for example working with Turkish or Antillean clients, or working
with client categories like families or specific groups). The main change
is that separate departments or individual social workers are no longer
available for a single category of clients. Still, based on the organisation’s
perspective of individualised help, which implies a client-focused ap-
proach (zorg op maat), the agency continues to offer group sessions for
immigrant women. Moreover, the organisation recently entered into a
contract-based agreement with the Central Reception Organisation for
Asylum Seekers (COA) to offer psychosocial help to asylum seekers.
Along with these social services, the agency also offers group sessions
for refugee women in co-operation with the Organisation for the Medi-
cal Care of Asylum Seekers (MOA).
Cultural diversity in this specific social services organisation is no
longer an explicit issue either in the organisation’s policy reports or in
its daily practice. However, some specific actions in this area have been
taken. An internal study on working with immigrant clients was con-
ducted, a migrant social worker wrote a proposal for an integral ap-
proach involving migrant women and the team participated in the train-
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ing sessions on trans-cultural counselling, and the social workers work-
ing with asylum seekers and refugees were offered special education.
Anchors in Social Work Discourse
The beginnings of social services in Dutch society go back more than a
hundred years. Although care for the poor already existed in the 18th
century, the foundation for the first school for social work in Amsterdam
in 1899 is generally considered as the symbolic milestone of the profes-
sion in the Netherlands (Waaldijk et al. 1999). Following certain defini-
tions of professionalism (Wilensky 1964; Freidson 1986), some even as-
sert that professional social services in the Netherlands did not actually
start until after the Second World War, when social work icon Marie
Kamphuis introduced the American methodological innovations of so-
cial casework. Social casework is a method and a process in which the
contact and relationship between client and professional are central is-
sues, with the aim of mobilising clients to ‘better adapt’ to their social
contexts (Waaldijk 1999: 121).
Social work traditionally focuses on the management of everyday life
(Gastelaars 1985), which in earlier times quite normatively concentrated
on ‘adapting the unadjusted’ to the standards of ‘good citizens’. Nowa-
days, the ‘programmed change’ (Van der Haar & Gastelaars 2004) pro-
posed by social work predominantly consists of emancipation and indi-
vidualisation. As social services agencies are subject to public finance
and are therefore part of the wide range of street-level bureaucracies that
are related to the Dutch social state (Lipsky 1980; on social workers as
street level bureaucrats) government social policy also frames their prac-
tices. The current government administration defines three aims: in-
creasing the self-realisation of people, stimulating their self-reliance,
and stimulating their participation in society (Welzijnswet 1994, Art. 1.
b1). A Dutch Social Employers’ Group (Maatschappelijke Ondernemers
Groep) dedicated to serving social welfare interests has incorporated
these aims into its vision document, and expresses the public mission
of social work as ‘contributing to the self-reliance of people’ (Maatschap-
pelijke Ondernemers Groep 2002).6
The analysis of the interviews identified five anchors, referring to the
practical frames of reference of social workers. The first four anchors
accentuate the relational aspect of everyday social work practice. The
fifth refers to the current dominant aim of social work.
The first anchor is known as the client-centred approach, in which
social workers focus on the actual relationships with their clients. The
ever-recurrent phrase ‘linking up with where the client stands’ in the
social work department seems to capture this primary approach to social
work practice. This is manifested in how social workers take ‘the ques-
tion as formulated by the client’ as the starting point for their path of
assistance.
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The second anchor is the placing of the individual in his or her social
context. Again, the organisation in this research places a lot of value on
its professionals connecting with where the client stands. This anchor
clearly articulates an individualising approach towards clients. One of
the interviewees explained that in the contact with the client she tried to
walk on his ‘map’ in order to ‘find out how this client looks at the world’.
This provided the actual starting point for her counselling efforts. In
social-work jargon or formal language, terms like ‘involving the client
and his system’, referring for example to the family, work environment
or neighbourhood, are also be used to refer to this issue.
The third anchor is the mutual negotiation process between profes-
sional and client, characterised by a more or less symmetrical relation.
The Dutch sociologist De Swaan (1982) defines this as a negotiation re-
gime (onderhandelings-huishouding). In the quote below, a social work-
er relates explicitly to this regime, as he clearly differentiates his position
from that of the traditionally highly-valued medical sector, where the im-
age of ‘people in white coats’ still holds, accentuating a large distance
between the professional doctor and his lay patients. He also relates this
mutual negotiation process to the first two anchors, claiming to support
his client.
What we want to avoid is that we are the experts and that the client is the
dependent person who asks for help… in earlier times, of course, it was the
social workers, from the medical point of view they were the doctors, the
men in the white coats… and as far as the one who asked for help was con-
cerned, you were ignorant and uninformed… What we want to try is to stand
next to people and look at their situations together with them, and be as non-
hierarchical as possible. (Interview with social worker, 23 October 2003)
Pointing out that social workers – interestingly referred to as ‘we’ by this
social worker – do not want their clients to be dependent on the profes-
sional serves as a direct link to the third anchor of trying to create a more
or less symmetrical power relationship between the two parties. As a
result of this attitude towards clients, communication between profes-
sionals and clients in the Dutch social sector tends to be non-authoritar-
ian.
The accent of the fourth anchor lies on change in the client’s situation.
To be precise, social work assumes that the client will take his or her own
steps during the path of assistance. This anchor also assumes a client
who is motivated and actively trying to solve the defined problem. In the
following quote, a social worker explains this focus on change as she
talks about the client’s personal development through counselling:
You can work together with them towards a moment of development… Well,
and that is what you could call social work, to develop yourself personally,
even though you have doubts, personal development means making sure
102 when diversity matters
you never have those doubts again… so, that is what inspires me the most in
this profession. (Interview with social worker, 2 October 2003)
The fifth anchor is often labelled empowerment. The major issues here
are autonomy and personal responsibility. These issues are clearly in
concordance with government social policy, as described earlier. As seen
in the fourth anchor, social work interventions often focus on some sort
of change in the client’s situation. The fifth anchor suggests that social
workers prefer their interventions to follow a certain route of develop-
ment, namely that of empowerment. The focus of social work is to sti-
mulate the emancipation of the client. The following interview fragment
illustrates the empowerment anchor:
The emancipatory vision from which social work starts is making people
aware of the problem, of their situation… getting people to be aware of the
fact that they have their own choices, and to support them in creating a
different situation, both within the person and within the situation. (Inter-
view with social worker, 5 November 2003)
Besides the anchors, social workers also present a significantly uniform
picture of what a client ought to be doing, or at least what he should be
learning during the consultations and how to act in the future. Social
workers compare their clients with their own representations of an ideal
client. Where once the social services sector was criticised for its patern-
alism and patronising approach, empowerment is now central in its atti-
tudes toward clients. According to the interviewees, the people they deal
with should have or at least develop self-reflection, self-reliance, self-sup-
port, personal responsibility, awareness of one’s own capabilities, aware-
ness of the fact that people can make their own choices in life, and a
network of people around them.
These definitions belong to the script of a modern responsible and
autonomous individual, which is very much the current cultural frame-
work in the Netherlands. This script dominates the agenda setting of
social workers. It is within these ‘codes of the ideal client’ that social
workers frame their contacts with individual clients. Social workers ap-
proach their immigrant clients in conformity with this characteristic re-
pertoire.
Constructing ‘Culture’ as Difficult
In various ways, the everyday practice of social workers is full of dealings
with diversity. The primary approach of social work, to ‘place every indi-
vidual in his social context’, already points out the importance of differ-
entiating between clients. Moreover, categorising and labelling clients is
a routine part of the professional repertoire – although most social work-
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ers are well aware that this labelling is risky, if only because it easily leads
to stigmatisation.
Despite this individualising approach, social workers quite often end
up reducing ‘people of another culture’ – in most cases the interviewees
referred to are immigrants or refugees/asylum-seekers – to a relatively
homogeneous group. The general tendency of the interview responses
was for social workers to experience difficulties when dealing with cul-
tural diversity in their practice. To paraphrase from the interview materi-
al, words like difficult, tough, complex and hard (plus more positive con-
notations such as fascinating, nice but ambivalent and special) were
used when referring to the actual social work practice. Despite these eva-
luations, none of the social workers would ever exclude immigrants
from their caseloads.
‘Specific conditions’ of their migrant clients result in a dynamic of
practising social work in which a considerable number of interviewees
identify some sort of problem. Social workers typified their problems
related to working with migrants in terms of their professional identifi-
cations, using their professional jargon or formal language. To quote
again from the interviews, social workers used terms like ‘somatisation
of problems’, ‘having difficulties talking about emotional problems’,
‘being passive’, ‘having little self-reflection’, ‘having a victim mentality’,
‘being theatrical’, ‘being isolated’, ‘being limited or non-emancipated’,
and ‘having other norms and values’ (for example with regard to gender
relations). Some interviewees mentioned that immigrants have ‘other
expectations’ of social services. The following quote from an interview
with a social worker who preferred not to work with immigrants illus-
trates these accounts:
What I found difficult about it [dealing with migrant clients] was… the vic-
tim… mentality, making things so theatrical… I found it difficult to work
with foreigners because they keep sticking in ‘Oh, oh I am so pitiful’ instead
of what can you do about it yourself… that might seem somewhat black-and-
white. (Interview with social worker, 10 November 2003)
From the interviews it appears that culture was frequently used as an
explanatory category (Bulcaen & Blommaert 1999). A more relativist
stance on culture was also heard in the accounts, and here I paraphrase
from the interviews: ‘Culture is only a packaging, or something like
that… human beings do not differ fundamentally, I think… it is often
about the same things’ (8 October 2003); ‘I think it is nonsense to say
that… culture justifies everything’ (22 October 2003); ‘An exaggerated
amount of respect for culture… you constrain people by only walking on
this map’ (17 October 2003). Still, on this issue, social workers generally
mentioned that it was culture that made dealing with immigrants so dif-
ficult.
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Cultural differences were experienced as obstacles to their preferential
social work practice. Interviewees noted that ‘it is difficult to take steps’,
that they have to ‘repeat things a lot’, that you have to ‘create a lot of
conditions’, and that they have to ‘involve the context’ (family, religion).
The same social worker from the introductory quote explains more spe-
cifically why she experiences difficulties in her dealings with migrant
women, in this case with a Turkish background. In her account, the so-
cial worker claims culture as the reason for being unable to perform as
professionally as she would like:
It is… uh… the limitations that they [she refers to women with a Turkish
background] have in their culture… For example when you observe home-
sickness in a woman, she is very limited in all her activities because she is
under her husband’s thumb, which again is a cultural arrangement. Then it
is very difficult for me to work on standing up for yourself or making
choices of your own while that is what they want to learn, but it just is not
possible because they do not get the space because of cultural aspects. (Inter-
view with social worker, 7 October 2003)
When we look at the language that the social workers used in the inter-
views, in a considerable number of cases, expressions like ‘that other
culture’, ‘cultural arrangement’, ‘cultural boundaries’, ‘culture aspect’,
‘from their point of view’, ‘because of their culture’, ‘embedded in the
culture’ and ‘it is so interwoven in that culture’ are used to emphasise
the accounts. A set of generalisations is used to define the migrant clien-
tele, which appears to produce, at least in this part of the conversation, a
picture of the migrant client as first and foremost determined and deter-
minable by culture. At this point, it must also be said that some of the
clients also use culture to explain their situations. Nonetheless, the inter-
viewed social workers tend to classify migrants as a homogeneous group
in which all of the ethnic groups take part in and appear to show the
same patterns of behaviour. Thus, it is this culture thing that represents
absolute ‘otherness’ (see also Anis 2005).
Even more specific are the accounts in which social workers use terms
like ‘impediment’, ‘barrier’, ‘obstacle’, and ‘limitation’ to refer to clients’
cultural identifications. These accounts emphasise that some social
workers use ‘the culture of the client’ as a fundamental explanation, for
instance, of why the counselling does not proceed the way the social
worker desires, or to reduce the problem of the client to a cultural di-
mension. The remarkable aspect of this is that, in these accounts, cul-
ture tends to override other client identity markers, such as being a wo-
man, a mother, a neighbour or an employee.
Besides categorising all of the various migrants into one client group7
and labelling them as ‘difficult’ or as using ‘their culture’, the interview
accounts also provide various professional classifications that are specifi-
cally attached to this client group. One example is the construction of the
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‘classic case of the migrant’. Transforming an individual story into a pro-
fessional case (Bulcaen & Blommaert 1999: 141) serves the professional
repertoire, and is rationalised in this way. But these cases also present
the pitfalls of essentialism, insofar as this activity confuses the distinc-
tion between general classifications and individual characteristics. For
instance, many immigrant clients are characterised as discussing their
problems in a psychosomatic way, not being reflective (enough) on their
own lives and not taking responsibility.
In the next quote, the social worker explains how she deals with per-
ceived limitations in terms of culture in actual counselling talks. Having
identified a divergent frame of reference between herself and the client
(a woman with a Turkish background), this social worker points out that
she encourages the client to formulate ‘a solution herself within her own
cultural boundaries’. The quote shows that the social worker not only
refers to the individual, but to a cultural framework (‘what we are used
to in the Netherlands’ versus ‘your culture’) in order to explain the situa-
tion (see also Wikan 2002). She also encourages the client to reflect on
her points of reference, which again is consistent with the ‘ideal client’
perspective of stimulating, or at least focusing on, client self-reflection.
Then I say, for example, ‘Well we in the Netherlands are used to dealing with
that like this, but how does it work in your culture, how would you yourself
deal with this, so, again, call on their own… self-reflection. (Interview with
social worker, 7 October 2003)
Although this attempt could be framed as a methodological tool to create
a dialogue (after Anis 2005), in doing this, the differences in terms of
cultural identification are once more confirmed. Then again, this inter-
vention of the professional could also be interpreted as an act of proxi-
mity (gaining trust through empathy).
A second example of dealing with diversity in practice demonstrates
the emphasis on bringing about a change in the client’s situation: A so-
cial worker – who has experienced group work with migrant women
mentions that this kind of social work is successful in the sense that the
women experienced the group as pleasant and they all felt safe, and
tended to return over and over again. She remarks however that this
‘does not contribute to what you want to achieve’. She is referring to the
social work anchor of change, when she talks about ‘getting people to
move’ and ‘to really take steps’.
It is a pity that in the end, you get so little movement there… that it is like
this again and again. I have done several groups and you see the same peo-
ple coming over and over again. So you can say, well, we have really offered
them something good, it is nice, it is safe, it works, but it does not contribute
to what you really want to achieve. (Interview with social worker, 17 October
2003)
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This focus on change and movement is an expression of how social work
aims to make individuals more autonomous, active and responsible. A
bit further into the interview she mentions a gymnastics club as a possi-
ble replacement for group work, if the women continue to return to so-
cial services ‘without really achieving anything’. As soon as this social
worker is under the impression that her professional ambition to change
something in the situation of the migrant women does not work, her
task is over and she prefers to hand the client over to one of her collea-
gues in the social sector. More explicitly, this social worker is not satis-
fied with just any change in the client’s situation; she wants her female
immigrant client to move within the context of empowerment and
emancipation.
In both examples, the social workers relate professional attitude and
competencies to perceptions of their culturally plural clientele. The inter-
viewees do take ‘culture’ into account, and search for ways to incorporate
it into their repertoires. However, by focusing on the existing social work
discourse that prefers clients as modern responsible and autonomous
individuals after all, they seem to constrain the space for diversity. Be-
sides, at least in these cases, the interviewees do not take into account
that social work discourse is its own cultural framework.
Conclusion
In European countries, social workers are often blamed for being cultur-
alists. An excessive respect for different cultures, as Wikan (2002) has
argued, betrays assistance-seeking citizens. This chapter shows that,
although social workers often see migrants as ‘others’, they nevertheless
encourage them to pursue the uniform goal that focuses on individual
empowerment and emancipation. The moral anchors used by social
workers in this study show that cultural relativism is not a dominant
discourse in social work practice.
The social workers presented a significant, uniform picture of what
the client ought to be doing, or at least should be learning, in the course
of the counselling process. Clients are measured in terms of their em-
powerment and emancipation – which are defined as characteristics of
individualism and liberalism. All clients are expected to feel at ease with-
in non-hierarchical mutual negotiations, and expected to fit into the ob-
jective of being willing to ‘take steps’ during the path of assistance. Many
migrants are perceived to have a passive attitude. This evidently conflicts
with the social worker’s own perception of the anchor of change. The
accent on empowerment as the preferred route of change can also be
interpreted as constraining the space necessary for diversity. Rarely do
social workers recognise that empowerment is also a hegemonic cultural
framework, which could be just as much a determinant as the ‘culture’
they perceive as being an obstacle in the counselling process.
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Notes
1. I thank Marja Gastelaars for commenting on earlier versions.
2. See Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000) on the different dimensions of the con-
cept of discourse.
3. Although it has to be noted that the organisation’s statistics on this item are
not fully reliable due to impure registration.
4. The Dutch Organisation for Statistical Research (CBS) defines immigrants
(allochtonen, compared with autochtonen, or native Dutch) as ‘those people
with at least one parent born in a foreign country’ (CBS 2004). The classifi-
cation of origin also distinguishes between first and second generations,
and between Western and non-Western migrants (see CBS 2004 for more
specifics). Note that the four main migrant groups (Turkey, Morocco, Suri-
nam, and the Dutch Antilles/Aruba) are classified as non-Western migrants.
5. All interviews, which lasted between 60 and 120 minutes, were taped and
transcribed. The questions related to the following themes: personal motiva-
tion and frames of reference, professionalism, being a social worker in an
organisation, interaction with clients, and the experience of working with a
culturally plural clientele. I interviewed the social workers during working
hours and within the physical setting of the social services agency.
6. The manager of the investigated organisation uses the vision document of
this Dutch Employers Group as a guide for the social work policy of the
organisation.
7. Although the social workers are not always that specific about what people
they are referring to when they talk about migrants, the interviewees are
mostly referring to ‘migrant women with stress’. Even more explicitly, they
are talking relatively often about women with a Turkish background. The
latter is explainable by the fact that migrants of Turkish origin form a con-
siderable group of inhabitants in the city where the research was conducted.
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From Residents to Neighbours
The Making of Active Citizens in Antwerp, Belgium
Maarten Loopmans
The fostering of an active civil society is a basic part of the politics of the
third way. (Giddens 1998: 78)
In the 1990s, active citizenship and community involvement spread as
core concepts in social policies across post-welfarist North-western
Europe. Active citizenship has been promoted as an indispensable tool
for the regulation of society, in policing and safety policies, provision of
social services, welfare and health policies, and local economic develop-
ment (Body-Gendrot 2003; Mayer 2003; Uitermark 2003; Cruikshank
1999; O’Malley & Palmer 1996; Rose 1996), but it has been particularly
prominent in politics for the regeneration of – often urban – public
space (Giddens 1998; Imrie 2004). These days, involvement, consulta-
tion, and participation are pervasive notions that emerge as a new spe-
cialisation of government, having moved from the sphere of theory and
social critique into professional programs and knowledge. As a conse-
quence, new relations between citizens, professionals and policy
emerge. Active citizenship turns client-citizens into co-producers and
co-deliverers of services, while the tasks of professionals increasingly
shift from service delivery to the co-ordination and mediation of citizen
involvement in policy programs. Community involvement has been de-
scribed alternatively as a new successful technique or strategy to en-
hance the scope and effectiveness of government, or as a means to de-
mocratise policymaking and service provision. However, little attention
has been paid so far to the new dilemmas, complexities, contradictions,
and resistance in the relation between government and the governed
that emerge when active citizens are ‘made’; indeed, the readiness of
citizens to become activated is all too often taken for granted (Flint
2002; Larner & Walters 2000).
In this chapter, the analysis of a concrete program to involve residents
in the management of public space reveals the practices deployed by
professionals to activate city residents and to mediate between individual
needs and demands of citizens, setting collective goals. More specifically,
I focus on the way these practices affect how ‘activated citizens’ think
about themselves and their relation to their neighbourhood, city and fel-
low citizens, leading to potentially disturbing contradictions that provoke
mixed feelings and resistance.
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The subject of analysis is Opsinjoren, a policy program in Antwerp,
Belgium. Opsinjoren is a branch of the Opzoomeren family, a commu-
nity involvement program developed in Rotterdam in the early 1990s
and subsequently exported as a ‘best practice’ to other Dutch cities and
abroad (for instance, Copenhagen in Denmark and Genk and Antwerp
in Belgium). Like its Rotterdam forerunner, Opsinjoren draws on the
involvement of active neighbourhood residents in public space manage-
ment to address new collective problems (aggregated under the common
denominator ‘liveability’) that cannot be regulated efficiently ‘from the
centre’.
The chapter draws on empirical material collected through occasional
conversations and participant observations (both as participant resident
and while participating in on-the-spot visits to resident groups – called
‘jury rounds’ hereafter – together with Opsinjoren professionals), in-
depth, semi-structured interviewing (of politicians, professionals and ac-
tive residents, individually as well as in group) and analysis of written
sources (newspaper articles, promotional leaflets, and internal docu-
ments of the Opsinjoren team).
The first section introduces the characteristics of the Opsinjoren pro-
gram. First I outline the way Opsinjoren presents itself: The program’s
goal as set by the local government, the rationale for seeking out com-
munity involvement, and the practices deployed to get citizens involved.
I then discuss how ‘active citizens’ think and feel about their involve-
ment and relation with the local government, their neighbourhood and
their neighbours. Finally, the conclusion can be read as a warning as the
techniques deployed to activate citizens not only stimulate participation
but also contestation. A double tension arises from the deployment of
citizens for the government of public space: First, between the visions
and expectations of active citizens themselves and the goal of the pro-
gram; second, between the expectations of active and ‘passive’ residents.
Managing and attenuating this double tension is and will remain a prin-
cipal challenge for the professionals running the program.
Opsinjoren at Work
Opsinjoren started in Antwerp in 1997. Its name is a contraction of Op-
zoomeren, with the age-old nickname for Antwerp citizens, señores or
sinjoren. It was funded by the then urban policy fund of the Flemish
government, Social Impulse Fund (SIF), which had as one of its main
purposes enhancing the quality of life in cities, particularly in the most
deprived urban neighbourhoods. This is exactly the target of Opsinjoren,
whose official purpose, as formulated on its website, is
encouraging communities to take initiatives to increase the quality of life
and the ‘liveability’ of streets and neighbourhoods. The project aims at creat-
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ing and reinforcing social networks, involving them in neighbourhood man-
agement, using the creativity and activity available, and stimulating engage-
ment of local residents, organisations and schools by rewarding them for
extraordinary initiatives or activities. (http://Opsinjoren.antwerpen.be)
The Opsinjoren program offers two types of ‘reward’ or support for
once-only activities, and two types of support for more permanent activ-
ities. The Premie op Actie (Bonus for Action) rewards and provides fi-
nancial and logistic support for residents’ own initiatives, while the Ste-
delijke Actiedagen (Urban Action Days) are specific actions organised
more top-down and city-wide, in order to give greater publicity to the
program and attract new active residents. Initiatives could focus on the
development and maintenance of street-based social networks (e.g.,
street barbecues, Christmas drinks) or on enhancing the quality of the
living environment (sweeping one’s street, putting flowers on the win-
dow sill, etc.). After an internal evaluation in 2001, it was decided to put
more emphasis on the latter goal. Opsinjoren was sometimes laughed
off as a ‘free party fund’, so the organisation felt the need to produce
more ‘visible’ results, i.e., cleaner, greener and safer streets. Hence the
number of ‘free parties’ per street committee sponsored by Opsinjoren
is now limited to three, and in public communication an emphasis is put
on the co-production of quality neighbourhood space.
It was also decided that the program should insist on a more enduring
engagement of citizens; attempts were made to turn once-a-year activ-
ities into buurtcontracten (neighbourhood contracts/BCs) and to look
for straatvrijwilligers (street volunteers/SVs). BCs are contracts between
the city and at least five neighbours, whereby these citizens promise to
take care of the cleanliness-greenness and/or safety of a square, play-
ground or street on a permanent basis and in close collaboration with
the city departments concerned. A SV does the same, but on his own.
From its very start, the Antwerp population warmly welcomed Opsin-
joren. In 1997, 3000 households participated in the first Lentepoets
(Spring cleaning, the main Urban Action Day), a number that continued
to rise to 9500 in 2005 (over 4% of the city’s total number of house-
holds). The number of SVs rose from a mere 24 in 1999 to 553 in 2005
(De Antwerpenaar 2005). Among decision makers, Opsinjoren is
equally popular. In 2003, when the Flemish government abolished the
Social Impulse Fund and replaced it with the City Fund (Loopmans
2005), many social programs in Antwerp faced budget cuts or were dis-
continued, but the budget of Opsinjoren continued to rise unabated
(compare Stad Antwerpen and OCMW Antwerpen 1997; 2000 with
Stad Antwerpen 2003). Opsinjoren now has an annual budget of nearly
EUR 1,100,000. Its goal is to support at least 750 different neighbour-
hood initiatives – a goal that was already surpassed in 2001 (Stad Ant-
werpen 2002).
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The Opsinjoren Rationale: Together for a Liveable City
The popularity of Opsinjoren, both with citizens and politicians, can be
explained by the fact that it seems to grapple successfully with problems
of liveability, a concept introduced by the Social Impulse Fund in 1996.
This Fund was an explicit reaction against the electoral rise of the ex-
treme-right party, the Vlaams Blok (see Loopmans et al. 2003; De Decker
et al. 2005). The electoral success of this party was linked by social scien-
tists and political analysts to a range of ‘minor’ issues that provoked dis-
content among residents of deprived neighbourhoods, such as street lit-
ter, feelings of anomy, intercultural conflicts, vandalism and petty crime.
Liveability was introduced as a container concept that made it possible
to talk about the same problems while naming them differently, and it
has now become a central concept for urban governance in Antwerp.
The ephemeral character of many of these ‘minor incivilities’ makes
them difficult to tackle. Street litter, loitering, noise pollution, drug traf-
ficking, streetwalking… most of these phenomena are not targeted effec-
tively by traditional police actions. To throw a bag full of litter on the
street only needs a second of invisibility. The Antwerp city council has
deployed a huge number of workers to tackle the problem of littering
(police, neighbourhood surveillants, square surveillants, specialised
sweeping squads called White Tornadoes; the most recent attempt fea-
tured regular officials sworn in as ‘litter controllers’), with fairly little
result. As Allen (2003) has noted, the power to control directly from the
centre simply does not reach widely enough in time and space.
Opsinjoren intends to solve this problem of reach by involving local
residents. Instead of controlling from the centre, control is split up
among hundreds of ‘street volunteers’ and local social networks. These
informal ‘inspectors’ remain at their post even when the formal ones go
home; Opsinjoren functions 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
In addition, active local residents are very motivated and efficient.
While professionals might first consider their own safety or are hindered
by rules of politeness and competence, street volunteers do not keep
their mouth shut for offenders, even though this could lead to aggressive
reactions, and they sometimes find creative solutions that officials are
not allowed to suggest.
B and C run a compost park together with some other neighbours. The park
is open to the local residents several days a week, the volunteers keep an eye
on them putting their kitchen refuse in the right bin. But whenever the park
is closed and nobody is there, children climb over the fence and make a
mess. Both men proudly presented a creative solution to the problem: they
planted spiky bushes around the fence and fertilised them with the com-
post. In no time, they had grown tall and now very efficiently deter children
from climbing the fence. While we were talking to them and congratulating
them for their invention, two neighbourhood surveillants turned up. ‘You
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are not allowed to grow spiky plants in public space, the police code states’,
they say. ‘You should remove them’. ‘But who will keep the kids from climb-
ing the fence?’ ‘When we are here, we tell them not to do it. But we cannot
do more than that. When we are gone, they do what they like’. (Observation
on jury round, 3 September 2004)
Apart from directly controlling fellow residents, participants also en-
hance the functioning of city institutions. They make visible otherwise
‘invisible’ neighbourhoods and streets to ‘distant’ public services. As day-
to-day observers, they see and hear more than the remote bureaucrat or
politician who has to make policy.
A great advantage of our contacts with the residents’ groups is the signals we
receive. Through these groups we perceive what the needs of the population
are. This is very important. We constantly reorganise our sweeping plans.
With these signals, we can reorient our sweeping plan more efficiently. ‘Sig-
nals from the citizen’ can also be used to support decisions: when there is a
conflict between two departments, they can be a good argument. (Head of
the Antwerp Sanitation Department, interview 24)
Through Opsinjoren-supported networks of residents, city authorities
are more swiftly informed about new problem areas and about what and
who provokes these problems. Politicians, various sections of the sanita-
tion department and the local police eagerly make use of these ‘eyes and
ears’ on the street.
In addition, Opsinjoren helps the local bureaucratic top control the
work of fieldworkers. Opsinjoren has enabled residents to find a very
approachable channel for all kinds of complaints about garbage collec-
tors, neighbourhood surveillants or local police officers who are not
doing their job properly, and some of the more established resident net-
works and street volunteers have even developed direct contacts with lo-
cal top-level officials and politicians themselves.
I not only attend their meetings, many of them have my e-mail, and in the
most problematic areas I’m in touch with residents on a day-to-day basis. I
get mails from residents all the time, informing me about the local situa-
tion. (Head of the Antwerp Sanitation Department, interview 24)
Luring Residents into Action
Opsinjoren is good, because it’s cash on the nail. We do something and they
give us something. That’s why Opsinjoren is a good service to work with.
(Resident, interview 33)
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Guaranteeing successful ‘community governance’ of public space does
rely on the willingness of the population to collaborate. Hence, the main
task for Opsinjoren professionals consists of motivating people and
bringing them into line in order to make them deployable for increasing
the liveability of the neighbourhood. Except for the material and logistic
support for their activities, the core element is that when you become an
Opsinjoor you attain a special position; you enter into a special relation
with your city. Opsinjoren creates a distinction between active and pas-
sive residents. Two principles of distinction are applied: First, active resi-
dents are allowed to partially appropriate certain parts of public space;
second, they are given exclusive access to networks of urban govern-
ment, something that is very difficult for other residents and users of
the neighbourhood to obtain.
The idea of making residents appropriate parts of public space so as to
take more responsibility for it and exert social control over it was formu-
lated by Oscar Newman (1972). This is also a leading principle in Opsin-
joren. By allowing residents to plant and take care of a nearby flowerbed,
Opsinjoren counts on the fact that they will also supervise it. The Opsin-
joren coordinator formulates it as such:
If the City does it, residents don’t feel like it is theirs. It is only because the
ground is drenched by their own sweat that people will say: ‘that’s mine, I
have put a lot of effort into that, I have been thinking about it, we have
organised ourselves around it. It’s a part of my environment, I have put a lot
of energy into it, and you are going to respect it, I will make sure you do’.
(Opsinjoren coordinator, interview 1)
Opsinjoren brings volunteers in touch with the network of government
institutions that are engaged in the neighbourhood, even when it consid-
ers problems that are not directly linked to the activities of Opsinjoren.
Since the problem of liveability touches upon various policy domains,
Opsinjoren comes in touch with a wide range of city services (the depart-
ment of open space planning, street cleaning, community building and
the police collaborate on a regular basis); when necessary, Opsinjoren
brings them in touch with dissatisfied residents. Opsinjoren profes-
sionals function as middlemen for ‘their’ residents, guaranteeing a swift
and efficient solution of a variety of problems.
We cross M on the street, he volunteers at the garbage park. He immediately
starts off complaining about litter. ‘We need to hold another meeting, with
the litter department, with Opsinjoren and with the police. The problems
are huge. Last week, there was this Eastern European with a broken sports
bag full of garbage. He threw it on the street. I told him, “don’t, it’s going to
cost you 135 euros, I’ll call the cops”. After some quarrelling, I went to the
police, but you know what? They didn’t have time for me! And the Aldi shop
on Ooievaar street, you should also have a talk with them too. They only
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have one dustbin, and they do not always put it outside. It’s a regular dump
out there’. (Observation on jury round, 29 September 2004)
As mentioned previously, Opsinjoren groups also profit from their sta-
tus as ‘organised residents’ to establish direct contacts with local offi-
cials, as well as with politicians and the media. Opsinjoren residents use
their network to exert more power over their environment than other
residents and users of the same space, from obtaining better service pro-
vision to agenda setting.
I find it useful that politicians attend the parties in their neighbourhood.
The people are glad to see you there. Especially when they clean up, they
see it as a form of recognition. When I was an alderman, I visited these
activities, and then people would speak to me and say, ‘what about this
neighbourhood park’? And then I would say, ‘ok, what’s your vision? I’ll put
aside 6000 euros to renovate the benches’. (Former alderman, interview 6)
Making Neighbours out of Residents
There is something deeper at play behind the professional techniques of
luring calculating residents. The people behind Opsinjoren made it very
clear that part of the challenge also consisted of changing the way citi-
zens think about themselves, their relation to their living environment,
and the city’s government and administration. Policymakers identified
the attitudes of citizens as a key problem for the Antwerp city govern-
ment. Increasingly, citizens seemed to have an individualistic, ‘instru-
mental-fiscal’ relationship to the city – a relationship that culminated in
a very negative attitude towards city hall. The only contact politicians and
officials had with residents were through ‘professional complainers’. Re-
sidents only contacted the city government to claim more services and
facilities for themselves, claims that simply could not always be met. A
failure to do so resulted in complaints on their inadequate provision.
The problem of clean streets is illustrative:
If everybody cleans in front of his or her house, the city is ‘enormously’
clean. But residents don’t do this anymore. They have the attitude of ‘the
city should take care of it, what else do I pay taxes for?’ But you can have
10,000 employees cleaning, and when residents keep throwing their cigar-
ette butts on the street, or when kids on their way home from school throw
their empty bags of crisps on the pavement, it’s no use. (City official, inter-
view 25)
Opsinjoren offered a way to circumvent this ‘individualistic’ type of resi-
dent and to reach out to those who still feel a collective responsibility
towards their city.
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The Antwerp government collectively reached out to its citizens and said ‘do
something yourself, instead of complaining’… The core idea of Opsinjoren
was that some people in the street would take initiatives themselves… Doing
things collectively for your environment, that’s the basis, actually. And of
course, cleaning one’s street is a good and simple model. (Former alderman,
interview 6)
Instead of responding to individual demands by solipsistic residents,
Opsinjoren focuses on ‘responsible residents’, who also feel emotionally
tied to at least their immediate living environment.
We need to connect people to the neighbourhoods again. Neighbourhood
life was disappearing. Social networks had gone. The Catholic network had
disappeared, the socialist network as well. And if you live in a neighbour-
hood but you do not have any social ties with it… It’s a fiction to create ties
with a city, but it’s possible with the neighbourhood. (Former alderman, in-
terview 6)
Opsinjoren both thrives on and tries to re-establish feelings of connect-
edness and shared responsibility amongst the city’s residents, and be-
tween citizens and their city (see also Whitehead 2004). For Opsinjoren
to be successful, people had to start thinking and feeling differently
about their relation with the city, or at least with their immediate living
environment. What is at stake is convincing people that they do not
merely inhabit a house, but also a street, a neighbourhood in which this
house is situated. A home is more than just the actual building. Only
when residents are convinced that they also inhabit the area around it,
will they take responsibility for it and get involved in its management.
The Opsinjoren motto is ‘making neighbours out of residents’ (De Ant-
werpenaar 2005). This challenge has been articulated clearly in the
speech current alderwoman Pauwels wrote for the five-year anniversary
of Opsinjoren.
The street and the neighbourhood are an extension of our house… Hence
this street, this neighbourhood is something very precious, but also some-
thing vulnerable. We have to take good care of it. For the past five years,
Opsinjoren has proven that together, we, the city, but above all the residents
themselves, can make a huge difference. (Stad Antwerpen 2002, p. 4)
Opsinjoren puts a great deal of effort into diffusing this ‘new’ mental
make-up amongst Antwerp citizens. Street volunteers are honoured an-
nually at City Hall as ‘good citizens’, and regular promotional campaigns
call on citizens to ‘do it yourself’. Since the early days of Opsinjoren, a
local weekly (De Streekkrant) offers a ‘cake of the month’ to a ‘meritor-
ious citizen’ in consultation with the Opsinjoren team. Other local and
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national newspapers also regularly profile Opsinjoren participants in the
most glowing terms.
Neighbours vs. Residents
At first glance, it appears that Opsinjoren participants have indeed taken
on the subjectivity of the ‘neighbourhood resident’, and now think of
themselves as inhabiting a neighbourhood, not just a house somewhere
in the city. This seems to be the central precondition for taking responsi-
bility for one’s living environment. When asked why people participated
in Opsinjoren to take care of their neighbourhood, they invariably an-
swered –with a sense of despair in their voice – ‘because we live here!’
Many respondents claimed with pride that this was indeed a new
mentality, to feel part of and responsible for a neighbourhood or a street.
Opsinjoren seems to have been an important trigger.
And then this old lady next door came up to me and said: I have lived in this
house for 30 years, and it’s the first time I even thought of putting a flower
outside on my window sill. Nobody did it, until you moved here and started
with Opsinjoren. I said: Are you serious? (Resident, interview 41)
This is a residential street. People did not bother each other. The first year I
organised a street barbecue, many of the older residents met each other for
the first time. They didn’t even know each other’s name, while they had
lived here for decades! (Resident, interview 33b)
These positive accounts on the new ‘neighbour mindset’ can however be
countered with more contradictory statements. Especially when engage-
ment exceeded the organisation of a street party, respondents were
sometimes very clear on the fact that they actually still did not consider
it their task to keep the streets clean. They were quite nostalgic about the
time that city sweepers took care of it. They just ‘grabbed the brush’
themselves because they felt deserted by city services.
We are moonlighters, moonlighters for the city. We do their job for nothing.
If I did these kinds of things for a friend, I could be prosecuted.1 But I am
doing it for the city, and they can get away with it. (Resident, interview 42)
Also, these ‘new neighbours’ were seldom satisfied with the results of
their own – and the city’s – engagement. As people are infused with the
new mentality of being a neighbour, greater personal needs seem to sud-
denly appear concerning their environments. Identifying with the neigh-
bourhood and the street they live in exposes them to feelings of despair.
Litter and dirt become more visible and less bearable, and the uncivil
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behaviour or mere inactivity of others becomes an aggression upon their
private self.
The Opsinjoren coach calls E (a 35-year-old lady) a ‘tough cop’ (not just be-
cause she works as a police officer, I have the impression). She has a very
negative attitude towards her neighbours. According to her, they do not co-
operate enough. ‘It’s impossible to motivate the people here’. She seems
very demanding to me. She complains about a neighbour’s lush lavender
because it is too big; they should have trimmed it. The Opsinjoren coach
tries to conciliate by claiming that the sidewalk is broad enough for that.
(Observation on jury round, 3 September 2004)
‘Active neighbours’ are disappointed about those fellow citizens who do
not put a similar effort into the upkeep of their residential environment.
They vent a lot of frustration about the limited engagement of others:
In this street, residents received a basket with flowers to hang beside the
door from the city. The contract stipulated that the residents water their
flowers. The older lady who guides us around complains: ‘I took mine away
because they had torn it down’. (The Opsinjoren coach already knew about
it: people had destroyed the lady’s wall plaster as well. It cost some money to
repair the wall and therefore she did not want to run the risk again.) ‘Some
people take care of it, but not all of them. When I say to them, you have to
water the flowers, they say ‘it rains, that’s enough’. W (from the Department
of Open Space Planning) says terracotta balls are useful, they absorb the
water and then you only have to water the flowers every four days. ‘Ok, but
they do nothing. The first one over there, and those two there, they do noth-
ing. I told them several times and they say yes but they do nothing. (Obser-
vation on jury round, 29 September 2004)
H (55, male) is waiting for us outside. The flowerbeds around the trees in
front of his door and his neighbour’s look very nice, further on it looks a
little less agreeable. H tells us that he cleaned the whole street this morning,
and already now (13:30), there is some litter. ‘Sometimes I think, the more
you clean, the more they throw on the street’. He tries, but does not succeed
in keeping the whole street clean. When we ask, how many people are work-
ing on it, he answers, with a grin, ‘What do you think?’ There are only three,
while many more people had signed up to help in the beginning. The Op-
sinjoren coach says it is a formidable result, with only a few people. Some of
the flowerbeds are empty. She asks whether people still put their bin bags on
the flowers. H claims it has not improved a bit. Further down the street we
meet P, a lady in her sixties. The Opsinjoren coach congratulates her: ‘The
street looks very nice, thanks to the residents!’ P corrects her: ‘That is to say,
thanks to a few of the residents ’. (Observation on jury round, 3 September
2004)
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Besides non-participation, active neighbours are also simply confronted
by fellow residents. Their partial incorporation into government net-
works and the right they obtain to exert a certain level of control over
‘their’ public space seems to be a thorn in the side to the less ‘active’
residents. In the stories I recorded, reactions from others vary from dis-
belief to utter aggression. Some people cannot imagine that someone
would do this job voluntarily and are of the opinion that the SVs are
paid by the city, while others attack them verbally and sometimes physi-
cally (2). A resident of a large social housing estate in the periphery puts
it bluntly:
You cannot imagine what they shout at us. ‘Stupid ass, you take away other
people’s jobs, etc.’ (Resident, interview 42)
Pestering is a common complaint, especially amongst those who are
very engaged.
E complains that someone is obviously pestering her. ‘They have already
broken the mirror of my car three times. She says, ‘if you stick your neck
out in this neighbourhood, you get all the shit thrown at you. As a SV, you’re
a sitting duck’. (Observation on jury round, 29 September 2004)
The partial appropriation of public space and the apparently arbitrary
control active residents exert over ‘their place’ in particular, provokes re-
actions from other residents and users.
M (70, female) guides us around ‘her’ flowerbed. On her own, she cleans
the statue in the middle daily and keeps an eye on it. The problems are
clearly overwhelming her. The monument has been thoroughly vandalised;
litter lies scattered around the dustbins… ‘Dogs are a problem, people let
them crap here, and when I say something, they show me a finger’. M also
complains that she is pestered because she takes care of the park. ‘They put
oil on my window sill and pilchards on my doorstep’. We say that is not nice
of them and urge her to keep it up. She will, she says. (Observation on jury
round, 29 September 2004)
Mr. B (65) complains that his neighbours across the street disagree with his
gardening activities. ‘They asked me when I was going to remove “these
weeds”’ (B is growing beds of wild flowers under the trees in his street).
After a while, they turned to action: they poisoned his plants – even the tree
in front of their house had died – so that they had a reason to tear them
out… Mr. B sounds very sad. We all pity him. (Observation on jury round,
29 September 2004)
Confrontations by non-participating neighbours provoke conflicting feel-
ings and thoughts in the minds of participants. This demoralises them
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and becomes a reason for others not to get involved in ‘clean and green’
streets, the core business of Opsinjoren. Many prefer to stick to low-pro-
file street parties, often with a very small group, in order to avoid con-
frontations or because they do not agree with the tasks that are imposed
on them. This is strikingly at odds with the goals of the Opsinjoren
team, as one local Opsinjoren coach relates with some contempt:
Here you only have parties, hardly any workers. Once at one of these parties,
I suggested someone partake in the annual spring-cleaning, but she looked
down at me and said: we do not want to have anything to do with that! An-
other group even asked me whether Opsinjoren could arrange for the city’s
sweeping squads to pass through their street after the party. There was al-
ways a lot of litter afterwards, they said’. (Opsinjoren coach, informal con-
versation)
Refraining from becoming too involved is a strategy chosen by some
active neighbours to avoid burnout. As one respondent put it, as an ac-
tive neighbour you must try to find a balance between ‘engagement’ and
becoming a ‘village idiot’:
I only clean once a week. I’ve been thinking a lot about it, but I didn’t want
to go around cleaning up everybody’s rubbish. I just wanted a reasonably
clean street for myself. (Resident, interview 29)
Conclusion: Warning
The agility with which Opsinjoren connects the impetus to action ema-
nating from individual needs and desires for policies to solve collective
social problems is the main reason why the program is considered such
a success. It expands the powers of city government into areas that were
formerly unattainable, by making use of self-governing people. Resi-
dents are a crucial resource to attain clean and liveable streets. Opsinjo-
ren activates residents by promoting and building upon a greater attach-
ment to the neighbourhood or street of residence, and giving them a
greater say and control over their living environment.
The techniques deployed to stimulate civic action also provoke con-
frontation. A double tension lies at the base of this paradox. First, a ten-
sion exists between private needs and collective goals: those attached to
their living environment indeed ‘take up the broom’, but this often oc-
curs more out of a feeling of desperation rather than sense of responsi-
bility. Participants explicitly confront what they see as an unfair division
of labour between the city and its citizens. Moreover, attachment to the
living environment not only stimulates action, it often increases dissatis-
faction and demands, as people’s expectations about that same environ-
ment change.
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Consequently, tensions also occur between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ neigh-
bours. While the first group complains about the lack of engagement or
poor engagement of the latter, some passive neighbours are also dissatis-
fied with the special status that active neighbours receive in the public
space. They defy the partial appropriation of what they regard as totally
public space (defined negatively as a ‘no man’s land’) and the ‘arbitrary’
control active neighbours try to exert over it.
These tensions sometimes lead to overt confrontations that provoke
demoralisation amongst the participants. Indeed, sometimes the active
Opsinjoor not only faces fierce reactions from others using the public
space, but often has difficulties reconciling collective goals with his own
self-image and purposes as well. This is where Opsinjoren seems to
come against its limitations. Finding a balance between the free involve-
ment of citizens and purposive government action through them will
likely be the dominant challenge for Opsinjoren professionals in the fu-
ture.
Note
1. In Belgium, you can only provide your close family with services that are
normally provided for by the market or the state (e.g. housecleaning, or in
this case, streetsweeping). If you do it for friends or neighbours, this could
be considered as moonlighting and hence you could be prosecuted. The
comparison is not absurd: The head of Opsinjoren often signs certificates
for volunteers who are unemployed or on social benefits; if they cannot
prove to the social services that they do voluntary work for the city, they
could loose (parts of) their benefit when caught ‘in action’.
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Authority, Trust, Knowledge and the
Public Good in Disarray
Monique Kremer and Evelien Tonkens
Over the last thirty years, welfare states have witnessed a considerable
number of debates concerning the identity and power of clients of social
and care services. Criticism of the authoritarian and paternalistic prac-
tices of professionals and a call for democratisation have stimulated
changes in services delivery. Western countries have witnessed a trend
towards more user-based services, with increased attention towards cli-
ents’ wishes and demands. The clients’ position towards services deliv-
ery has strengthened. This shift in power was initiated by the assump-
tion of new roles as citizens and consumers. These roles were carved out
against the older idea of clients as patients (in health care) or underprivi-
leged (in welfare and social work). The three roles of patients, citizens,
and consumers respectively correspond to the three logics of services
delivery: professionalism, bureaucracy, and marketisation (Knijn 2000;
Freidson 2001).
In the process of turning patients into citizens or consumers, the posi-
tions of professionals were hardly ever taken into consideration. Profes-
sionals were simply seen as the problem, as the opponents. Ironically,
professionals themselves have played a prominent role in this attack on
professionalism. Social workers, for instance, were the first to argue that
they themselves were too powerful and paternalistic towards clients and
should step back (Duyvendak 1999). Health care professionals were the
main force behind the strong wave of criticism of psychiatry and mental
health professionalism (Tonkens 1999). Social professionals reinforced
guiding notions like autonomy and independence that fundamentally
changed the client-professional relationship.
But even while professionals played a crucial role in the process that
resulted in new roles for patients, such as citizens and consumers, little
attention has been paid to what the corresponding new roles of profes-
sionals should be. What is the new identity of professionals and what are
their tasks when clients are turned into consumers or citizens? What
defines good professionals in the eyes of clients as consumers and/or
citizens? Are they expected to wait passively and refrain from using their
powers unless asked to by the client? Or do powerful clients need power-
ful professionals? While the clients have changed, no explicit new role
has been defined for the professionals.
We argue that the new roles of citizens and consumers tend to create
new, conflicting demands of professionals, while leaving these profes-
122
sionals completely in the dark as to how to cope with these demands. In
this chapter we identify and analyse the unresolved issues concerning
the new identities and activities of professionals. We argue that the rede-
finition of clients from patients to consumers and citizens demands re-
flection and a redefinition of the roles of professionals and the interac-
tions between clients and professionals. We focus on four aspects of the
roles of professionals that have upset by the redefinition of clients: the
status of their knowledge, their authority, their orientation towards the
public good, and the trust between professionals and their clients. In
their new roles of citizens and consumers, clients have claimed to pos-
sess more knowledge and skills concerning their own problems.
Yet what exactly is the status of their knowledge, and how does it relate
to the knowledge of professionals? The question of the authority of the
professional is also under pressure. Both citizens and consumers have
claimed increased control over their own lives. The authority of profes-
sionals has never been totally dismissed, but it has never been made
totally clear either. Additionally, the new roles of clients have also af-
fected the issue of trust. Clients, now considered citizens and consu-
mers, no longer trust professionals to know best and act in their inter-
ests – yet trust is acknowledged to be a precondition for any good
relationship in the care and welfare sectors.
How can new forms of trust be developed and on what basis? This is
the expression of the public good. While professionals used to be consid-
ered guardians of the public good, consumers and citizens have debated
this notion. In different ways they have both concluded that the notion of
the public good is not very valuable, because what is most important is
self-interest. They presume that professionals too are only self-inter-
ested, but at the same time criticise professionals for it. So the question
of what relationship professionals should have toward the public good
versus their own self-interest remains unresolved.
In this chapter we sketch the ideal types of patient, consumer and
citizen, and try to formulate what kind of professional would fit each
ideal type. What does this role imply for the four themes mentioned –
authority, trust, knowledge and the public good? What comes to the fore
is that these three client roles are highly problematic when we consider
these four themes. Therefore we request a fourth role, that of co-produ-
cer or participant, which is a more recent invention and fits a fourth
logic, that of democratic professionalism. The role of participant or co-
producer is the most promising one, as this role allows for a good bal-
ance between professionals and clients in which both perspectives and
positions are acknowledged. It is built on the strengths of both, espe-
cially when it concerns trust, knowledge and the public good.
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Professionalism and its Siege
In the 1950s and 1960s, people who needed care or welfare were re-
ferred to as patients (in care and cure) or the underprivileged (social
work). This fitted the ideal type of professionalism: a highly exclusionary
system that excludes others – especially other workers and clients –
using criteria of (abstract) knowledge and skills based on expert educa-
tion and training. This claim to abstract knowledge and skills was often
followed by regulations of professional, regulatory schools and associa-
tions, and finally ethical codes (Abbot 1988). Although there seems to be
a constant battle about what kind of occupation can be called profes-
sional, Freidson (2001) nevertheless distinguishes five characteristics: 1)
a body of knowledge and skills officially recognised as based on abstract
concepts and theories, and requiring the exercise of considerable discre-
tion; 2) an occupationally controlled division of labour; 3) an occupation-
ally controlled labour market requiring training credentials for entry and
career mobility; 4) an occupationally controlled training program asso-
ciated with ‘higher learning’, providing an opportunity for the develop-
ment of new knowledge; 5) an institutionalised ‘secular calling’ or voca-
tion. This vocation is rooted in an ideology serving some transcendent
value (professionals work not only for the money) as well as in institu-
tions that embody that vocation and introduce newcomers into it. Profes-
sionals, in other words, are also defined by their desire to serve the pub-
lic good and given the chance, to do so via some institutionally organised
practice.
Distinctive and protected knowledge and skills as well as the secular
vocation to serve the public good constitute the basis of the authority and
trust of professionals. This notion of professionalism can be found in
the work of Parsons (1964; 1968), who used the relationship between
the professional and his patient as an exemplary case of functionalism.
Parsons believed that the separate and one-sided roles of professionals
and clients – the uneducated patient listens to the all-knowing expert –
were necessary for successful treatment. Such professional power was
necessary as it was grounded in expertise, guaranteed by professional
control and, Parsons argued, offset by the trust between professional
and client. Authority was based on the assumption that clients had little
expertise and knowledge concerning their own situations. The solid
training and expertise of professionals formed the basis for the uncondi-
tional trust of clients. The professional, in turn, trusted the patient to
follow his advice. This trust has been reinforced by social institutions
and symbols: professionals were well-paid, had their own control me-
chanisms, and were often supported by welfare states and welfare insur-
ance schemes.
As for vocation, the trust in professionals was also based on their (al-
leged) commitment to the public good. Freidson’s fifth feature addresses
this issue. Professionals were benevolent and their main aim was to cure
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the sick and support the underprivileged. Consequently, social workers,
doctors, and other professionals assumed an important role in the allo-
cation of care, welfare and health services. They were supposed to serve
as gatekeepers of (often costly) state interventions. Because they pos-
sessed expertise and were supposed to be benevolent, they were respon-
sible for balancing a patient’s claims with the common good.
Professionalism has been fiercely criticised since the 1970s precisely
because of the Parsonian ‘myth’ of professionals having exclusionary
knowledge and who only serve the common good. Critical professionals
as well as patient movements argued that professionals at best possessed
a one-sided knowledge of the problem. Professionals may possess speci-
fic scientific knowledge, but without the everyday expertise of patients
they would simply be incapable of making solid diagnoses. Patients
claimed that their knowledge was also crucial in the care and welfare
processes. Knowledge, they claimed, does not come exclusively with
training and education. The criticism of professional knowledge, led to
growing doubts about professionals’ trust and authority as a conse-
quence. Patients claimed that they could study their diseases themselves,
and that they had much more experience with the available services than
most professionals.
In the 1970s, doubts also arose about whether the unprivileged were
really underprivileged and the ill really ill. It was argued that the ones
who were labelled as patients were really the only sane ones because
they were close to themselves, more authentic, while it was society that
was sick or crazy (Tonkens 1996; 1999).
It was also argued that professionals’ commitment to the public good
masks their power positions and strategies, towards both other profes-
sionals and the public. Behind the mask of servitude, critics saw the al-
leged enjoyment of power and self-interest. Since the late 1970s, critics
like Foucault and Illich – as well as Freidson in his earlier writings –
pointed to the disciplinary power of professionals. The Dutch philoso-
pher Hans Achterhuis (1979) argued that welfare professionals were not
solving or reducing social problems, but were actually creating a new
market, which he called The market of welfare and happiness and was
also the title of his book. Professionals were more interested in keeping
their jobs than in sorting out the problems of clients and more guided by
self-interest than the public good. This assault received unexpected sup-
port from both workers in the field and left-wing writers (Duyvendak
1997). Professionals, it was argued, simply reinforced the passivity and
helplessness of their clients.
Because of their presumed lack of real knowledge and the pursuit of
their own self-interests, professionals could no longer be trusted as guar-
dians of the public good. To be able to break professionals’ power posi-
tion, patients demanded a stronger voice (by way of client councils and
specific rights) as well as more exit options (by choosing their own ser-
vices, their own professionals). They hoped this would function as a le-
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ver and change the nature of health and social services. The two major
responses to professionalism were promoting clients as consumers and
as citizens. We will start with the latter.
Claiming Rights and Accountability: Bureaucracy
Clients’ organisations demanded that the interests of clients be secured
by legal rights as well as via the accountability of professionals. This cre-
ated a new logic of performance for clients: bureaucracy. The authority
of professionals was overruled by the authority of the law. Clients de-
fined themselves as (rather passive) citizens and, as the bearers of rights
in a judicial and state context. As citizens they claimed their rights to
services (access) and to good treatments and protection. A stronger voice
became the dominant paradigm.
Claiming power as citizens resulted in a new provisional regime in
professional organisations, such as health care and welfare. Clients
gained various rights such as the right to take part in decision-making,
the right to complain backed-up by official complaint procedures, and
the right to legal assistance from institutions and/or the state (see also
Trappenburg’s contribution in this volume). As a result, clients could
take their grievances to court. The degree to which these rights are im-
plemented varies by country and sector. Since this emphasis on clients’
rights emerged as a way of balancing the power of professionals, no
attention was ever paid to rights of the professionals or the duties of the
clients. The client-professional relationship became part of a legal re-
gime.
This bureaucratic logic of course did create new duties for profes-
sionals, who had to develop new knowledge about legal procedures and
the actions that increased the risk of being taken to court. The emphasis
on clients’ legal rights gradually created a whole series of procedural du-
ties for professionals that made them more accountable and would allow
them prove themselves not guilty in a trial. This performance logic insti-
tutionalises distrust between clients and professionals. Not only are cli-
ents encouraged to critically observe every step a professional takes, pro-
fessionals also end up distrusting their clients (will he sue me?).
Professionals may, as a consequence, actually alter their behaviour to
avoid lawsuits. As one senior social worker in a British study on account-
ability said: ‘One of my clients hung himself in the garage yesterday
afternoon. The first thing I was asked was “is the file up to date?” Be-
cause it’s so important that the file is up to date and nobody can be held
to be responsible’ (in: Banks, 2004:151).
In fact, because of this growing mistrust in risky situations, profes-
sionals may opt to no longer take on high-risk clients. This came to the
fore in the Savanna case in the Netherlands, where a three-year-old girl
named Savanna was found dead in the trunk of a car. Her mother and
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boyfriend turned out to have killed her. The investigation showed that
the Child Welfare Council (kinderbescherming) had seldom intervened
because it had focused more on maintaining a good relationship with
the mother than on protecting the child. It was the first time in Dutch
history that a public prosecutor opened a criminal investigation on a le-
gal guardian. Could she, the guardian, be charged with culpability in the
homicide when carrying out duties? The organisation for child protec-
tion services warned that this strategy could cause a backlash, as guar-
dians already felt they were faced with great difficulties in their jobs
caused by the high levels of bureaucratisation. They argued: ‘Who would
still dare to provide child support in the Netherlands?’ Top officials ar-
gued that they feared that guardians would no longer want to work in
the field any longer. The professional organisation was shocked because
this pressure would make the job even tougher, considering that guar-
dians already had excessive workloads (Trouw, 12 March 2005).
Mistrust is heightened even further by the bureaucratic procedures.
With clients in the role of citizens, professionals now had to focus more
on following procedures than on spending most of their time providing
real help. Dutch research shows that in medical care, where accountabil-
ity has become more important, medical specialists spend one quarter
(26%) of their time filling out bureaucratic forms and living up to proce-
dures. This figure was only 6%, 25 years ago (Kanters et al. 2004). This
is also documented in Dutch youth care, which is known to be very bu-
reaucratic.
Bureaucracy is also a threat to the public good. Pols (2004) shows that
legal procedures can also remove the moral deliberations necessary for
professional intervention. In her study of nurses and care workers in
psychiatric wards, the separation of clients was sometimes considered
exclusively an administrative routine – as separation is now strictly regu-
lated – rather than as a situation that needs moral deliberation. In this
sense, laws do not add morality to practice but may actually be removing
some.
At the same time, it is good to remember that clients have demanded
and continue to demand bureaucracy and its core values: equal rights for
patients and the legal and procedural accountability of professionals.
The above examples also show that the rise of the bureaucratic logic cre-
ates new tensions and dilemmas because professionals were not actually
supposed to completely give up the logic of professionalism. For exam-
ple, the professional maxim to do everything in one’s power to help a
client was still adhered to by everyone. In other words, client movements
attacked the entire logic of professionalism, but at the same time were
silently counting on professionals to continue with their old professional
habits to some degree.
Professionals thus have to find ways to balance their professional duty
to provide the specific kind and amount of care or help that each client
needs, while treating all clients equally. The special treatment of one cli-
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ent can create a whole series of lawsuits from other clients who may
legally claim that they deserve the same treatment. Conversely, and parti-
cularly in a medical context, the professional maxim of trying to refrain
from medical intervention if there is no imminent danger conflicts with
the bureaucratic claim that all of the treatment option that are legally
available be offered. John Clarke (1998) signalled a ‘dispersed manage-
rial consciousness’ whereby the calculative framework of managerialism
becomes embedded in everyone who works for a particular organisation.
This ‘dispersed juridical consciousness’ also develops when citizens take
more active steps toward legal strategies such as filing complaints or
going to court. This only further exacerbates the mistrust between pro-
fessionals and clients. Professionals then have to protect themselves
from all kinds of legal claims that may have a negative impact on their
professionalism.
This indicates that, although bureaucracy is seen as a guardian of the
public good, the lack of discretionary professional space is problematic.
Of course the law articulates the public good. Yet, while bureaucracy
puts equal treatment first, in the care and social work sectors equal treat-
ment does not always coincide with the best quality treatment for each
individual or group. Here too we find a tacit return to professional values
because people often still expect professionals to make an exception for
their particular situation. If they do, professionals distance themselves
from the bureaucratic logic and thereby become more vulnerable con-
cerning complaints and lawsuits. Empirical research shows that profes-
sionals in care and welfare would like to be held accountable for their
behaviour (Vulto & Moree 1996; Hutschemaekers 2001; Kremer & Ver-
planke 2004; Banks 2004). This distinguishes them from informal
carers or other lay people. But with clients as citizens, the meaning of
accountability has become unclear. So has the ‘public good’; is it equal
treatment for all, or is it tailor-made treatment for each individual?
Also, what is the public good when some clients are better-equipped to
act like citizens than others? Professionals signal that some clients have
more ‘bureaucratic expertise’ than others. Some speak up more, perhaps
thanks to being better educated. These citizens know how to manoeuvre
their way through the bureaucracy or an alderman or the mayor and
have their demands heard, while others have no idea how to get what
they want. Some health care clients know the legal procedures by heart,
while others are still grateful when a doctor pays attention to their prob-
lems. When patients are primarily classified as citizens, professionals
can no longer use their discretionary space to compensate those with
little bureaucratic expertise.
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Clients as Consumers: The Market
The 1980s and 1990s gave rise to the ideology of the market as a new
model for reforming the public sector in many welfare states. Client
movements embraced the market as a saviour, hoping it would provide
them with the rights of bureaucratic logic without the inconvenience of
slow procedures. The market was also going to put an end to clients’
dependency on professionals: its logic promised that whenever the pro-
fessional service lagged behind clients’ standards, the new ‘consumer’
could simply move to another supplier. In other words, the market ideol-
ogy would skip the vices of bureaucracy but preserve its virtues – having
power over the professionals. But the market has instead brought
authority, trust, knowledge, and the public good into disarray.
Market logic assumes that consumers have the last word on knowl-
edge: they know best who is the most knowledgeable. Hence consumers
– also called users or choosers (Cornwall & Gaventa 2001) – possess the
authority over what help or care is needed, and professionals are sup-
posed to deliver this service. Services are then called demand-based or
user-based: the demands of the client are the point of departure. Profes-
sionals and professional organisations are now compelled to compete in
the care and welfare markets.
Consumerism makes vague promises that the ultimate authority will
be in the hands of clients. What does this mean for professionals? How
can professionals be critical of clients’ behaviour if they are being di-
rectly paid by them? In many European welfare states it is increasingly
possible for care clients to hire a care-giver with public money. In Britain
a system of Direct Payments has come into being, in the Netherlands
people in need of care can receive a Personal Budget that allows them to
hire an employee. But giving clients power as consumers also raises
problems. In the Netherlands people employed by a Budget holder
sometimes report that they have to act against their own professional
standards, as otherwise they may be fired (De Gruyter 2004). Moreover,
consumerism in general allows social professionals to intervene in the
lives of clients or in collective problems only if they are explicitly asked to
do so. It is the consumer who decides which care or welfare is necessary.
This does not mean the end of their authority, but rather a focus on
negative behaviour and interventions. Professionals are not entitled to
interfere, unless clients cause damage or injury (Tonkens 2002). This
necessarily creates a negative dynamic in the relationship between pro-
fessionals and clients, further augmenting distrust.
In practice, however, consumerism actually seriously limits the
authority and knowledge of consumers. First of all, competition is not
based on expertise and skills, but merely on prices. Cheap care may win,
rather than the care that best fits the client’s needs. Marketisation also
stimulates organisational mergers to eliminate competition. Since most
forms of care are scarce there is little choice anyway, as Dutch marke-
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tised child care sector proves (Marangos & Plantenga 2005; RVZ 2003).
Finally, in practice it is often not the consumer who chooses but inter-
mediaries. This is clearly the case, for example, when we look at the
Dutch icon of consumerism, the Personal Budget in care.1 Many budget
holders hire organisations to choose for them and arrange their care.
This has led to the development of a whole new ‘market’ of intermedi-
aries, simply because choosing and organising one’s own care is quite
complicated.
A big caveat of consumerism in the care and welfare sectors is the fact
that no one is ultimately responsible for the development of knowledge
and skills. Freidson was among the first scholars to criticise professional
power in the 1970s, but has since become increasingly worried about the
consequences of this critique, especially the loss of knowledge and skills
development. One feature of professionalism is that professionals ac-
tively invest in knowledge and safeguard its use. But when this is left to
the consumers – who have tight budgets anyway – it is doubtful whether
individual clients are willing to pay for professional innovation. This is
evident in the practice of the Dutch Personal Budget. A quick scan of
home care workers who are employed via a Personal Budget also shows
that they themselves are concerned about their professional develop-
ment. They not only miss the direct contact with other professionals to
discuss their vocation, but they also complain about the lack of space for
developing their knowledge and education. Some would prefer to im-
prove the quality of care but lack the prospect of being able to do so
because they have no opportunity to consult other professionals or train
and educate themselves (Sting 2004). They have no control over the de-
velopment of professional knowledge, as Freidson has warned.
Moreover, the consumer does not trust the professional as the posses-
sor of knowledge, nor as the authority to decide how to proceed. Profes-
sionals can at best be trusted to deliver what is demanded, as clients can
easily take their services elsewhere. This is particularly so in the case of
personal budgets where consumers are allowed to fire professionals
without the usual employer-employee relationship which allows for dis-
cussion of an employee’s performance. Consumerism thus makes trust
weak rendering it fragile. The continuous threat of exit options is quite a
contrast to the long-term investments in a relationship and the trust that
may develop over time. Mol (2004) shows the difference between what
she calls the language (and logic) of markets and that of care. In market
language transactions are short and finite. After the transaction, the rela-
tionship is finished. The logic of care is based on continuity and interde-
pendence as this is crucial for trust and thereby for the quality of care
(Mol 2004).
Consumerism does not leave much room for the notion of the public
good either. The market renders the public good as obsolete, and not
something to foster. The market presumes that if all of the actors pursue
their own self-interests, this automatically results in the best outcome for
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everyone. Freidson also worries about the disappearance of the notion of
the public good by the successful assault on professionalism. His main
concern is the corrosion of morality, in other words the decline of the
institutional ethics of professionalism. ‘What is at risk today, and likely
to be a greater risk tomorrow, is the independence of professions to
choose the direction of the development of their knowledge and the
uses to which it is put’, Freidson (2001:14) observes. Professionals have
a duty to balance the public good against the needs and demands of cli-
ents and employers. Transcendent values add moral substance to the
technical content of disciplines. Professionals are obliged to be the ‘mor-
al custodians’ of their disciplines (Freidson 2001: 222).
Participants and Democratic Professionalism
A new, fourth logic is gradually emerging, both in the literature and in
practice. This most recent logic tries to do justice to the demand for de-
mocratisation and gives rise to the criticism of professionalism while
still retaining its core public values. The new logic can be described
either from the perspective of the client or the professional. With the
client as the starting point, this logic can be called co-production or par-
ticipation (Cawston & Barbour 2003, Cornwall & Gaventa 2001) or colla-
boration (Vigoda 2002).) Starting from the perspective and tasks of the
professional, this same logic may be called democratic professionalism
(Dzur 2004a, 2004b) or civic professionalism (Sullivan 2004).
This logic should not be mistaken for client participation as such,
which is often participation without professionalism. Many current ex-
amples that focus on listening to clients surpass professionals’ voices
altogether. This is discernible, for instance, among client panels that
have been established in care services and in interactive policymaking.
The dialogue in these situations is generally somewhere between the
interests of the clients and managers. Professionals are usually not part
of these dialogues, and if they are, they are basically there to listen, not to
participate (Pollitt 2003).
The fourth logic is an adaptation of the logic of professionalism. It
shares with professionalism the idea that public services are different
from bureaucracy and the market in their commitments to the public
good and their ‘secular calling’ to values such as health, education and
justice, as well as their dedication to maintaining these values in society.
Knowledge and skills are also very important in this logic. But there is
also a crucial difference with the standard logic of professionalism.
Knowledge and skills are not exclusively owned by professionals – they
are the object of a dialogue between professionals and clients. Democ-
racy itself should be seen as an important ‘higher value’ that should be
promoted by professionals in this logic; it is comparable to health, edu-
cation, and justice. Therefore the dialogue between professionals and
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clients plays a crucial role in this logic at the individual, group, and col-
lective levels. This fourth logic thus resembles professionalism because
professionals are acknowledged and defined as driven by a vocation
rather than by status or money (Sullivan 2004). But they can only main-
tain that vocation via a democratic exchange with clients.
It shares the core values of participation with professionalism, and as
with professionalism, the development, maintenance, and exchange of
knowledge is very important. Professionals are defined by their posses-
sion of and willingness to preserve specialised knowledge from their
field. By exchanging this knowledge with others collective knowledge is
cultivated. But knowledge is not only exchanged among colleagues but
also with clients. Professionals explain their views and procedures, ac-
knowledge the specific knowledge that clients possess, and come to a
compromise regarding the problems and solutions. ‘Traditional bound-
aries between expert and lay become blurred. The perceptions of partici-
pants become indispensable to providing a greater “fit” with the unique
features of their situation’ (Cawston & Barbour 2003: 721).
This vague idea can be made more concrete with the help of Richard
Sennett’s Respect (2003). Sennett proposes that the client acknowledge
the superiority of the professional’s knowledge in terms of diagnosis
and treatment, while the professional should acknowledge the superior-
ity of the client’s knowledge in terms of how it feels to live with a demen-
ted husband or to live on welfare for years. Note that the boundaries here
between expert and lay do not become blurred at all. On the contrary,
they remain quite clear, but there is a new balance as to who is the expert
and who is lay in a particular area.
Including the experiences and wishes of clients and an emphasis on
professionalism are tried out in innovative ways in geriatric patient care
as described by Pols (2004). Even so-called silent patients offer their opi-
nions via an ‘act of appreciation’, for instance. Nurses use professional
strategies to find out what these enacted appreciations are (does the per-
son like to drink coffee or not?), and then produce situations in which
silent patients can enact their wishes. The latter is what Pols labels as co-
production.
Various authors have claimed that trust can be restored via dialogue
and the greater openness and accountability of professionals. ‘Growing
and serious risks of citizen’s alienation, disaffection, scepticism, and in-
creased cynicism towards governments’ can be averted ‘only [by] a high
level of co-operation among all parties in society’ (Vigoda 2002: 538).
Here too, Sennett’s notion of the organisation of respect can be helpful.
His model is promising when it comes to restoring trust, because he
makes it clear when and how authority is delegated to whom, thereby
generating more peaceful and respectful situations in which trust may
flourish.
As with professionalism, democratic professionalism also considers
professionals as guardians and promoters of the public good. But again,
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defining the public good is no longer just a task for professionals, but is
shared with clients. Yet civic professionalism dictates that professionals
take the initiative in this respect to keep the debate on the public good
alive. This is characteristic of their vocation because they are paid to be
responsible. Community workers still see their task as such and they
want to be able to point out the dominant social problems in specific
neighbourhoods (Duyvendak & Uitermark 2005; Kremer & Verplanke
2004).
In previous decades, however, teachers were also much more involved
in articulating both social and pedagogical goals and the broader needs
of society. In the new professional logic, ‘professionals take public lea-
dership in solving perceived public problems’ (Sullivan 2004: 18) and
‘re-engage the public over the nature and value of what they do for the
society at large’ (Ibid). Professionals must be ‘in real dialogue with their
publics and open to public accountability’ (Ibid: 19), thereby ‘inviting
public response and involvement in the profession’s effort to clarify its
mission and responsibilities’ (Ibid.).
Within this logic, the basis of trust is different than it is within profes-
sionalism. Again, the secular calling is a reason for trust, but this is
combined with the democratic dialogue sketched above, as well as with
the degree to which professionals actively create this dialogue and open
themselves up to accountability procedures. It is also acknowledged,
however, that trust is a precondition for this dialogue and cannot be a
result. The starting point of a fruitful democratic dialogue is that the
different parties involved dare to trust each other and only stop doing so
temporarily and for a reason – if something happens that destroys that
trust. Even then, they may actively seek to restore that trust, since de-
mocracy cannot flourish without it. Therefore, all parties try to stay away
from a juridical relationship, reserving this for situations of serious and
irresolvable conflict.
Authority is shared, since professionals and clients recognise each
other’s knowledge and come to a joint understanding of the problem
and a mutual solution. Clients are ‘seeking greater accountability from
service providers’, among other things ‘through increased dialogue and
consultation’ (Cornwall & Gaventa 2001: 9). This approach combines the
strength of professionalism with the recognition of clients as knowledge-
able and responsible citizens. Yet professionals have to earn their author-
ity, which means they have to discuss their actions, not only with their
clients but also with a larger audience like the public at large.
Democratic professionalism leaves space for paternalistic professional
interventions; at the same time, efforts are made to debate such inter-
ventions in public and thereby gain the support of the broader politically
democratic community. Democratic professionalism not only means
that professionals are accountable and take a leading role in discussing
the public good; it also means professionals themselves need the active
and clear support of the democratically elected political elite in coping
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with dilemmas that cannot be solved, since this coping cannot be
decided on an individual basis alone. Democratic professionalism in
child protection, for instance, can only be enforced when guardians are
more accountable for what they are doing, and when they receive the
necessary support from a broader political debate – among profes-
sionals, clients and citizens – to help sort out the devilish dilemmas they
now have to sort out by themselves. The issue of whether some particu-
lar care or welfare intervention is necessary should never be confined to
the private arena (as in consumerism), even though it cannot be comple-
tely resolved, the discussion on authority has to be supported in both the
public and political domains. Social professionals are part of a political
and normative project (De Boer & Duyvendak 2004). This entails that
the discussions between professionals and clients should be inspired,
motivated and supported by the broader political and social community.
Note
1. In 2004 nearly 70,000 Dutch people received a budget to purchase the care
they needed and to hire a professional of their choice. Some 10,000 of them
are members of the organisation of budget holders called ‘Per Saldo’. This
made anti-professional sentiments obvious and this policy was the result
The right-wing liberal Secretary of State, Erica Terpstra, observed upon it’s
the policies introduction in 1995 that ‘A personal budget makes handi-
capped people less dependent on professionals’ (in Munk 2002, 11).
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PART III
PROFESSIONALS

Heroes of Health Care?
Replacing the Medical Profession in the Policy
Process in the UK
Celia Davies
Not so long ago, a dozen or so people were gathered together at an invi-
tation dinner hosted by one of Britain’s think tanks and health policy
research funders. As the meal drew to a close, the host invited one of
the academics present to open the discussion with some prepared re-
marks. A lively informal discussion ensued. Among those who had re-
mained silent for a while was a senior doctor who had been invited to
participate. His comments then became a point of reference for several
others in the discussion. Not long after this event, I found myself at an-
other dinner, placed next to a government minister. Learning that much
of my research was on the nursing profession, and thinking of the pol-
icy-related meetings that he had attended where both nurses and doctors
were present, he asked, ‘Tell me, why don’t the nurses say anything?’
As someone who has written about the classic and dominant profes-
sional identity exemplified by medicine as well as about nurses, allied
health professionals and patients as the ‘others’ who sustain this identity,
I am sometimes urged to say that things have changed. In this chapter I
will document a number of key changes, accepting, however, that such
changes are likely to be fitful and contradictory rather than tidy and un-
problematic or evenly paced and linear. Change can only be achieved
reciprocally with the involvement of others (including clients and co-
workers). Discursive changes and the process of embedding change into
institutional forms and policy practices are likely to be out of step with
each other. These are some of the themes that thread through this chap-
ter. My concern will be with arguments about the decline of medical
power now prevalent in the sociology of professions, the manner in
which arguments are advanced, and the often unacknowledged theoreti-
cal baggage that accompanies them. Perhaps it is time for a change of
direction.
The Decline of Medical Autonomy in the UK
There is currently a fairly widespread consensus among sociologists and
policy analysts about the declining power of the medical profession. This
concerns the loss of a long-enjoyed autonomy to shape the day-to-day
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conduct of medical work, to influence priorities in the delivery of health
care, and to shape public understanding of the nature of health and pub-
lic policy in the field of health. Challenges to medicine have come from
governments across Europe, North America and elsewhere, in an effort
to reduce health care budgets and create more efficiency in public-sector
spending. They have also come from a better-informed public, more
prone to question and to complain, and from the rise of social move-
ment groups that contest the medicalisation of a range of various condi-
tions.
Neo-liberal ideas were advanced with great tenacity throughout the
1980s and early 1990s. This was aided in the UK by the successive re-
election of the conservative governments that espoused them. Over a
decade and more, a pattern of health care delivery that had survived for
40 years began to change shape. Performance systems that managed the
sector from the centre were implemented early on. New-style general
managers with a vocabulary of business principles and business plan-
ning were introduced. Professionals found themselves surrounded by
an unfamiliar discourse, challenged to attend to issues of volume, qual-
ity and performance in ways that were entirely novel. The powers of
newly-constituted NHS trusts deliberately encouraged entrepreneurial
activity. The foundations of New Public Management (NPM) were being
laid. Armed with performance information, the new managers were to
ask searching questions about what was being done and how. It was not
just a question of reducing waste and working more efficiently, but of
managing assets to an overall advantage, outsourcing support services,
and perhaps seeing opportunities for income generation. Here and else-
where in the public sector – in schools, policing, social services, and
local government administration – welfare professionals were consid-
ered out of step; their protest was ignored. Different professions, such
as auditing and accountancy, came to the fore.
Adding markets to managerialism gave the new configuration more
bite. Trusts would now compete with each other to win contracts in order
to provide services to their local communities. If the health authority
and, in some cases, the GP as purchasers were not satisfied with the de-
tails of price volume and quality, there was a real potential that the con-
tract would go elsewhere. With this internal market or quasi-market sys-
tem in place, the potential consequences of ignoring business-like
thinking became more serious. Observing three specific cases of doc-
tors, social workers and teachers, Foster and Wilding (2000) charted leg-
islative changes that were meant ‘to bring the professions to heel’ (ibid:
146.). ‘Looking back’, they argue,
…we can now see that the 1950s and 1960s were a golden age for welfare
professionalism. These were the decades in which policy makers trusted
professionals to shape and run the social services without “outside” interfer-
ence from elected politicians, public officials or consumers. (ibid: 143-4)
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Taking a detailed look at the profession of medicine, Harrison and Ah-
mad (2000) agreed with this analysis. They point out that arguments for
the decline of dominance and autonomy can be assembled at different
levels. At a micro-level, calculating the price of services in quasi-markets
necessarily made medical activities much more transparent, and doctors
and managers now had a mutual interest ‘in ensuring the survival and
prosperity of their institutions’ (ibid: 134). Changes to doctors’ employ-
ment contracts also gave local employers more leverage. When Labour
returned to power in 1997, the trend continued. The plans for reorganis-
ing primary care challenged the GPs’ power. There was a new frame-
work for examining the quality of treatments under the banner of ‘clin-
ical governance’. There was to be a standard-setting national agency
reviewing the evidence base for medical interventions, the National In-
stitute for Clinical Excellence (NICE), the production of National Service
Frameworks (NSFs) defining the pathway through care for different pa-
tient groups, and a Commission for Health Improvement to provide a
rolling programme of inspection that would cover each and every trust.
Altogether, stronger performance management and high-profile national
targets were to hold the system together. Any such shift away from lo-
cally generated practices towards more standardised national frame-
works is ‘a process which necessarily weakens local professionals vis-à-
vis newly created auditors’ (Power 1997:109).
At a meso-level, these authors urge us to look behind the public con-
frontations and more at the inroads made into what had been a close
corporatist arrangement between the profession and the state, with con-
siderable scope for the interests of the profession to be upheld. Succes-
sive challenges were made to the system of distinction awards, which
gave substantial discretionary additions to salaries. Changes also started
to be made to a ‘parallel structure’ for the profession inside the Depart-
ment of Health which, for example, had previously put workforce plan-
ning very much in the hands of the profession which largely determined
the shape of the medical career – something that had historically worked
to the advantage of doctors and to the detriment of nurses (Davies
1995:70ff). New powers to investigate complaints against GPs and legis-
lation potentially enabling changes in professional self-regulation were
also cited.
At the highest macro-level, however, these authors saw few inroads
into the dominance of the biomedical model of disease, notwithstanding
the Labour emphasis on primary care and on working in partnership
towards improving the health status of local populations. Harrison and
Ahmad attributed the lack of strong resistance within the medical pro-
fession in particular to the climate generated by high-profile allegations
of medical malpractice, specifically in what has become known as the
Bristol doctors’ case. Poor survival rates in paediatric cardiac surgery
had gone unchallenged. Parents whose babies had died protested. The
press and public interest in what was the longest-running case under
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investigation was intense. A debate opened up as never before about
how doctors behaved and how far the medical profession could be
trusted to regulate its own members. While acknowledging a number of
important caveats, the authors nonetheless sum up:
The conclusion remains that for the ordinary medical clinician autonomy
has been eroded… and that this is the case for high-status specialities such
as surgery as for the less prestigious ones such as general practice. Thus it
has increasingly become the case that doctors must adopt a managerial per-
spective in order to progress within the profession, and that clinical deci-
sions must be justified by reference to external research findings. (Harrison
& Ahmad 2000:138)
An Argument Extended
Evidence can be marshalled from more recent years, which ostensibly
strengthens this loss-of-power thesis. First, there have been some dra-
matic new moves at the workplace level, focusing on the re-organisation
of clinical practices and on new roles and alternative modes of delivery of
care. The NHS Modernisation Agency, formed in 2001, developed a
range of organisational redesign projects derived from an examination
of the patient journey, and over a four-year period was particularly active
in advocating radical changes in the ways in which clinical staff worked.
New ideas have been cascaded out via conferences and training events
and new roles are in place shifting the traditional boundaries between
doctors, nurses and allied health professionals (Davies 2003).
Legislation has underpinned this change. The 2001 Health and Social
Care Act gave nurses and pharmacists the right to prescribe a limited list
of drugs. Demonstration projects have been funded under a ‘changing
workforce’ banner (DOH 2002). The NHS Plan (DOH 2000b), pub-
lished during the government’s re-election campaign, underlined all of
this, adding some strong anti-professional rhetoric. For all its praise for
staff and assurances that they would have the freedom to shape the care
they provided and to tailor it to individual circumstances, their relations
with patients were deemed hierarchical and paternalistic. There was a
reference to ‘old-fashioned demarcations’ and ‘unnecessary boundaries’
in what, in many ways, is still ‘a 1940s system in a twenty-first century
world’ (DOH 2000b:15; see also DOH 2000a). A chapter on nurses,
midwives, therapists and other NHS staff made it clear just how much
central thinking there had already been on repositioning the work of the
various health professions to take over the work previously within the
scope of medicine. National frameworks, giving benchmarks for chil-
dren’s services, availability of old-age care, mental health services, renal
services, and more have developed apace; so too have clinical guidelines
and protocols for practice (Appleby & Coote 2002). The National Patient
Safety Agency, another national-level regulator, began work on systems
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for reporting and controlling levels of medical error and patient safety. At
the practical level, the loss-of-power thesis seems to have been further
underpinned.
A second consideration concerns what has been happening recently to
the collective self-regulation of the medical profession, the institutional
arrangement in the UK whereby the General Medical Council (GMC), a
body largely composed of medical professionals, controls admission to
and removal of doctors from the certification register that gives them
the right to practice. Here the loss-of-power story is both highly visible
and dramatic. Legislation in 1999 created an overarching regulator
charged with the responsibility of encouraging reform and greater con-
sistency across the different regulatory bodies in health care, and despite
fierce resistance, gave the government powers to alter the structures of
regulatory bodies without recourse to a full debate in Parliament (see
Davies & Beach 2000). Since then, a string of allegations of medical
malpractice has made headline news, prompting the government to in-
stigate public enquiries and reports following GMC decisions. With
cases doubly in the public eye, political pressure encouraged a range of
further measures. Detailed public attention has been directed for the
first time to the scope of the problem of poor performance and the in-
adequacy of informal and the peer-led disciplinary machinery in the
NHS (DOH 1999). A separate Clinical Assessment Authority was put in
place to advise on poor performance, and if necessary to make assess-
ments. Those on the medical register must now at intervals prove their
continuing fitness to practice. Doctors who are suspended or struck
from the register will now find it increasingly harder to return to the
medical profession. The structure of the GMC itself has changed, with
an increased proportion of lay people. Government has also taken an
interest in medical education, supporting schemes for non-traditional
entrants, putting pressure on the length of medical training, and devel-
oping plans for shared learning and for ‘bolt-on’modules to enable other
practitioners to take on specialist clinical work. All in all, the ‘gentle-
men’s club’ character of the GMC and its ‘light touch’ form of regulation
(Stacey 1992) are barely recognisable these days.
A third important development affecting state-profession relations in
health care has been the rise of organised patient and consumer groups,
and government’s willingness to incorporate them into the policy pro-
cess at a national level (Baggott et al. 2004). The emergence into promi-
nence of these groups has coincided with a broader ideological commit-
ment to combat voter apathy and to find new ways of involving citizens
at all levels. This relates to a conviction that in the 21st century, public
services need to become more responsive and take strategies for user
involvement altogether more seriously than in the past. Public policy de-
velopment and newly-established regulatory agencies have started mak-
ing room for patients and the public in new ways. Thus, alongside repre-
sentatives from the various professions and health service management,
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representatives from the Stroke Association, the Alzheimers’ Society, the
Carers Association and others were co-signatories of the NHS Plan in
2000 and participated in the Modernisation Action Teams that preceded
it. All of the NSFs have had patient representation. Consultations on
clinical guidelines at NICE not only involve patient groups but offer sup-
port to enable patients to contribute. A further device, a Citizens Coun-
cil, has also been tried. There is now a ‘patients’ czar’ in a senior position
at the Department of Health. In the context of what is now a strong
rhetorical commitment to a patient-centred health service, the new parti-
cipants at the national policy table who sit alongside the doctors cannot
be dismissed. At this level too, a case can begin to be made regarding a
loss of power for the doctors.
Whatever mix of factors has prompted this – shifts in expectations
galvanised by the exposure of medical malpractice, changes in the social
composition of the profession, perhaps together with government haste
to show a return on unprecedented levels of new investment – the evi-
dence all seems to point in the same direction. Five years after the pub-
lication of Harrison and Ahmad’s analysis, their conclusions about the
decline of power of the medical profession have surely been reinforced
both at the level of loss of individual clinical autonomy for the doctor and
at levels beyond the workplace. And yet, it is still possible to question
this account, as the following section will show. Four areas of doubt are
suggested
Questioning a Loss-of-Power Orthodoxy
First, while detailed empirical evidence on loss of power by doctors may
be in short supply for the period of the late 1990s (Harrison & Ahmad
2000:140), studies from the earlier stages of the move towards manage-
rialism and markets were cautious about a loss-of-power thesis. Work in
which Harrison himself was involved paints a vivid picture of early hos-
pital trusts in England, showing moves not simply to control doctors but
also to involve them more directly in the new managerial regime. Seven
constraints in relation to the loss-of-power thesis are identified and dis-
cussed (Harrison & Pollitt 1994:137ff), and the study ends with the im-
age of an ‘elastic net’, portraying professionals and managers as ‘in the
middle of a period of intense bending and stretching and re-positioning’
(ibid:148). Ferlie et al. (1996) considered the potential for new patterns
deriving from the introduction of a private-sector model of executives
and non-executive directors on hospital boards. They too deny any sim-
ple loss-of-power thesis. They argue that the picture at that point was
mixed, particularly regarding the new hybrid clinical manager roles.
They did envisage a possible future where competition between profes-
sionals for contracts might place strains on professional collegiality and
impair collective action – but also draw attention to changes which do
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not remove power so much as alter the relationship between different
sections within the medical profession. They concluded that one cannot
substantiate the view that there has been a unidirectional shift of power
from professionals to managers in health care in the UK. The evidence
is complex and sometimes contradictory, demonstrating both losses and
gains in different areas and at different levels of analysis. We would ar-
gue that the most accurate interpretation is that in a changing context,
the profession can be seen as altering within its boundaries, for example,
between specialties and adapting in novel ways (Ferlie et al. 1996:193).
Detailed studies of medical managers bear out this complexity. The issue
of whether doctor-managers are ‘colonising or colonised by’ the world of
management has by no means been settled, and at the very least, we are
witnessing a ‘new and more complex power dynamics’ (Thorne 2002:
1515; see also McKee et al. 1999, cf; Harrison & Ahmad 2000:138). For
some, re-stratification within the profession is a more important feature
(Gallagher 2003; Sheaff et al. 2004).
Second, doubt still surrounds the interpretation of the emphasis on
quality. While it was clear that the idea owed much to industrial models,
quality is also an ‘intermediate concept’ (James 1994) – that is, one that
can be shaped by professionals, managers or politicians. Available evi-
dence seems to suggest that the early quality initiatives were fragmen-
tary, limited and confusing (Davies 2000). Doctors found it easy to dis-
tance themselves from the actions of quality directors, who frequently
had a nursing background. Confronted with the need to provide a medi-
cal audit, they resisted or remoulded it in the shape of research projects
under their own control (Black & Thompson 1993; Harrison & Pollitt
1994). On the face of it, the New Labour quality framework (DOH 1997;
1998) was altogether harder to cast aside, bringing as it did national
guidelines on clinical effectiveness, standards for service delivery and a
new regime of monitoring trust performance. But this too could cut both
ways. Were clinical guidelines and protocols for practice an imposition
of ‘cookbook medicine’ from above (Miles et al. 2000) and of a regime of
rationing (Appleby & Coote 2002)? Or were they useful advice for busy
practitioners that, in the words of the Chief Executive of NICE, ‘far from
limiting clinical freedom… actually informs it’ (Dillon 2001:141)? The
rise of evidence-based medicine in what has become almost a new in-
dustry for the academic arm of the profession, the strong input of doc-
tors albeit alongside others to formulate guideline, the way the Institute
built on work already being undertaken by the Medical Royal Colleges,
and not least of all, the careful formula that emphasises guidelines as
advice, all indicate that here too a straightforward loss-of-power argu-
ment is hard to sustain. Evidence on how guidelines are handled in the
local setting by doctors adds further doubt to the issue (Parker & Lawton
2000; McDonald & Harrison 2004).
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Third, what should one think of the changes involving regulating the
professions? Are the government-inspired measures that have changed
the character of the register and the way in which it is controlled irrefu-
table indicators of a loss of power? The developments have been striking,
but a somewhat different view of the story emerges when medicine is
compared with other health professions. Where change has been all but
imposed on the other health professions, there has been a protracted,
behind-the-scenes period of negotiation with the doctors (Irvine 2003).
A certain amount of pre-emptive action on medicine’s part was visible at
an early stage (Harrison & Ahmad 2000:137). Consumer groups still ar-
gue that GMC reforms do not go far enough (Kmietovicz 2004), and one
close observer of developments has recently concluded that without
stronger lay input ‘new forms of regulation may prove simply to be a
more sophisticated version of regulation by professionals themselves’
(Allsop 2004:91).
Fourth, there is the matter of the changing nature of the policy com-
munity. Have doctors been squeezed out of the close corporatist relation-
ship they previously enjoyed? Are they incapable of influencing the cur-
rent government? Are today’s governments more ready to defy the
opinions of medical professionals? Surprisingly, little is known about
the formal and informal structures and relationships that make up the
health policy community in the UK. Patient groups report that their in-
fluence has grown (Baggott et al. 2004), although systematic research on
how significant the many stakeholder events are and how the dynamics
of potentially unequal dialogue work in practice is not yet available. Also,
not much is known about shifts in the structures of the Department of
Health, and their further development and significance. There are hints
that informal contacts such as those that have surrounded GMC reform
may continue to be important. One factor to place firmly on the other
side of the loss-of-power equation is the strategy pursued by the present
government that involves recruiting charismatic figures acceptable to it-
self and the profession to spearhead potentially controversial changes. If
the medical profession has become less effective at directly blocking
change, it certainly seems that its doctors are still indispensable in shap-
ing how change will develop and in mediating ideas to colleagues. The
obvious, empirically-driven way forward on the loss-of-power thesis –
amassing relevant evidence, repeatedly weighing it on both sides of the
argument – leaves us with uncertainties, with answers that are ‘still
open’, ‘not sure’, or perhaps ‘not yet’.
Towards an Alternative
Why have people had so much difficulty with this assessment of whether
or not the medical profession is in decline? It would be easy to say that
we just do not have sufficient data on how things are working both on
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the ground and at the policy level. That may be the case, but empiricism
in this field, as Frankford (1997) has vigorously argued, often has unac-
knowledged conceptual and theoretical baggage, restrictive both in its
analytical capacity and its political visions and alternative possibilities.
First, the decline thesis leads us to a terrain of power as a quantity and
as zero-sum. Has it been lost by one party? Has it been gained by an-
other? At best we defer, and at worst, lose sight of questions such as:
Does this set of changes shift the manner in which policy is made and
reshape how we think about health care’s possibilities? Does it represent
a shift in identities? Does it transform doctor-patient relationships?
Second, the decline thesis operates with a strongly subject-centred and
agentic notion of power. The bounded collective entities, state and pro-
fessions, or state, professions and public are centre stage. Our task be-
comes to chart the shifting balance of power between and perhaps also
within these entities. Third, the images that it calls upon are the images
of war, of battles for possession, involving cold calculation and strategic
manoeuvring, attempts at capture, advance and retreat. This type of lan-
guage is less commonly used today than in the past – perhaps because
its militarism and masculinism makes us uneasy more quickly than
hitherto. But the legacy remains, particularly in the sociology of profes-
sions in the Anglo-Saxon world. We have been so thoroughly schooled in
the historical ‘battles for registration’ and in the project of unmasking
professionalism as a quest for autonomy and control. It rests in particu-
lar on that aspect of Freidson’s (1972) early and influential work on pro-
fessional dominance that insisted that a profession sought control over
its own work. We have since taught generations of students to think that
professionalism has to be seen first and foremost as a power claim. In
practice, however, and for some years now, the sociology of professions
has taken a different route.
Power as Constitutive and Relational
Foucault has taught us the need to separate power from agency, to see it
not as a possession but as a constant flow that is constitutive of actors
and relationships. In this model, power is ubiquitous and self-sustain-
ing. It should be seen not so much as a negative and prohibitory phe-
nomenon but rather as something that creates interlocked identities and
relationships, subjects and subjected positions, and is to be understood
as relational. In this sense, power is the understanding of self and other
that it makes possible, and it should be studied through discourse and
texts more than through the acts of an apparently sovereign state. Ac-
cording to this way of thinking, the post-war settlement and the bureau-
professional alliance that it entailed (Clarke & Newman 1997) was not so
much a granting of autonomy by the state to the profession as the con-
stitution of a space for legitimate state action through notions of profes-
sional expertise. The shift is a significant one. It acknowledges that state
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and profession are mutually constitutive, and this constitution creates
state power as much as professional power. While he is not influenced
by Foucauldian traditions in any overt way, Moran’s comparative study of
what he calls ‘the health care state’ in the UK, the US and Germany
exemplifies this way of thinking. Health care systems, he argues, ‘pose
problems for statecraft’ (Moran 1999:5), and the national state and
health care system mutually pervade each other. He believes we should
not be studying health care policies but health care politics – and the
governance of medicine in all cases is at the centre of this. For him, the
institutions of the state and of health care and the professions are to be
seen as ‘wound round each other’ rather than ranged against each other.
In all three countries he examined, a process of destabilisation and mu-
tual reconstitution rather than a loss of power is a key theme. He com-
ments on this process:
New interests are being mobilised: stable policymaking communities are
being penetrated and transformed into more open, unstable networks of
actors; and hierarchies that rested heavily on the deference of citizens are
being transformed as that traditional deference declines. (Moran 1999:16)
Working directly with Foucauldian theorising and with an eye on the
sociology of professions to which he himself contributed earlier, John-
son draws out the implication that ‘the expert is not sheltered by an en-
vironing state but shares in the autonomy (sic) of the state’. Where this is
the case, he argues,
any attempt radically to separate professional experts from official definers
is misconceived… doctors themselves are intimately involved in generating
official definitions of reality. (Johnson 1995:13)
The analytical strategy must shift:
We must develop ways of talking about state and professions that conceive
of the relationship not as a struggle for autonomy or control but as the inter-
play of integrally related structures, evolving as the combined product of
occupational strategies, governmental policies and shifts in public opinion.
(Johnson 1995: 16)
These injunctions fell on somewhat deaf ears at the time. What would it
mean to view the earlier parts of this paper through this sort of lens? We
suggest two post-war settlement moments: First, the moment when the
NPM took hold, reclassifying the welfare professions as part of the pro-
blem, not as part of the solution. This represented a radical re-imagining
of the state where the professions were neither the state’s advisors nor
its providers. A new configuration of power was assembled around the
accounting professions, auditing techniques, and forms of active man-
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agement that would render costs transparent on the one hand, and re-
duce the state budget by putting welfare out to market on the other. This
configuration also began to re-valorise a new and seemingly indepen-
dent agent – the sovereign consumer in the marketplace who trans-
mutes into the citizen-consumer of public services. Subsequently, and
with a new political party in power, came discourses about ‘the third
way’ and later ‘modernisation’. These had strong continuities with the
immediate past but also to some extent acknowledged the continuing
resistance from those with loyalties to earlier ideas of public services
and the welfare state, and who had antipathy towards the ‘intrusion’ of
business principles. They also built on the ideal of a more participatory
democracy, both at the national and community levels of involvement.
All this is to suggest that professionalism is constructed in and
through the state’s programs. Likewise, these programs are constructed
in and through the professions. This has yet to be clearly spelled. The
missing element has to do not so much with what professions claim,
but with what they offer.
Professionalism and its Promise
What do doctors offer? Academic writing has emphasised the power
claim to a point where it eclipses what it is that professions promise or
offer. I would like to propose that medicine offers a two-pronged pro-
mise – operating both at the individual level of the encounter with the
patient and at the collective level where doctors participate in the policy
process, both locally and particularly nationally. At best, and at the indivi-
dual level, the medical profession offers a release from physical and
emotional suffering and in some cases an escape from death. It replaces
uncertainty and fear with hope. The unbearable is dismissed or at least
made bearable, and the patient is given an opportunity to rebuild a life,
mend a relationship, and feel once more at peace or in control. All of this
is enough for many of us to put doubt on hold, to defer to the doctor, to
be passive and compliant in adopting the ‘sick role’. The joking refer-
ence to ‘doctor’s orders’ to explain and justify a lifestyle change is one
acknowledgement of this. In practice, of course, medicine may be un-
able to perform so heroic a feat. But the knowledge that it can, and the
hope that it will do so, pervades the medical encounter, and as I will
indicate below, the way in which others relate to members of the profes-
sion. Medicine, in short, offers us heroes.
The profession also has reserved a hero’s seat at the policy table. The
doctor embodies not only a seemingly neutral expertise, but also a com-
mitment to the values of health and health care and to the importance of
health in a policy setting. Doing the best for the individual patient in the
face of an array of counter-tendencies carries over into the policy context.
Members of the profession are thought of as setting aside personal inter-
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ests, including financial interests and self-aggrandisement to ensure ap-
propriate treatment for their patients. Here too they represent a wish to
cut a pathway through the bureaucracy with its red tape, rules and de-
lays; to defend the patient in the face of penny-pinching government
measures; to provide a buffer against the profit-seeking drug companies;
and to use clinical judgement alone to assess the worth of claims in a
particular case. In these ways, a doctor has more credibility than a bu-
reaucrat, a politician, or an industry lobbyist. The hero stands between
the damsel and these dragons – traversing the dangerous terrain of poli-
tics, all the time guarding the ideals of health care.
The hero identity has, of course, immensely positive consequences.
Heroes attract deference and rewards of money, status and power. They
carry a strong sense of personal agency and a confident belief in them-
selves and their personal worth compared to others. But there are also
negatives. We demand more from heroes than they can realistically deli-
ver, and our sanctions for failure can be correspondingly great. Doctors
sometimes talk about the sure knowledge of uncertainty and risk that
they have to bear and of the patients’ denials and unwillingness to come
to terms with this. Separation from and lack of intimacy with others of-
ten follows, and the burden of individual responsibility and an interna-
lised demand for efficacy and zero error can have a strong impact on
their lives (Allsop & Mulcahy 1998; West 2004). Detachment as a coping
strategy can spill over into arrogance and a failure to double check their
judgements and practices with others – as illustrated dramatically in
some of the recent public enquiries into the actions of particular practi-
tioners. The ‘flaw of self-sufficiency’ and the dynamic that can separate a
group from its social context was identified long ago (Freidson
1970:368ff), but it has been only minimally heeded in current debates.
Does a much more informed, educated and confident public now out-
date and supersede all of this? Sociological theory has made much in
recent years of the challenge to expertise across different areas of science
and social engineering (Giddens 1990, Reed 1996). Scepticism about
experts has given rise to a crisis in public services and a continuing em-
phasis on managing performance (Clarke 2003). There is evidence, at
least, of a more discerning public in the way in which individual medical
practitioners have been effectively challenged for their arrogance and
poor practice, in the rising numbers of complaints, and in the growing
resort to complementary and alternative forms of medicine. The
strength of some patient groups in directly challenging health care prac-
tices is an indicator of a change in a similar direction. But I am not en-
tirely convinced. What all this fails to acknowledge is the emotional
charge that underpins the medical encounter – a theme recently en-
dorsed in an important paper challenging the pre-eminence of regula-
tory discourse in health care policy and, instead, placing trust in the fore-
ground (Harrison & Smith 2004). People, although more critical, still
seem to trust doctors. A report on a survey of patient perceptions of doc-
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tors in the UK, the US, Canada, Germany, South Africa and Japan con-
firmed rising expectations on the part of patients. It also discovered,
however, that doctors scored themselves rather higher than patients did
on attributes such as their own compassion and understanding. The gap
between doctor and patient perceptions was particularly high in the UK.
But the survey also found that patients still trusted doctors – the relation-
ship emerged, rather startlingly, as second in importance only to family
relationships and above relationships with co-workers and spiritual and
financial advisors (Pincock 2003). Coulter’s detailed evidence on the de-
mand for shared care and the ‘autonomous patient’ frequently intro-
duces cautionary notes that echo these aforementioned points (Coulter
2002; 2003). When it comes to health, I suspect we will continue to
hope for heroes – without these heroes the outlook would be too bleak.
What can be provisionally said about the durability of the hope for
heroes in the context of policymaking? There are similar challenges to
the persona of the neutral expert, to the altruist, and particularly to the
doctor as advocate – as patient groups are increasingly directly repre-
sented in policy arenas. While ultimately there is empirical work to be
done in understanding policy networks and their operation, those who
would argue for the reduction of medical power need to acknowledge the
kinds of contradictory tendencies that have been outlined above. I sug-
gest they also need to consider the impact of continuing, as many doc-
tors do, in one-to-one clinical practice. This may well serve to reinforce
the hero identity of doctors now operating on a national stage. When
both the wish for heroes and the unstable dynamics of heroism are fac-
tored into understanding ‘decline’, the resulting picture is a lot less
straightforward than analysts have thus far been prepared to counte-
nance.
Discussion
All this begins to point the sociology of professions in some new direc-
tions. The first is towards the field of emotions and the potential of psy-
chodynamic theories for further unpacking the ambivalent conse-
quences of the construction and demolition of heroes. The argument
here is not so much about the return to such approaches in clinical and
professional practice in a more regulated world (Chamberlayne & Sud-
bury 2001; Chamberlayne et al. 2004). It is rather about removing these
analytical tools from their safe place as the expertise space of named
professionals (psychiatrists, social workers, mental health nurses), and
turning them instead on the professionals themselves. West (2004) pro-
vides one directly relevant example in his use of biographical methods
and psychoanalytical theory to explore distress in the life histories of in-
ner-London GPs, some of whom he describes as ‘enmeshed in a dis-
course of the doctor as omnipotent and omniscient hero’, and others
celia davies 149
who struggle against this. Psycho-dynamically influenced work in re-ex-
amining issues of rationality, emotion and ‘race’ in care work organisa-
tions also points to the power of such developments (Gunaratnam & Le-
wis 2001).
A second important direction points to the need for the study of pro-
fessionals within the national policy process. The present policy climate
in the UK, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, is one in which the
government has created multiple-stakeholder discussion arenas that
bring together professions, service providers, officials and representa-
tives of organised patient groups. How do these groups mutually consti-
tute themselves and the practice that results in health policy decisions?
What transformations occur when patient representatives appear at the
policy table? The doctor may be dislodged without necessarily being di-
minished. There is empirical work to be done here and answers may
well both vary considerably with the policy context and be rather un-
stable as new vocabularies, identities and understandings of the possible
begin to emerge.
If new thinking on the profession of medicine needs to work with an
alternative model of power and to acknowledge emotion in the ways sug-
gested, there is also a third move to be made, related to social theory and
its conceptualisations of change. Here it may be more helpful to work
not with familiar arguments about late modernity and its declining faith
in expertise (Giddens 1991; Beck 1992), but with more recent concepts
of liquid modernity (Bauman 2001, 2002). Bauman challenges the fixity
of institutions, arguing that if nothing solidifies into an end state, what
is left (returning to the battle imagery) is an endless series of ‘reconnais-
sance skirmishes’. ‘Things today’, he suggests
are moving sideways, aslant or across rather than forward, often backward,
but as a rule, the movers are unsure of their direction and the nature of
successive steps is hotly contested… (Bauman 2001:137)
In an observation particularly pertinent to the argument here, he con-
tinues:
One change starts before another has been completed, and, most impor-
tantly, the sediments and imprints of one change are not wiped clean or
erased before another change starts to scatter its own. (Ibid:137)
Conclusion
The present analysis has sought to confront some of the ambiguities that
continue to surround the profession of medicine. It has explored the
nature of some contemporary arguments about decline, noting their
strengths but also logging their inconclusiveness. It has traced this pro-
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blem to an overly simplistic and overly solid model of power, going on to
argue that we need to attend to the hero identity which infuses the rela-
tion of the medical profession both with the state and with the public. All
this suggests that it is now perhaps time to refresh and replenish the
theory of professions, to re-infuse it with an understanding not only of
claims for control, but also of the nature of the promise that it offers and
our ambivalent response to it. To do this, we must address the complex
relationship between state and profession – conducted under the eye of a
changing public, sometimes prepared to challenge, but by no means al-
ways ready to give up on the hope that the profession of medicine offers.
In this chapter I have shown that the medical profession is not so
much under siege – squeezed ‘between people and policy’ – as that it
continues to play an altogether more ambiguous role in mediating be-
tween the two. When the heroic character of this positioning is un-
masked – when, or rather if, the advantages of class, gender and ethni-
city are stripped away from the medical profession – I suspect that hope
and fear will continue to be present and to have a profound effect upon
what happens both in the consulting room and in the corridors of politi-
cal power.
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Tensions in Medical Work between
Patients’ Interests and Administrative
and Organisational Constraints
Werner Vogd
The German health care system is undergoing various changes due to
what is known as the third health care reform (Gesundheitsreform), in-
itiated by the Social Democratic and Green Party coalition government.
Obviously, one of the aims is to reduce the general cost of health ser-
vices. With the slogan ‘Rationalisation without Rationing’ (Rationalisier-
ung statt Rationierung), a transformation process is currently taking place
which influences the work of medical personnel in different ways.
This particularly affects hospital doctors, who will no longer be ‘cap-
tains of the ship’. New members of hospital boards will be increasingly
recruited from the administrative elites. In this process, doctors will gra-
dually lose their influence on organisational aspects, especially with re-
spect to human resources and strategic decisions within their hospitals.
The way in which physicians conduct their daily work will also be af-
fected. From a sociological viewpoint, there seems to be an ongoing pro-
cess of de-professionalisation and dissolution of the power and autono-
my of the medical profession. One might think that a new kind of
professionalism is emerging, because under the new conditions, expert
knowledge will remain one of the most powerful resources in medical
work. But as I argue further, the configuration of this expert knowledge
increasingly acquires the characteristics of highly distributed knowledge.
Because of this feature I propose to use the term ‘medical expert’ rather
than ‘medical professional’.
Whether this movement affects patients negatively or positively is a
question that needs to be answered empirically. The decreased power of
physicians may lead to more patient autonomy. However, confronted
with an anonymous organisation, it will be more difficult for patients to
address their needs to an individual person, like a specific doctor.
Participant Observation in German Hospitals
The following remarks are based on ethnographic studies in German
hospitals focusing on medical actions and decision-making. The investi-
gation was accomplished in the form of a panel design, which allows us
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to perceive how the organisational changes have affected medical work
in hospitals.
In the first part of the study field research took place from 2000 to
2002, in four different types of hospital departments (abdominal sur-
gery, oncology, clinic for psychosomatic diseases, and a general medical
ward) at several institutions. In the second part of the study, a general
ward and a department of abdominal surgery were revisited during
2004.
In the period between the two field research phases, hospitals in Ger-
many were experiencing an extensive process of organisational change.
On the one hand, the introduction of the new Diagnosis Related Groups
(DRG) brought about a new cost-accounting structure. The basis for cal-
culating costs is no longer length of hospital stay, but a billing system
related to diagnosis. On the other hand, connected to the ongoing priva-
tisation of hospitals, concepts of modern management (computer-based
controlling, outsourcing, and centralisation of important functions) are
beginning to enter hospital life. These processes may bring about signif-
icant changes in the context of medical work, as well as in the way in
which medical decisions are made. I will try to reconstruct the processes
of change and their interactive dynamics in a comparative analysis with
three distinct levels.
On the first level, I will focus on a pre-post comparison of the medical
practices and/or the different organisational forms of medical work be-
tween the two different investigation phases. The second level will in-
volve comparing the observations and my reconstructions of the differ-
ent medical disciplines and cultures. The third level contrasts the
relationship between the observed practice and the reflection of this
practice by the actors. The aim of this step is to elaborate on the tensions
between classic medical professional habitus (Bourdieu 1997) and the
new organisational requirements.
The comparison of these levels is structured by various common
themes that occur in all of the observed wards. Identification of these
themes is guided by empirical observations. Common themes are pa-
tient management, complex and complicated cases, routine cases, orga-
nisation of ward rounds, care of dying patients, etc. Because we look less
at the medical details of the treatment and more at the social organisa-
tion of these processes, we are able to abstract from an individual case.
In spite of the different diseases and their particularities, we will see
structural homologies, and maybe with changing administrational con-
ditions differences in the social organisation of medical work (for
further methodological details, see Vogd 2005).
Even if the empirical reality of medical routine work seems extremely
complex, in many cases we can identify a common theme that shapes
the dynamics of decisions in the examined wards. This is a conflict be-
tween the central values of the medical profession and economic and
bureaucratic rationality. Physicians at a clinical ward would like to give
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maximal care to their patients, but have to act according to limited re-
sources (see Vogd 2004a; 2004b). In my research, I would like to find
out how the introduction of Diagnosis Related Groups and new instru-
ments of economic control affect the relationship of medical profes-
sionals towards their organisation and the contact with their patients.
These processes may change not only the contexts of medical work, but
will probably influence the way in which physicians make their decisions
and manage their daily work. Maybe these processes will also affect the
basic characteristics of the medical profession.
The next section reviews the characteristics of the medical profession
from a traditional theoretical sociological viewpoint. This is followed by a
reflection on the role of the profession in modern society under the con-
ditions of functional differentiation. The previous considerations will
then be clarified on the basis of empirical examples from everyday life
in a general medical ward of a hospital in a large city in Germany.
Professions in the Traditional Sociological Theory
In the 1930s, Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1933) defined professions by
the fact that their participants control specialised intellectual techniques,
which are justified by nature or jurisprudence and have to be learned
during a longer training process. The professional – and Talcott Parsons
(1968) follows this definition – is therefore conscious of his social re-
sponsibility with respect to his client as well as to society. It is assumed
that he or she acts predominantly in the interest of welfare and the pub-
lic, and does not act according to individual profit interests. From the
perspective of institutional power, a profession is characterised as an in-
stitutionalised organisation that regulates its interests autonomously
without outside interference. The medical professional himself decides
on the interpretation of his knowledge and outlines the code of his pro-
fessional ethics. The profession itself trains its novices and those care
occupations that are traditionally subordinated to it.
From an ideological-critical viewpoint – which is especially connected
with the name Eliot Freidson (1970) – the public-interest orientation of
professionals was questioned and distrusted in the 1970s. The model of
hierarchical distribution of knowledge, the professional dominance of
physicians, and the minor role of patients and nurses was being increas-
ingly criticised. The claim for more individual patient autonomy and
nurses’ organisational autonomy seemed to be the appropriate demand
of a democratic society of individualised citizens. With headlines like
‘shared decision-making’ and ‘informed consent’, a number of health
policy discourses ensued.
In spite of the political correctness of the demand for patient emanci-
pation, empirical studies as well as theoretical reflections show that
there are ‘good’ reasons to maintain the hierarchical asymmetry between
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doctor and patient (or nurses) (see Charles et al. 1999; Debe et al. 1996;
Guadagnoli & Ward 1998; Blanchard et al. 1988; Frank 2002; Margalith
& Shapiro 1997; Saake 2004: Strull et al. 1984; Verhaak et al. 2000).
This functional sociological argument does not contradict the finding
that well-informed patients who understand and agree with their treat-
ments seem to recover better than very compliant patients. The author’s
argument is that professional practice cannot be translated into a ra-
tional discourse between two (business) partners, i.e., doctor and patient,
because when faced with serious illness, medical practitioners have to
act in real time.
While scientists and social scientists are relieved from the acute pres-
sure to act and decide, and usually have enough time to reflect on things
thoroughly, physicians have to act against the risk of not acting. They
have to act under ambiguous conditions. Therapies may fail and some-
times there are substantial uncertainties in the diagnosis. It is crucial to
note that physicians cannot delegate responsibility, and that their author-
ity is to be maintained under conditions of lack of knowledge and uncer-
tainty. Practical authority results not only from scientific reasoning, but
also from the asymmetric logic of the practical alliance between physi-
cian and patient (see Oevermann 2000). Thus physicians have to simul-
taneously act as both specialists and generalists. A physician notices the
patient specifically, in terms of his disease, and in a more general sense
as a whole human being in his emotional, social and existential condi-
tions. Even if the physician is not able to help the patient with his medi-
cal knowledge and the patient is going to pass away, as a professional he
has to maintain the relationship with the patient and his relatives, and
offer his support.
From the outlined perspective, all the paradoxes of the modern medi-
cal system – which can be summarised in the sentence ‘more medicine
results in more medicine’ – are not primarily caused by the misuse of
power and the profit interests of physicians, but more likely by an inher-
ent characteristic of the treatment of serious illnesses in a highly func-
tional differentiated modern society. Seen from this sociological view-
point, the social and economic costs of modern medicine do not
originate in the uncontrolled power of physicians: in fact, in line with
the scientific progress of medicine, the uncertainties within the medical
decision-making process also increase. More medical knowledge re-
quires more personal authority to interpret this knowledge.
Professions Descending from their Zenith?
In the 1970s, the medical profession appeared to be a winner of the
modernisation of health care services. Its positive knowledge seemed be
grow limitlessly thanks to presumably unhindered medical research.
Hafferty and Light (1995) therefore speak of the ‘golden age of medi-
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cine’. A decade later, the social situation had led to a different picture of
the medical profession. While the economic cost of further growth in the
health care system seemed to be burdening the options of the modern
welfare state, diverse academic elites who claimed to be in control of
health care services were now suddenly speaking in a different tone of
voice. The political crisis of medicine intensified with the uncontrolled
increase of its consumption as a resource. Health insurance companies
and health service agencies in the Federal Republic of Germany have
since 1977 been obliged to cut cost-expansion politics with the goal of a
stable state budget, like in other Western countries. In terms of the aim
of balancing health care expenditures, the reform was not very success-
ful.
With the German health reform laws (which appeared in three stages
in 1989, 1993 and 1997), access to economic control was gradually ex-
tended over the medical sector. External controls on the plausibility and
rationality of professional services by health insurers, contracts between
individual hospitals and insurance companies, and other ‘regulative’
practices have been made possible. ‘Faced with tightening revenue
streams, individual [medical] specialities have taken up arms to control
particular diagnostic or therapeutic modalities… A related conflict has
been drawn between generalists and specialists over who should func-
tion as a legitimate source of primary health care service’ (Hafferty &
Light 1995: 136).
With respect to the development of medical professionalisation, an-
other aspect must be discussed. The ongoing functional differentiation
between specialists leads to a disintegration of health services. Even if
the political side, especially the former coalition government of Social
Democrats and the Green Party, favours the family doctor as a gate-
keeper, family doctors’ contribution to the health care supply has in fact
decreased continually in recent decades in terms of budget and number
of practitioners.
Modern health care is no longer the job of an individual professional,
it is divided labour within an institution, where the responsibilities are
shared among a team of physicians and nurses. Hereby patients, espe-
cially in hospitals, rarely face an individual professional who makes a
decision based on his authority and with regard to the personal relation-
ship he has with his client. Instead, patients are usually confronted with
an organisation that enacts bureaucratic routines and presents various
anonymous doctors in multiple contexts. We find an increase in the tai-
loring of medicine. As the sociologist Rudolf Stichweh (1996: 50) points
out, we can see that the evolution of modern organisations leads to a
decrease in influence of the professions in favour of highly organised
and bureaucratised systems of experts.
The central role of the medical professional is also challenged from
another angle. With the academic institutionalisation of public health
and the health care economy in the 1980s and the development of evi-
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dence-based medicine (EBM), the old clinical elites have been disputed.
The medical profession itself no longer holds the top positions in the
various health care organisations without a challenge. Professionals in
new disciplines, such as health economists, epidemiologists and health
care managers are usually not well qualified to assume clinical duties.
They make their decisions far away from patients, on the basis of statis-
tical information, and ‘evaluate’ medical practice without contact with
the daily routines in clinical wards. This new type of academic elite pre-
fers bureaucratic and economic ways of thinking (see Hafferty & McKin-
lay 1993), directing its attention to a lesser extent towards clinical prob-
lems and therefore the suffering individual, and more towards
administrative affairs and resource management.
In a political and economic sense, the medical profession hereby loses
its traditional power. Guidelines for medical treatment, originally formu-
lated as self-regulating instruments for the medical profession, mutate
into a means of economic and political contexts, to control the economic-
ally relevant treatment parameters (Vogd 2002). For example, German
legislators now determine the form and extent of post-graduate medical
training. Those doctors who do not follow this rule risk losing part of
their public licence (Pfadenhauer 2004). Although the contents of this
training are still controlled by medical specialists, the future will reveal
whether political threats will have any real effect on the work and educa-
tion of physicians.
These are all indicators of the medical professional’s increasing loss of
significance. Individual doctors lose their power with respect to organi-
sational affairs, while having to face the consequences of the differentia-
tion of their discipline into many sub-disciplines. They have to work in
teams and will not always have the chance to survey the entire diagnostic
and therapeutic process of those patients with whom they are involved.
This kind of de-professionalisation is not limited to any single country
but can be observed in all of the modern industrial nations (see Hafferty
& Light 1995).
From Spoken Medicine to Written Medicine
How do the changed role of the medical profession and the current re-
strictive economic conditions affect everyday life in hospitals? To answer
this question, let us take a look at the empirical part of this study. At an
internal medicine ward, an initial superficial comparison between the
two different research phases (2001 vs 2004) reveals the following dif-
ferences: in the first observation, 3.75 full-time resident physicians were
responsible for a ward with 36 patients. Three years later, only 2.25 resi-
dent physicians were responsible for the same ward. Apart from this re-
duction of medical staff, the average hospital stay had decreased from 11
to 7 days.
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I discovered that there is less verbal interaction between physicians
nowadays. For example, handing over information on a patient’s status
at shift changes now tends to be done in written form. Daily hospital
routines now involve significantly fewer interactions between physicians
and patients. Instead of personal interaction, medical records now seem
to play a major role in organising medical decision-making. We also find
an increasing fragmentation and tailoring of the treatment process. Im-
portant parts of the patient’s treatment, for example the question of post-
stationary care, contact with social workers, and management of patient
discharge, are now handed over to nurses. Doctors are no longer respon-
sible for the treatment process as a whole. This means that modern doc-
tors, contrary to their own professional self-description, never seem to be
responsible for the ‘whole patient’ any more.
While uncertainties in medical decision-making would have pre-
viously been managed by finding a consensus within the medical team,
it now seems that an increasing emphasis is being laid on routines, with
decisions becoming more individualised at all levels. The authority of a
single individual has gained more weight in dissolving uncertainty. Let
us go more into detail:
Dr. Martin (resident physician) to the participant observer: Now there are two
doctors for the ward and then a doctor from the diagnostic department who
spends a quarter of her time at this station… Sometimes one of us works
alone… then sometimes things happen that are not so good... but we are not
able to take care of everything.
While three years ago resident physicians examined each of their pa-
tients attentively and in detail, a careful examination is no longer possi-
ble under today’s conditions. Instead, doctors now rely on the diagnosis
that the admitting physicians made:
Dr. Martin: now with the overtime hours... I have just as many as before…
but now they are not paid for... now I work faster … I have less time to speak
with the patient… I used to always proceed with a comprehensive internal
examination... now I have to trust the examination given at the admission
station.
Communication between physicians is now often conducted only in
written form, on the basis of a patient’s record. There is usually no time
to personally hand over a patient to a colleague:
Dr. Martin: I now feel strong… good mood, I am going on vacation... the last
day is usually very hectic... now I have to write everything down… the other
doctor has to know what will need to be done on Monday... it’s not like it was
in the ‘good old days’, when we went together on ward rounds, to visit pa-
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tients three days before… back then I thought it took about a week to know a
patient well… today the patient is gone within a week…
Under the ‘new’ organisational conditions, the treatment process ap-
pears more fragmented and tailored. There is less time to spend on phy-
sician-patient interactions. Instead of personal meetings, patient records
are the medium used to figure out the patient’s process. Under these
conditions, the physician is no longer responsible for the ‘whole’ patient,
but only for a part within a fragmented work process. The change from
personal to written communication requires a new culture of reading
and writing medical scripts, to minimise mistakes during information
transfer.
Sometimes it happens that a patient is released after a cardiologic in-
tervention without being seen or examined by a resident physician on
the ward. This fragmentation sometimes causes complications:
9:45 (on the ward)
Nurse: Mrs. Schmidt, the patient who had the PCTA, had to go... she was
shifted from ward 15 to ward 33 because now there is a free bed...
Dr. Kranz (resident physician): Good; once again, I have released a patient
I’ve never seen or examined.
(to the nurse) Was an electrocardiogram done?
Nurse: Yes.
(a few minutes later the electrocardiogram assistant visits the ward)
Dr. Kranz: Has Mrs. Schmidt received an electrocardiogram?
Assistant: I don’t know... Shall I do one?
Dr. Kranz:Maybe one was written up in the other ward.
Assistant: I can’t remember... Shall I do one?
Dr. Kranz: She is probably already gone... then we are providing a mere ske-
leton of medical services (wir machen hier nur Schmalspurmedizin).
(10:30, in the physicians’ room)
Dr. Kranz: (Prepares the documents for Mrs. Schmidt, codes the diagnoses in the
computer and writes the short physician’s letter. The whole procedure takes only 20
minutes).
Participant observer:Was that the female patient you did not see?
Dr. Kranz: Yes.
(A few minutes later)
Nurse: We have mixed up the letters... Mrs. Schmidt has the letter for Mrs.
Smitz... I have just made a copy to give the right one to the other patient.
Dr. Kranz (to the participant observer, with a wink): You may not write down
what happens here... patients being released and only briefly examined... the
wrong physician letter... in earlier times, I always handed over the physician
letter to the patients personally and exchanged a few words with them... to-
day there is not enough time...
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In the accelerated treatment process, competencies and responsibilities
are divided into smaller fragments. Highly educated physicians in parti-
cular suffer under these new conditions, because sometimes they are
only observers in a process they cannot influence:
(In the ward: Dr. Kranz, herself a cardiologist, studies the record of a patient who
has arrived after an ambulant cardiologic intervention.)Resident physician Dr.
Kranz: With Mr. Nahod... our patients get a mere skeleton of medical ser-
vice... usually we have to measure the cardiovascular functioning of the
heart before we undertake the intervention… now this is no longer per-
formed... I always get an uncomfortable feeling when I read that the cardio-
vascular functioning is unknown ...
Participant observer: You are a cardiologist?
Dr. Kranz: Yes, this is my problem... I am only an assistant now... and in the
quality assessment ‘the cardiovascular functioning is always important’...
when the function is low, we can achieve a lot with different types of medi-
cation… and with the PCTA, if it is too low, it can become problematic... this
is the difference between theory and practice... even though it is pointed out
in the studies that patients would benefit... but whether I do it now or write
something in the letter to the family doctor… it is also a question of their
budget …
The division of the treatment process and the frequent shift changes
produce new demands on the organisation of medical work in the ward,
where the rounds made by senior and chief physicians, means that phy-
sician sometimes meet patients not known to them :
8:35 (In the ward)
Resident physician Dr. Holstein: Yesterday I was alone in the ward... and
then… the ward round with the chief physician... I don’t know why under
these [organisational] conditions… most of the patients are unknown to me.
Participant observer: And you saw all the patients?
Dr. Holstein: Yes, and then it was a little bit stupid… I didn’t know my collea-
gue’s patients… therefore, I could only read out loud what was written in the
record… but I don’t know if these facts are still up-to-date… there was a pa-
tient who had received a computer tomography the day before.
Participant observer:Mr. Manstein?
Dr. Holstein: Yes… I remembered the X-ray pictures only vaguely.
Participant observer: And now? Did the chief doctor make a decision?
Dr. Holstein: He wants to inject him… this is the problem… I know nothing
about the patient… how he feels, what he expects from us… I only read from
the record but I am unsure whether this is reasonable or appropriate for
him …
Participant observer: Did you check the documents of the unknown patients
in the morning?
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Dr. Holstein: No, I did not have the time to do this... I had to do blood sam-
ples and arrange examinations... I only read what was documented... well, I
often get the hang of the subject rather quickly.
Participant observer: And to inject him, this is the decision now?
Dr. Hollstein: He (the chief physician) says ‘it’s a really interesting case’...
however, he cannot actually decide because he does not even know the pa-
tient.
(10:30, ward round, a few weeks later)
Chief physician: With the record... now we should also look at the charts out-
side the patient’s room... we don’t have to play more stupid than we actually
are… to study the record outside the room takes just as long as inside…
therefore, we have a look outside now... new conditions lead to new ways of
proceeding... only the difficult cases must be familiar to every doctor ...
usually there are 2 to 3 of these problematic cases on the ward...
(In the patient’s room)
Chief physician (to a medical student): Where is the nurse?
(The student goes to the nurses’ station. A few seconds later she comes back with a
nurse.)
Nurse: Good morning... my colleague is ill... we have a nurse stepping in
from ward 15 who does not know the patients...
Chief physician: Well, then tell me at least that no one will come with us.
These few details of everyday life in a hospital show that physicians in
modern organisations no longer get to act as professionals in the sense
of the classic sociological understanding of the word. Only periodically
does a physician get to build up a personal relationship with his patient.
His work depends mostly on organisational, administrational and eco-
nomic obligations. The lack of personal contact touches a core value of
medical professionalism. It used to be that physicians knew the whole
patient. Now this knowledge has become increasingly distributed across
a network of different human members in a team and the non-human
agents of the organisation (e.g., the medical record; see Berg 1996). On
the one hand, it has to be taken into account that in an organisation of
divided labour, specialised workers may fulfil their tasks in a more quali-
fied way, e.g., nurses may be more competent at fulfilling ‘sentimental’
and ‘emotional work’ than physicians (see Strauss et al. 1997). On the
other hand, the costs of the increasing fragmentation of work should be
considered, e.g., the interface problem in communications between the
various agents of a treatment process.
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Concluding Remarks
The cited examples indicate that German hospitals are in a transitional
state. The old habitus of the physician in a general medical ward has
been massively altered. Physicians still remember that things used to be
different – that there was less bureaucracy and more time for ‘spoken
medicine’. Sometimes doctors miss the routines and are unsure how to
adjust smoothly to the new conditions. Maybe in the future they will
refer more often to formal solutions, like guidelines and standardised
treatment paths for common diseases. While uncertainties in medical
decision-making used to be mastered by finding a consensus within the
medical team, now there is less time to discuss problematic cases with
colleagues. It seems that an increasing emphasis is being placed on rou-
tines, while decisions have become more individualised at all levels. The
individual authority of the medical specialist has increased for purposes
of eliminating uncertainty, but it is undermined by the process of stan-
dardisation and distributed knowledge between doctors, nurses and
non-human agents (Latour 1994). It seems to me that hierarchy, espe-
cially the function of the head of the medical department, may acquire a
new meaning in medical organisations in the future.
The organisational changes pointed out concern work at a general
medical ward in particular. We also notice more pressure in surgical sta-
tions. Surgeons feel more exploited by the organisation in their daily
work routines and have less time to speak with their patients, but they
essentially perform the same kind of medicine as before. The situation is
especially different for resident physicians of general medical wards. Be-
sides being exploited by their organisations, they feel that their profes-
sional identity, their own medical culture, is being threatened. They no
longer see themselves in the position of being able to live up to their own
professional standards. From a sociological viewpoint, they are experien-
cing an ongoing process of de-professionalisation, a dissolution of their
medical autonomy.
Physicians at hospitals are obviously under pressure due to increasing
time constraints, the importance of which lies with the economic ratio-
nale. The most expensive time is the working hour of a specialist physi-
cian, so time is one of the main factors in a medical organisation under
neo-liberal conditions.
The fact that hospital stays are much shorter now than in the past is
not only driven by intrinsic medical developments – such as minimally
invasive surgery – it is also a consequence of the rationalisation of medi-
cal work. From this perspective, the demands of extramuralisation can
be primarily seen as an economically-driven trend to reduce costs com-
pared to the insight that care at home or at specialised institutions is
statistically cheaper than care in a hospital, supervised by expensive
medical experts.
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The long-term effects of these processes remain an open question. We
have to take into account the consequences of the education of physi-
cians, the costs of interface problems between the new health care orga-
nisations, and the costs of administration of medical services (see Wool-
handler et al. 2003). We have to think about the costs of changing the
established professional medical culture, as well as reflect on the new
roles of patients and their relatives and of nurses in these processes.
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Empowerment of Social Services
Professionals
Strategies for Professionalisation and Knowledge
Development
Jeroen Gradener and Marcel Spierts
Professionals in public service do not have it easy. They suffer under the
constraints of government, market and managers, and are confronted
with ever-higher demands that threaten their discretionary space. Freid-
son (2001) sees an advancing market logic in which citizens present
themselves as vocal and demanding consumers who do not want to hear
about the considerations and assessments that professionals normally
make on the basis of their professional standards. Administrators, civil
servants and managers are also constantly making higher demands on
professionals that have little to do with the work itself. Standardisation
and protocols resulting from this bureaucratic logic also limit profes-
sional space.
The results of research in the degree to which the discretionary space
of social professionals is threatened are less clear. Jordan (2001) predicts
that in the near future professionals will no longer be able to make pro-
fessional judgements. Instead, they will have to service government
guidelines and policies, instructions from research departments, and or-
ders from management. Practitioners will thus become executors in-
stead of professionals. In the Netherlands, Tonkens (2003) also con-
cludes that professionals find themselves in the middle of a painful
fissure between highly demanding citizens and officious managers.
Further research reveals that policy developments such as accountabil-
ity, free-market processes and demand-oriented work have not yet ac-
quired an urgent meaning for the practice of many social professionals.
The government does want to be in charge of things by demanding ac-
countability and threatening to use market practices, but it does not yet
know where that might eventually lead. It also seems that in some parts
of the social sector (like community work) things are not so bad regard-
ing the forceful and intrusive behaviour of managers, because they
usually know from practice that a professionals’ space is not a trivial con-
cern. In fact, they often try to protect it. Social professionals aren’t taken
aback by citizens’ outspokenness. On the contrary, fostering the empow-
erment of citizens is one of their main tasks (Kremer & Verplanke 2004;
Spierts et al. 2003). In short, although at present – at least for part of the
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professional group – there is no great urgency, there are indications of a
creeping curtailment of professional space. Labour market studies show
that the public sector scores the worst when it comes to aspects like work
pressure, work conditions, job satisfaction, absenteeism, vacancies and
training facilities (Van Essen et al. 2001).
Controversial Professionalism
Social professionals frequently depend on the political and public con-
sensus concerning the necessity of social interventions. They will receive
little endorsement from public opinion, are rarely applauded in public,
and their professionalism is often questioned. In turn, the mistrust of
outsiders translates into a low level of professional pride and low self-
esteem (Gradener 2003; Spierts et al. 2003).
There is much support for the idea that, against the growing influence
of market and bureaucratic logic, the logic of professionalism is in need
of reinforcement (Freidson 2001; WRR 2004). The process of the pro-
fessionalisation of the social professions has stalled in recent decades,
however. Social professionals could use some self-esteem to set this pro-
cess in motion again. This will certainly not be a simple task. It demands
that we discover the most suitable strategy for strengthening the social
professions. But first we would like to outline how we will discuss the
problem. We believe that the nature of knowledge development is a deci-
sive factor in determining the current position of social professions. In
the next section we will sketch the dimension of knowledge development
and relate it to other dimensions, to determine the degree of professio-
nalisation among the social professions. Subsequently, we will explore
possible strategies for the development of the social professions, in order
to further elaborate on the conceptual and practical consequences in the
area of knowledge development. And lastly, we will show that empower-
ment benefits social professionals when they forge alliances with ex-
perts, policymakers and managers.
The Struggle for Knowledge
Social professionals are quite capable of agreeing on the most urgent
social problems. However, their own practical expertise is insufficiently
articulated in the social debate. Osmond and O’Connor (2004) claim
that ‘in the current environment, an incapacity to articulate what we
know places us at a considerable disadvantage’. Welfare workers, for in-
stance, often note differences in interpretation concerning the kinds of
problems and the nature of necessary interventions. Knowledge of and
access to specific social sector target groups are deployed mainly by sol-
ving politically formulated problems.
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By expertise of the social professions we mean a body of knowledge
and skills. The question of how knowledge and skills can be strength-
ened at a time when the professionalism of the social professions is un-
der mounting pressure is central here. The effectiveness and efficacy of
the interventions as well as their scientific substantiation are being in-
creasingly discussed (WRR 2004). The institutions where social profes-
sionals work, react to this pressure by giving in to market logic and sub-
mitting themselves to a new methodological stringency. This does not do
justice to the complexity and contextual orientation of the social profes-
sions. By pointing out existing professionalisation practices and strate-
gies for knowledge development in other fields, we will show that solu-
tions are available with which the social professions can profile
themselves as an independent field.
One reason for the lack of appreciation for the knowledge and skills of
social professionals lies in the limited scientific status of their profes-
sions. When the knowledge areas of the social professions are measured
against other scientific disciplines, Tucker (1996: 401) says:
Extensive exchanges in recent literature about validity… and nature and fo-
cus of professional practice… reveal social work to be fragmented, [which is]
a serious obstacle to its scientific growth. The basis of this analysis is the
paradigm concept of Kuhn. The degree to which a scientific discipline has
reached consensus over theory, methodology, techniques and problems,
forms a strong indicator for the status of such a discipline.
Tucker identifies a ‘continuing, unresolved’ internal debate over these
topics. A strong core of scientific journals is also lacking, as are a domi-
nant philosophical internal applicability and cohesiveness. Social profes-
sions, together with their academic environment, the socio-cultural
sciences, indeed seem to be the scenario of a struggle of cultural-political
views that reverberate around the development of a Kuhnian-oriented
epistemology. It is a struggle, among other things, between a positivistic
(‘first world science’) (Gareau 1986; Healy & Peile 1995); a modernistic
(Ungar 2004); and a more interpretative, holistic, dialogic and knowl-
edge gathering (Peile & McCouat 2004).
The cultural-political struggle between the knowledge domains of so-
cial work appears as of yet settled into favour a positivistic vision of
science. The work field predominantly stimulates scientific research on
evidence-based practice. After all, at a time in which investors want to
see tangible results, there is a growing call to define a clear object, a
thorough process, and a SMART-formulated result. What’s more, it
seems that the core task of science has become the description of ‘sense
and nonsense’ in the field. In his attempt to measure the social profes-
sions, Tucker includes the list of prophets of objectifiable and objectified
social-work practices. The dominance of managerialism in the social sec-
tor (Ming-sum & Cheung 2004) enhances this process towards the ob-
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jectification of professional practices. It allows ‘command knowledge’
(input, output, procedures) to prevail over professional knowledge. The
degree to which this sort of ‘knowledge development’, motivated by poli-
tical pressure, really strengthens the legitimacy of interventions in the
social profession is debatable.
Against these control-oriented interventions – which strive for scienti-
fic legitimation – researchers like Campbell and Jovcelovitsch (2000)
plead for a more contextual approach, in which social professionals learn
to make their practices more explicit in terms of content, nature, dy-
namics and solution. This is not the same as protocolling or converting
interventions into specific ‘products’. On the contrary, it is about differ-
ent prioritisations and a valuation of the relation between what is
‘known’ and what is ‘doable’. The expertise of social professionals is con-
cealed within the social-relational as a means for empowerment, in
which the technically perfect application of intervention techniques is
secondary. It is a plea for ‘the importance of local knowledge: participa-
tion and social representations’ (Campbell & Jovcelovitsch 2000). In this
rearrangement of what must be known and doable, all the normative
and strategic ambitions converge so that with a conscious knowledge
strategy, the social professions can claim a discretionary space where
they can identify social problems in personal and professional terms,
and address them.
Degree of Professionalisation
To summarise, we can state that there are indeed initiatives towards
knowledge development, but there is absolutely no unit of transferable
theoretical knowledge and a corresponding set of methodical concepts in
the sense of a systematic body of knowledge and skills obtained through
research. Reflection in the social sciences takes place only sparsely, as
people are afraid to ‘deliver themselves’ to practice. As a consequence,
there is no powerful claim of one’s own expertise domain in terms of a
unique knowledge and expertise that are reserved for a particular profes-
sional group.
The lack of systematic knowledge development is an indication of the
degree of professionalisation of the social professions. Freidson (2001)
uses four other dimensions to typify the degree of professionalisation of
professions. These dimensions enable us to complete the picture of the
situation of the social professions:
– Division of labour – Social professionals themselves are not in a posi-
tion to determine what precisely has to be done. In the Dutch situa-
tion, it was mainly those particular initiatives linked to the denomi-
national pillars during the period of ‘pillarisation’ that ensured that
the work was done properly. Gradually over time, the government
and managers increasingly began to determine what needed to be
done. This has placed professionals into an increasingly dependent
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relationship. For example, they have little influence on determining
the quality standards of their own work. The fact that the profession
developed from volunteer sector has not exactly contributed to its sta-
tus either.
– Labour market – The professional group has no control over access to
the labour market. In principle, anyone can call himself or herself a
socio-cultural worker, youth worker, or community worker. There are
no legal provisions in this respect. Formal recognition, title protec-
tion, and registration are almost nonexistent. Moreover, protected po-
sitions are not strived for either. The plea for a ‘open profession’
forms a connecting thread in the history of the professionalisation of
the social professions. The core notion of the open profession is that
access to the social professions should be of a multiple nature. Un-
like most other professions, this access is not restricted to one type of
training.
– Education and training – Professional organisations do not give pro-
fessional practitioners control over access to professional training;
the curriculum; continued education, which lacks a cohesive system
of training programs and corresponding certifications; and profes-
sional practitioner control over this via professional organisations.
– Professional ideology – Social professionals work, via subsidies and
funds, on objectives that continuously demand political or even mor-
al considerations. If the legitimacy of the goals is eliminated, the flow
of subsidies can simply dry up. Hence, professional ideology and
professional identity are partially dependent upon the environment.
Standards and norms for good professional practices have not been
established. Only social workers and community workers have a pro-
fessional code, which includes provisions for a number of profes-
sional ethics issues as well as sanctions for those who failure to com-
ply.
Professionalisation Strategy
Measured against the norm of the classic professions, the degree of pro-
fessionalisation of the social professions is extremely low. What are the
consequences of this low degree of professionalisation? Some opt to no
longer identify these practitioners as professionals, but more as execu-
tors. Because socio-cultural workers, community workers and youth
workers themselves lack an academically legitimized knowledge back-
ground and powerful professional associations, the profession cannot
regulate access, and seldom operates as a group of professionals but al-
most exclusively as salaried employees. Thus they are per definition
strongly dependent on managers (Bovens 2003).
The opposite strategy consists of setting a professionalisation process
in motion through which the profession can accumulate more recogni-
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tion and power. This can be done via better compliance with regulations
that other highly professionalised professions such as doctors and law-
yers have. As soon as the profession begins to meet these requirements,
it will be more clearly distinct from other professions, which will make it
increasingly clear who is qualified and what those qualifications entail.
Neither option is an attractive one. The option of deprofessionalisation
does not correspond with the complex societal problems that social pro-
fessionals have to deal with. Reaching the most difficult groups, acting
as an in-between and the shaping co-producership of citizens requires in
fact high-quality professionalism. The other option contains the danger
of an excessively rigid professionalisation, with the risk professionals
taking over activities from citizens and connecting less to citizens’ ex-
perienced problems and everyday challenges. Besides this being at odds
with the notion of an ‘open profession’, the wish to grow into a classic
profession hides the risk of looking only inwards and not focusing en-
ough on the traffic along the boundaries between profession and society.
Questions about what outsiders, politicians, the general public and so-
cial professionals may expect and how, and perhaps most of all to what
degree they can meet the expectations are not asked often enough (Koe-
nis 1993).
Is a third way for the social professions possible, and what should it
look like? Etzioni (1969) saw a different social field laid out for the
‘semi-professions’ such as the social work professions but also teaching
and nursing. The characteristics Etzioni attributed to these semi-profes-
sions also repeatedly included ‘non-characteristics-yet’. Compared to the
classic professions, Etzioni considered these occupations to have less
status, a shorter training period, less advanced specialised knowledge,
more limited autonomy and less emphasis on the confidential character
of their work. In fact, ‘semi’ means incomplete, flawed, and imperfect in
this case. Aside from the negative connotation that the designation of
semi-profession invokes, the classic professions are still the standard
here, so that the objective remains the same as that of the professionali-
sation option.
Fully-Fledged Professions: Making a Virtue out of Need
To what degree is a third way possible for the social professions in which
they can develop into full-fledged professions, not on the basis of their
alleged weaknesses but precisely on the basis of their strengths and un-
iqueness? Social professions are often accused of being vague and dif-
fuse. Contrary to occupations like nursing or teaching, the precise con-
tent of these professions is often unclear for outsiders. The explanation
lies largely in the connection between the social professions and the quo-
tidian, and in the fact that these professions are per definition cyclically
sensitive. This has significant consequences for the actions of social pro-
fessionals:
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– The connection with the quotidian makes social professionals visible
everywhere. Compared to nurses and teachers, for example, the orga-
nisation of their space is less clear. This applies in any event to those
social professionals whose work involves outreach. Community
workers, for example, can be seen in the company of a group of resi-
dents inspecting the neighbourhood or at a sports club discussing
the inclusion of a group of youth. For professionals working at a spe-
cific accommodation, the use of space is different than that of a tea-
cher or nurse.
– Practically the same applies in terms of organising time. Social pro-
fessionals are less bound to fixed times. Youth workers, for example,
often have to adjust their working hours to the leisure-time patterns
of youth, in order to come into contact with them.
– The social order is more diffuse. Nurse-patient or teacher-pupil con-
tacts have a social relationship between them that is fairly accurate in
its delimitations and arrangement, whereas for social professionals
and users of these services things tend to be far more open. There
are also different degrees of involvement, varying from volunteer to
the simple user of services and all sorts of co-producership forms in
between.
– A fourth aspect in which the vagueness and diffuseness are manifest
concerns the order and goals that are established. In education, those
goals are largely set in the form of finishing levels, and the way that
school life is ordered is more or less directly derived from this. Con-
tent and goals in the social professions are per definition strongly
determined by professional and societal cycles. One minute a social
professional may be required to combat youth disturbances, followed
not much later by a request to shift his or her attention to assisting
work trajectories or make parental involvement at schools a priority.
The profession is thus dependent on others (politicians and man-
agers, other financiers), who determine the social agenda.
– The fifth aspect relates to the nature of the services. Services of social
professionals never involve a clear demand or supply. What is asked
and what is offered are always subject to multiple interpretations.
Users seldom know precisely what they want, and professionals have
to make continuous efforts to understand their own intentions and
discover what the problems and needs of the users are. Supply and
demand are always ‘mediated’ in different ways. This requires nor-
mative choices that seldom or never allow the formulation of clear
answers to clear questions (Kuypers 1993).
These characteristics of the work of social professionals have distinctive
disadvantages, such as the image of vagueness and diffuseness it in-
vokes in outsiders. The work also depends to a high degree on third
parties and context, and requires a permanent debate about related
goals. This undoubtedly has an influence on the professional identity
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and recognition of the social professions. There is another side to this:
The social professions are usually in line with societal topicality, which
obviously offers many plusses. A sensitivity to what is current, linked to
the flexible way in which they deal with ordering space, time and social
relationships, makes them versatile in many ways. Social professionals
often function as the boosters of social innovation. Herein lies the
strength and uniqueness of the social professions. They have a consider-
able head start when it comes to complex and unexpected situations that
demand creative interventions.
Towards a Cohesive Development of Knowledge and
Practice
What does a professionalisation strategy look like for the social profes-
sions taking into account the specific features that are sketched above?
First, it is important to determine that the five dimensions of the logic of
professionalism distinguished by Freidson are assessed differently for
the social professions. The dimensions of division of labour and the la-
bour market are less important to them. A professionalisation strategy
that offers a one-sided dedication to professional group formation in or-
der to control the division of labour and the labour market is of no use to
them. It can even be a negative thing for a particular profession to pur-
sue recognition, status and power in this way. The three remaining di-
mensions offer more reassurance for the development of a profession
and practice. At this moment, two contributing strategies are basically
manifest: evidence-based practice, and the clarification and development
of practical knowledge.
Evidence-Based Practice: A Scientific Hallmark
Proponents of an evidence-based approach have pleaded that those
working in the social sector should use more scientifically tested meth-
ods. In their opinion, evidence-based practice will convince not only pa-
trons and subsidisers of the quality of the work but also entitle the cli-
ents of the social sector to be helped according to the latest insights.
Evidence-based work comes from the medical sector and points to the
conscious, explicit and judicious use of the best evidence available
(Hutschemaekers 2001; Melief 2004). This definition still leaves room
for a professional’s own judgment. However, this original point of depar-
ture has been abandoned in health care practice. The meaning of evi-
dence-based medicine nowadays is mainly the application of interven-
tions that have been shown to be effective.
In the welfare sector, evidence-based practice has seldom been applied
up to now. Some general work methods are accepted in the sense that
they are described in handbooks, but they usually have not been tested
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externally. In practice, there is a lot of implicit use of methods, and this
tends to depend on the person. Methods are generally not clearly de-
scribed according to acknowledged standards (Garretsen et al. 2003).
Practical Knowledge
A second strategy to develop a profession and practice consists of recog-
nising the value of practical knowledge, which implies an accumulated
and integrated body of knowledge, views and values related to the prac-
tice a professional builds on the basis of personal and professional ex-
perience (Hutschemaekers 2001). Practical knowledge tends to be impli-
cit and personal; contrary to what we saw in the evidence-based
approach, this is not negatively valued per definition. On the contrary,
the challenge of this approach consists precisely in stimulating profes-
sionals to clarify, deepen and improve their implicit and personal knowl-
edge through exchange and dialogue. This approach implies that the re-
newal must thus come from the inside. Professionals must regain their
trust in their own expertise. They must make their practical knowledge
explicit by sharing it with each other. This is not a sinecure, given that
practical knowledge is largely context-specific and hence not simple to
convey. In addition, professionals are not always used to putting their
knowledge into words.
Social Professions’ Own Knowledge Domain
At first glance, the two aforementioned strategies seem to be opposites,
but they are not irreconcilable. In fact, a cohesive development of profes-
sion and practice requires a co-ordination between the two. To this end,
two-way traffic is required: both knowledge and ideas ‘from the outside’
and ‘from the inside’ should be taken advantage of and interacted upon
as much as possible. However, that necessitates a different idea about
knowledge and its development than is common in the evidence-based
approach. Evidence-based practice places context between parentheses,
and ends up being far too oriented towards application, protocol and
standardisation. This is how health care professionals experience work-
ing via guidelines and standards in a top-down approach. This ultimately
creates a schism between scientists and professionals. For example,
guidelines and standards in family practice, where they have been used
for some time now, are only followed to a limited degree (Hutschemae-
kers 2001).
The social professions thus require a particular approach to knowl-
edge and development. In that sense, they can be seen as an indepen-
dent knowledge domain, with a unique, recognisable body of knowl-
edge. Even though the development of this body of knowledge is in its
origin and nature related to the existing social sciences, as a field of
knowledge the social professions nonetheless distinguish themselves ex-
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plicitly from the scientific study of the social realm. The field of knowl-
edge exclusively embodies the empowerment aspects of the relations be-
tween the social professional, the client(-systems) and the socio-cultural
environment. What type of knowledge development is the most appro-
priate for that specific knowledge domain? We believe that, for now, two
features are essential.
First, knowledge development within the social professions is not just
some scientific strategy. The input is not the generalisation of knowledge
and the protocolling of practical knowledge. On the contrary, it is about
specifying social practices in their context and the social, cultural, political
and economic powers that prevent people from finding their objective.
One example is the issue of immigrant integration. For politicians, ad-
ministrators and policymakers migrant integration is a measurable con-
cept that is expressed mainly in speaking Dutch and the chance of parti-
cipating in the labour process. Social professionals view this more
contextually as a process and not so much as an end. For older immi-
grants it is more of an interpretation issue, compared to youth, for
whom acquiring social capital (education, networking, income) is more
central. In these times of hardening attitudes towards immigrant issues,
this analysis gets very little attention. Knowledge of and access to the
specific target groups of the social sector are deployed mainly to solve
politically formulated problems.
Second, knowledge development relates primarily to the relationships
that social professionals enter into with clients – as individuals, as a
group, or as a community. It is the result of the development of a ‘con-
sensual domain’ (Baerveldt 1999) in which professional and client sys-
tems work together in a dialogical manner on shared insights into the
situation with regard to origin, nature and solution of the problem. This
is an issue of what might be called professional artistry. The knowledge
development that occurs within the consensual domain can be best de-
scribed as a dance or as jamming (Healy & Peile 1995) between the so-
cial professional and the client (group). A hidden aspect is where to find
the instrument of empowerment. Even if you have shared knowledge,
but no lifeline to ‘what the subject wants/can’ you cannot make much
progress as a social professional.
An Analytical Point of Departure
John Pickstone offers insight into science, technology and medicine
(STM) that constitutes a possible approach toward knowledge develop-
ment that fits into the social practices and interactions that take place
within these practices. In his Ways of Knowing (2000), Pickstone de-
scribed patterns of knowledge development on the basis of the history of
knowledge domains such as biology, technique and medical science dur-
ing the Renaissance. He does this by not only unravelling the represen-
tations of knowledge, but also by pointing out the products they create
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and the specific context this takes place in. For these knowledge do-
mains, Pickstone distinguishes four strategies that read like historical
phases in the cycle of knowledge development: natural history, analysis,
composition of the known, and experimentation and invention. For the
social professions, it is primarily the first two that are important.
Natural history describes and delimits a specific area of phenomena as
perceived by a researcher. This appears to be a question of pure explora-
tion and classification. For a social worker assisting a client with debts, at
first glance a marriage crisis or a broken car engine would not fall within
the knowledge domain of his intervention. In practice, the social worker
would notice that a psychosocial problem – mostly also through the con-
nection that the client himself establishes – influences the debt problem.
In the end, the social worker together with the person in need will look
for a connection between the relational and the financial problems, giv-
ing significance to the specific request for help. After all, the fact that car
problems are not that relevant to the solution of the debt problem and
therefore remains outside the description of the problem is debatable –
there is something arbitrary about it. In practice, social professionals of-
ten have difficulty with the validation of such a selection of phenomena
that supposedly belong or do not belong within the request for help.
They tend to point to the fact that they have executed the problem ex-
ploration together with the person in need – intersubjectively, and partly
constituted in a specific context, without a scientific substantiation of the
chosen delimitation. According to Pickstone, however, this process of
delimitation in knowledge development is universal and oriented to-
wards ‘making meanings and doing readings’. The delimitation and de-
scription of the corresponding domain leads to ‘symbolic understanding’
within a ‘meaningful cosmos’ (Pickstone 2000: 37).
Analysis and rationalisation, the second step in knowledge develop-
ment, is the search for order. Pickstone (2000: 88) illustrates this strat-
egy with an example from physicians: ‘Those who mechanised the world
picture separated the primary qualities of matter and motion from sec-
ondary qualities such as colour. They separated the “elements” of a suc-
cessful analytical programme from those qualities which seemed less
tractable, not least because they were hard to quantify’. Hereby he also
points to the selective aspect of analysis, in which certain signals that are
difficult to ‘place’ are excluded. For example, when analysing a social
problem, social workers will rapidly make the sub-classification of living
world and system world. Without taking into account that such an analy-
tical distinction in fact explains very little – at best it clarifies – the paral-
lel with the Pickstone example is easily established. Taxonomy arises of a
social-societal problem when a community worker can explain the ten-
sion between a family with multiple problems and fellow neighbour-
hood residents in terms of intra-psychic causes (emotional deprivation),
policy aspects (allocation of rental dwellings in a neighbourhood) and
cultural factors (decreased tolerance for deviant behaviour). It offers
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clues for interventions that include for the intra-psychological dimen-
sion, talk therapy; for ineffective residential policies, influencing policy;
for working on tolerance at a meso level, neighbourhood-oriented pro-
jects.
When it comes to determining more accurately the knowledge do-
main of the social professions, natural history and analysis are emi-
nently important. This is an excellent normative activity. Do we opt for a
delimitation of the knowledge domain in which the actions of the social
professional and the problems of the client are central? To what degree
does the professional use ‘general interest’, the concerns of politics and
policy, or chooses them as points of departure in the problem descrip-
tion? Pickstone asserts that describing and analysing the domain of
knowledge is not a rational activity but one of involvement, intentional
behaviour and meaning giving.
Pickstone’s observation that defining and thus also appropriating nat-
ural phenomena into a specific knowledge domain – also in the ‘hard’
sciences like the natural sciences and medicine – does not have a defini-
tive theoretical foundation but one of intention and intuition, is there-
fore highly relevant. It shows the essentially coincidental and arbitrary
character of theoretical canons, and tempts us to implement the distinc-
tion between knowledge and practice less stringently. It emancipates the
problem-defining practice within social work. The normative dimension,
the delimitation and identification of phenomena that belong to the so-
cio-cultural domain, is an indispensable link of the chain of knowledge
development. The ‘social’ is and must be wider, more diverse and more
gradated because it has a different practical and normative focus than
the ‘academic’ social disciplines, on the one hand, because its knowledge
objectives have per definition a social, historical, and cultural colouring;
on the other, because individuals, groups, and other connections them-
selves also produce the social, historical and cultural reality (Schweder
1990).
Knowledge development seen as natural history and analysis also
lends itself pre-eminently to the empowerment of social professionals.
In the social sector, it is mostly application-oriented knowledge practices
(in Pickstone’s terms, ‘composition of the known’, and ‘experimentation
and invention’) that tend to predominate these days. Consequently, we
see that in product development and innovation, or in making product
agreements between the government and welfare agencies, the knowl-
edge and experience of professionals play only a marginal role. Natural
history and analysis are unjustly seen as marginal activities that do not
contribute to market expansion and legitimation, limit application, and
are difficult to test through actions.
The training of social professionals places a strong emphasis on appli-
cation of methods and techniques, whereas there too description and
analysis would be more adequate. It is not the problems of citizens or
politicians that should lead actions, but the problem definition that the
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profession itself develops, in dialogue with society’s interested parties.
Additionally, explaining societal issues in relation to legal procedures as
well as the economic and political power fields are a ‘way of knowing’
that make social professionals more aware of the meaning and scope of
their professional actions (analysis). It is precisely the fact that the
knowledge domain of social work is relational as well as socially-cultu-
rally situated and constructed, that makes this necessary if it wants to
profile itself as a profession that is expert in societal discussions.
All of this brings us to another possible prioritisation of knowledge
practices in the social sector. We let go of the difference between theory
and practice for the sake of developing a unique epistemology in which
description, analysis, practice development and renewal can be listed in
terms of primary and secondary ‘ways of knowing’. Is the social profes-
sional no longer served by strongly developed primary ways of knowing
(delimitation, unravelling, analysis)? Knowing how to act (method,
knowledge transfer) as secondary ways of knowing are suitable here.
The American psychologist William James once aptly said, ‘A great
many people think they are thinking, while they are just rearranging
their prejudices’. It is because too many people believe they understand
the social domain, that we need a profession that gathers knowledge
about the social world of people from the realisation that this is a super-
ior social activity.
Prompting Knowledge Development in Practice
The ideas of Pickstone on knowledge development are suited for linking
up with the practical implementation of the social professions. Although
this does not apply equally to all professions in the social sector, social
professionals are used to reflect on their professional actions.1 The pro-
blem, however, is to make the knowledge and experience that are there
during reflection more widely available and to elevate it to a higher de-
sign. Experienced professionals may know very well what they must or
mustn’t do in certain situations, but it is much more difficult for them to
indicate what they are exactly doing and why. Their practical knowledge
is primarily tacit. The danger of practical knowledge is that, due to its
implicit and individual-oriented character, it leads to routine-like actions.
Although routines are necessary for professionals in order to tackle com-
plex situations, this should not lead them to exclusively trusting what has
worked in the past when faced with a new situation. This would lead to
the stagnation of the development of practical knowledge.
The question is how professionals can make their implicit and indivi-
dual-oriented practical knowledge accessible, as well as deepening and
improving it. Answering this question often leads one to refer to con-
cepts such as ‘reflective practitioner’ and ‘communities of practice’ as
sources of inspiration.
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Reflective and Learning Professionals
The idea of the reflective practitioner was already introduced by the early
1980s by Donald Schön (1983), but it still generates great interest. Schön
exposed the mechanism of how professionals search for suitable solu-
tions to problems in complex and unique practical situations, in which
they even have to deal with conflicting values. By reflecting on one’s own
actions and on strategies, theories, and underlying norms that lie in
those actions, professionals can contribute to the development of practi-
cal knowledge. In the social sector, Schön’s insights are applied mainly
to coaching and supervision. This automatically exposes a flaw of the
reflective practitioner. To the degree that reflection begins with experi-
ences, it usually starts with the experiences of individual professional
practitioners. Reflection should not be limited to individual practitioners
however. In addition, the profession and its position in society are under
discussion, as is the organisation the professional is part of. The ques-
tions are how this knowledge arises via ‘lonely’ reflection and how it can
be made productive for the profession and the organisation.
Communities of Practice (CoPs) offer a partial answer (Wenger 1998;
Wenger, McDermott & Snyder 2002; Poell & De Laat 2003; Huysman
2003). Learning and knowledge exchange in a CoP are strongly linked to
the everyday learning of professionals and are in the hands of the parti-
cipants themselves. Those colleagues who share an interest in the same
knowledge domains give form to professional deliberations. Together
they reflect on events that have taken place during work. Everyday learn-
ing at the workplace is thus strengthened. In a CoP, participants explore
the ‘real’ problems and inform each other about the developments in
their field. CoPs also risk acquiring a closed character after a while,
which would prevent them from exchanging the developed knowledge
with professionals in- and outside the organisation. This limits the gains
of collective learning. A second disadvantage is that the informal and
flexible character of CoPs often makes them invisible to management,
which steers mainly formal processes.
Professional Development and Knowledge Development
Concepts like reflective practitioner and communities of practice offer inter-
esting links for social professionals to contribute to professional develop-
ment ‘from the inside out’. But the danger of biting one’s own tail is not
unimaginable. For this reason, social professionals must be open to ex-
ternal influences. To this end, co-operation with researchers and scien-
tists is essential. In this context, knowledge development and utilisation
should relate not only to formal knowledge via the body of knowledge
and skills, but there should also be a focus on the local knowledge and
experience-related knowledge of those involved (professionals, volun-
teers, users). The golden rule reigns among occupational sociologists
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that the complexity of professional actions is higher as the share of for-
mal knowledge exceeds the share of everyday, practical and tacit knowl-
edge (Freidson 2001). As far as the social professions are concerned, one
can detract from this conclusion. Doesn’t the ability to combine various
sorts of knowledge and sources of knowledge in fact constitute a sign of
the complexity of the actions that professionals have to show?
Accordingly, the emphasis must lie not only on the development of
formal knowledge via the body of knowledge and skills. A more interest-
ing option is the design of trajectories in which existing practical knowl-
edge is confronted with scientific knowledge, and in which, in turn, new
scientific knowledge is tested for its relevance for professional practice.
This presumes not only a better unlocking of the already available knowl-
edge, but also – where possible – involving evidence-based practice with
practice-based evidence (Van der Laan 2003). This is about searching for
meaningful connections between different sorts of data, in which con-
text-specific links are made between scientific insights and locally ac-
quired practical knowledge (Hutschemaekers 2001).
Knowledge Alliances
Social professionals must make alliances with other stakeholders in or-
der to give a greater chance to the development of profession and prac-
tice. This requires not only co-operation with scientists and researchers,
but also with educators, managers and policymakers. What demands
and expectations can be made of the various parties involved?
Professionals
Professionals are expected to constantly bring their own actions up for
discussion and establish relations between their own practical knowl-
edge and scientific knowledge, between concrete questions from prac-
tice and the results of scientific research. Professionals are also required
to actively search for knowledge concerning the effectiveness of meth-
ods. To the degree that such knowledge is available, they have to be fa-
miliar with it and consider it in their actions (Van Yperen 2003). This is
quite different from indiscriminately following eventual guidelines or
instructions.
Scientists
Scientists should not claim a monopoly on knowledge, as a strict distinc-
tion between knowledge development and professional practice is disas-
trous for the social professions. As Pickstone shows, it is also not feasi-
ble, viewed from an epistemological perspective. Scientists should
therefore get professionals more involved in research. In this context,
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Kwakman (2003) points to the possible role of knowledge communities,
where knowledge developers, disseminators, and users work together to
develop more practice-oriented knowledge. In this way, scientists and
researchers can reconstruct the actions of practical workers in retrospect,
together with those workers. These days, the knowledge and competency
of practical workers are not always present at a reflective level and they
have to be unlocked. This is a difficult problem for scientists, because in
order to do this they have to work within close proximity to practice.
They must accurately observe and delve into the capricious dynamics of
the actions of professionals, as well as the factors that determine success
or failure. Conversely, this presumes that practical workers display the
necessary self-respect when it comes to the quality of their own practical
knowledge. An important task for scientists, method developers and
educators is to formulate ‘what we already know’, in other words what
competent practical workers already use in practice without explicitly for-
mulating it. This line of reasoning leads to an upgrading of practical
knowledge from which practical workers can derive the necessary self-
respect.
Managers
As an answer to the requirements and enquiries of policymakers, agency
managers design, among other things, trajectories for quality care, and
try via innovation – even if not scientifically proven – to introduce new
ways of working. An essential question is how policymakers, managers
and professionals can join forces here. Nowadays, the requirements of
policymakers and the responses of managers tend to be burdened by
bureaucratic obligations that do not always benefit the quality of the
work. When politics and bureaucracy such as patrons and investors de-
termine what should or shouldn’t be seen as a socio-societal problem,
institutions systematically allow the undermining of their strategic capi-
tal, i.e., their connection with the social world of real people. Let us hope
that social professionals are better at signalling and identifying develop-
ments in the social domain than what comes out of political and man-
agerial negotiations! The fixation upon tested methods and types of work
that follow from a specific assignment deserve a counteroffer: the mobi-
lisation of observations and analyses of practical workers.
Educators
Knowledge development deserves more anchoring in the initial forma-
tion of social professionals, as well as in competency development after
the original study. We have already indicated that in professionals’ train-
ing there is a strong emphasis on application, in which description and
analysis are supposedly more adequate. It is not so much the problems
of citizens and politicians that should lead actions, but the problem defi-
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nition that the profession itself develops, in dialogue with society’s inter-
ested parties. Increased emphasis on explaining societal issues can make
social professionals-in-training more aware of the meaning and scope of
their professional actions (analysis). In the initial training period, educa-
tors – vocational schools and universities – should pay more attention to
what we have called ‘primary knowledge development’. The ability to
apply specific methods (debt management, mediation) could take shape,
for example, in the specialisation, elective programs, or continued edu-
cation trajectories.
Policymakers
At the moment, policymakers are putting practice under enormous pres-
sure in order for it to work more effectively. They want interventions to
be based more on what might work. However, the problem is clearly that
the social sector has little scientifically proven knowledge at its disposal.
This burdens policymakers with at least two assignments. The first in-
volves doing more research from the policy side. When policymakers
want to continue renewal trajectories, they will have to facilitate a lot
more research than has been the case up to now. The second assignment
relates to the way in which institutions and professionals are made ac-
countable. Policymakers have to leave it up to professionals how to use
the available knowledge, even when scientifically proven knowledge is
available for certain interventions. The next task for policymakers would
be to compare the costs and benefits of the interventions performed with
those of other institutions. If the results are lagging far behind, profes-
sionals and their institutions should account for it, and attempt to im-
prove their results through development of practice. Learning from col-
leagues who achieve better results with the same type of clients is an
option (Van Yperen 2003: 299). In this way, professionals not only main-
tain the space to be flexible with situation- and context-specific factors,
they are also challenged to look beyond.
The knowledge that is necessary for social professionals to perform in
an engaged and efficient manner is available in different places. There is
insufficient knowledge exchange. Those involved have the important
task of improving the bundling of their efforts in the fields of research,
development and innovation, and then offering them to the service of
current social issues. It wouldn’t hurt professionals, scientists, educa-
tors, managers and policymakers to show their willingness to learn
more from each other.
Note
1. For example, social workers are more familiar with intervision and supervi-
sion than youth workers or community workers (see Spierts et al. 2003).
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Professional Management of
Professionals
Hybrid Organisations and Professional
Management in Care and Welfare
Mirko Noordegraaf
Health care and welfare provision have always been complex phenom-
ena – people who tend to be professionals who are caught between pri-
vate situations, community interests and public values deliver soft ser-
vices to vulnerable, weak, or powerless individuals. Over time, various
types of governance have been introduced in order to organise and pro-
vide complex care and welfare. These governance systems have unavoid-
ably been hybrid. Because health care and welfare are service delivery
issues; because they involve vulnerable clients and professional provi-
ders; and because individual, community and collective interests collide
– or conflict – it has proven difficult to leave care and welfare provision
exclusively to the state, the market, civil society or individuals. It has al-
ways required distinctive combinations of these spheres, especially in
small and heterogeneous countries like the Netherlands, which had to
introduce intricate, hybrid mechanisms to organise collective action (e.
g., Hupe & Meijs 2000).
This does not mean that all of these spheres have always been equally
active, or that governance systems have always been balanced. In specific
periods, history shows us, specific spheres tended to dominate care and
welfare. In previous centuries, the church took an interest in organising
services for the sick, the troubled and the poor (e.g., Tuchman 1980). In
later periods, municipalities, guilds and wealthy citizens organised or
financed service provision (Frijhoff & Spies 1999), due to moral obliga-
tions and practical reasons – the wealthy paid for and profited from
stable social orders. In the industrial era, private companies took part in
health care and welfare settlements, and states became increasingly ac-
tive. Dutch health care and welfare providers became ‘statist’ (verstate-
lijkt) organisations especially during the second half of the 20th century.
Embedded within extensive state-based welfare arrangements, they were
increasingly financed by public means and therefore controlled through
public accountability regimes. These arrangements were bureaucratic as
well as professional – in large, bureaucratic organisations, professional-
ism on the work floor was maintained (see Clarke & Newman 1997).
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By the end of the 20th century, state-based welfare settlements were
considered too costly, and both market-oriented and businesslike models
began to dominate (e.g., Clarke & Newman 1997). In contemporary neo-
liberal times, health care and welfare have been subjected to business-
like performance regimes (with businesslike managers) and market-or-
iented control logics. Businesslike models and markets are not the same,
and they pull organisations in different directions, but they have much
in common, like economic orientations, profit motives, and supply-de-
mand reasoning (Noordegraaf 2004). When both the historical evolution
of governance in social sectors and the specificity of social services deliv-
ery are taken into account, the economisation and marketisation of care
and welfare become controversial phenomena.
Firstly, the motives of businesslike managers and markets to take part
in social services delivery lack the moral and practical impetus of earlier
private initiatives. In neo-liberal times, motives rest upon cost-control,
efficiency and individualistic reasoning, while lacking a sense of the col-
lective. Secondly, states force businesslike managers and markets to be-
come active, pushing social services delivery towards the private spheres
but still feeling responsible for the public interest. Consequently, states
stick to and extend accountability systems, and ironically use business-
like and market logics in the process. Accountability systems have be-
come performance-based planning and control systems. Thirdly, busi-
nesslike managers and markets offer certain templates for organising
service delivery that are difficult to apply in social services delivery.
These templates contain concepts like customers, control and competi-
tion, whereas production processes in health care and welfare require
concepts like clients (who are much more dependent than customers),
professionalism (which is difficult to control) and trust (which is difficult
to cultivate in competitive environments). In other words, harming – or
destroying – professionalism on the work floor may instead of improv-
ing performance actually weaken performance (see also Harrison & Pol-
litt 1994).
This does not mean that businesslike and market-oriented models are
worthless. On the contrary, they will continue to be a part of hybrid gov-
ernance systems in health care and welfare. In current post-industrial
times (e.g., Stehr 1994), financial and cost-control demands are real,
and relations between clients and service providers have changed. The
decision to either accept or reject managers and markets is pointless.
Instead, we should explore how businesslike managers and markets in-
fluence each other, as they cannot be aligned easily. We should also ex-
plore how they can be combined with professional logics on the work
floor and at the street level. This is an organisational challenge that, para-
doxically, calls for professional managers. The central question is: how
can managers organise health care and welfare in hybrid governance
systems that face businesslike and market pressures?
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Social Services in Neo-Liberal Societies
Organisations that provide public and social services like care and wel-
fare have become ‘trapped’. They must be adapted – or perhaps trans-
formed – so that they can cope with the new demands of post-industrial
societies (Stehr 1994). But it is almost impossible to adapt service deliv-
ery to new demands in post-industrial societies. First and foremost, the
exact nature of these ‘new demands’ is hard to pin down. We ‘know’
societies have changed, but how and why remains unclear. The ultimate
truth about societal conditions cannot be found, although time and again
experts present fresh, absolute truths. The fact that there is no absolute
truth may actually be the only truth to be found in contemporary socie-
ties.
Contemporary societies are fuzzy societies, with strong yet contradic-
tory stories – dispersed and fragmented truths – about societal change,
coming from experts, academics, journalists, politicians and the like.
When we take an organisational perspective (assuming organisations
still exist), the contradictory nature of new demands becomes much
clearer. On the one hand, organisations face an increasing complexity in
an era of global networks, multifarious knowledge, acute risks, intangi-
ble symbols, uncontrollable incidents, ambivalent citizens, etc. (e.g.,
Reich 1991; Stehr 1994; Beck 1996; Perrow 2002). On the other hand,
organisations – and societies (Ritzer 1993) – face increasing pressures to
simplify and ‘McDonaldise’. In public services delivery, the latter ten-
dency is fuelled by the ‘new public management’ movement (Hood
1991; Pollitt & Bouckaert 2000; Noordegraaf 2004) that occurs in ‘audit
societies’ (Power 1999) and ‘managerial states’ (Clarke & Newman
1997). New public management turns public and social service sectors
into businesslike and market-oriented production sectors. Public service
organisations are forced to introduce ‘planning and control’, perfor-
mance management, measurement systems, quality models, monitor-
ing systems, benchmarking, ‘activity-based costing’, and so on. Condi-
tions that are hard to comprehend force organisations and managers to
act as if they have grasped these conditions. They must set targets, deli-
ver value for money and account for performance. This in itself is con-
tradictory. Service providers introduce businesslike managerial control
(cf. Freidson 2001) in order to deliver value for money. They also work
on market-oriented consumer control in order to strengthen consumer
choice and customer satisfaction. Businesslike managers and markets
pull service organisations in different directions.
When we dive into organisational realities, these contradictory forces
can cause severe problems. Not just because they pull organisational
practices into different directions, but also because they disregard the
distinctive nature of production processes in public and social services
sectors. Businesslike and market pressures not only contradict each
other, they also ignore or negate the professional basis of service provi-
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sion in sectors like health care and welfare (compare Exworthy & Half-
ord 1999; Freidson 2001). In some ways this is understandable (see, e.
g., Exworthy & Halford 1999; Harrison & Pollitt 1994; Harrison 1999).
For one thing, professional autonomy is a barrier to organisational cost-
control and smooth supply-demand co-ordination, as cost-control and
supply-demand arguments are alien to classic professional frames of re-
ference. In addition, professional autonomy and powers are barriers to
transparency and accountability, as ‘closing’ and ‘scaling down’ tend to
accompany strong professional control. It is difficult for clients to hold
professionals like medical doctors accountable, so new types of control
attempt to de-professionalise, ‘proletarianise’, bureaucratise, or ‘corpora-
tise’ professionals (Broadbent et al. 1997; Brock et al. 1999).
At the same time, the provision of services in domains like health care
can be said to be unavoidably professional (e.g., Brock et al. 1999). In an
empirical sense, social services delivery depends on trained people who
treat specific cases by drawing from learned, generic insights. Whether
professionalism is defined in a classic sense (e.g., Wilensky 1964; Freid-
son 2001; Mintzberg 2004) or in a modernised one (e.g., Schön 1983;
Brint 1994), such inferential applications of learned, often academic in-
sights can be considered to be the hallmark of professionalism. It is not
hard to perceive most public and social services delivery in terms of in-
ferential production processes – service providers at street levels must
make informed inferences. Medical doctors treat individual patients
with specific histories, symptoms, diseases, and tastes. Medical doctors
know a lot, and they must discern what to do when treating individual
patients. Welfare workers deal with clients who have distinctive social
surroundings, problems and abilities. Effective welfare workers ‘know’ –
have learned to know – how to treat clients, and they also know that
some clients cannot really be ‘treated’.
Medical and welfare work can thus be routine, but it has many non-
routine qualities, or routines can suddenly break down when cases or
clients are encountered that are difficult to ‘pigeonhole’ (cf. Mintzberg
1983). In addition, inferential capacities to treat cases transcend organi-
sations. Professionals need outside training to learn their trade, and pro-
fessional associations facilitate inferential decision-making. Professional
service providers need space to develop their inferential capacities. Infer-
ential behaviour can be standardised, but never completely. Profes-
sionals need to see many different cases, for example, so that they can
improve comparative insights. They develop ‘tacit knowledge’ (e.g.,
Sternberg & Horvath 1999) and need experience to strengthen inferen-
tial capacities. Service delivery becomes experiential in particular when
complex services are provided, characterised by unclear conditions, con-
tested values, trial-and-error, or latent or long-term effects.
Both inferential and experiential dimensions of public service delivery
are at odds with transparent, performance-based, target-driven, ‘lean and
mean’ organising. Inferential and experiential occupational dimensions
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need to be nurtured in settings, spaces and professional communities
that transcend organisational walls. For the new public management
movement there is no time to nurture in diffuse settings; organisations
must perform, and quickly. For the new public management, customers
are all that matters. For professionals, ‘service ethics’ count (e.g., Wilens-
ky 1964), and service ethics can not be guarded in individualised set-
tings. Although it is not difficult to trace problems – or even perversions
– of autonomous professionals, professionals need space and autonomy
in order to perform effectively. This includes space to determine what is
‘effective’. Because professionals cannot always show directly if and how
they are effective, they need space and autonomy in order to institutiona-
lise effective practices.
How can managers guarantee ‘effective’ social services delivery in un-
clear settings that require professionals to act inferentially and experien-
tially, as well as force organisations to perform efficiently and transpar-
ently?
Professionalising Managers who Deprofessionalise
The fact that professionalism is here to stay is proven by the fact that
those who are guilty of managerialising and marketising, and thus weak-
ening professional powers, are themselves professionalising. For a few
decades now, executives in health care and welfare organisations have
tried to professionalise health care and welfare management. Policy-
makers and policy managers at central government levels, who out-rank
these managers, try to limit the space that organisational managers and
executives can operate in, while they themselves try to professionalise
managerial practices. This circularity is ironic. Managers, executives and
policy managers who are attempting to control professionalism on the
work floor are also trying to professionalise their own trade, and they do
so by imitating and emulating classic professionals. They establish pro-
fessional associations that select, train, develop and supervise profes-
sionals. They identify competencies, build educational programs, pub-
lish magazines, hold conferences, agree upon codes of conduct and
ethical codes, and so on. In terms of classic professionalism, they try to
establish a technical base (cf. Wilensky 1964) with standardised knowl-
edge and skills as well as professional ethics (Wilensky 1964; Freidson
2001), both of which are guarded by state-guaranteed jurisdictions (Ab-
bott 1988).
The fact that managers and executives have started professionalising
could be expected. Decades ago, Wilensky (1964) even wondered
whether we were starting to witness the ‘professionalisation of everyone’
in post-industrial times. No wonder, when we recognise the fact that
‘knowledge workers’ in post-industrial or knowledge societies work with
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information and knowledge, which they apply to specific cases, instances
and situations, just like medical doctors. Managers and executives are
prominent examples of such knowledge workers. In addition, the neo-
liberal attack on the welfare state and the public sector was an attack on
professional powers, so managers and executives had to develop counter-
vailing powers – which they found in models for professional powers of
medical doctors, lawyers and the like. The attack led to the de-professio-
nalisation of professionals in health care, welfare and other social do-
mains, and paradoxically fuelled a professionalisation of managers and
executives in health care and welfare. The neo-liberal attack also deter-
mined the content of managerial and executive professionalism. To
manage professionally in fields like health care implies a businesslike
and market-oriented approach. Health care organisations have to be-
come normal, integrated companies (e.g., Kruithof 2005) that are guided
by market or quasi-market factors for health care provision (see also Le-
Grand & Bartlett 1994). They have to deliver products to customers, with
optimal value for money and returns on investment, by way of efficient,
co-ordinated, and accountable production processes (see also Meurs &
Van der Grinten 2005). This required executives and managers who
must control health care professionals (see, e.g., Harrison & Pollitt
1994), and various mechanisms have been instrumental in this process:
– Planning and control cycles include targets, contracts, results and ac-
countability. Professionals must stick to production agreements.
– Divisional management, with organisational divisions, is governed
strategically by executive boards. Professionals must contribute to di-
visional performance.
– Quality control, through peer review procedures, or using quality
models such as the EFQM model (www.efqm.org; www.ink.nl).
– Performance measurement, with monitoring and benchmarking,
using tools such as ‘dashboards’ and ‘thermometers’. Professional
behaviour is measured.
– Evidence-based medicine, with transparent medical work that has
been proven to work and be effective.
– Medical managers, who are both medical doctors and managers at
the same time. They manage doctors and nurses.
– Salaried professionals, instead of ‘free’ professionals. Professionals
like doctors are turned into regular employees.
Professional Managers and Executives
Whether managers and executives can become professionals is and will
remain a contested issue. According to some, it is possible (Brock et al.
1999), according to others, professional managers are a logical impossi-
bility (Raelin 1986; Mintzberg 2004). Irrespective of these theoretical
debates, managers and executives are professionalising – they have
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started to see themselves as professionals, they use words like ‘profes-
sional’, and they have started to introduce and institutionalise traditional
professional models in order to get a grip on managerial practices. A
broad trend towards professionalising managers can be witnessed, in
both public and private domains, accompanied by a professionalisation
industry, with advisors, conferences, books, documents, models, etc.
Health care managers and executives are one of the best examples of
attempts to ‘create’ professional managers, by way of (e.g., Noordegraaf
& Meurs 2002):
– Professional associations, such as the Dutch association of health
care executives (NVZD) that regulate executive work (www.nvzd.nl).
– Magazines, such as the Dutch ZM Magazine, read by most health
care executives and managers.
– Evidence-based management (EBM), as a counterweight to evidence-
based medicine, with competencies and behaviours that have proven
to be effective.
– Protocols, agreements about aspects of executive or managerial work,
e.g., regarding executive salaries and bonuses.
– Codes of conduct, professional agreements that identify and forma-
lise appropriate behaviour.
– Schooling and training, such as master classes and Master of Public
Health Courses, organised by universities (e.g., www.bmg.eur.nl).
– Management trainee and high potential programs, in order to stimu-
late management development.
As far as the Dutch Association of Health Care Executives (NVZD) is
concerned, its ‘strategy’ is framed in terms of professionalism. It is cir-
cumscribed as follows (www.nvzd.nl):
The NVZD is the special interest group of health care executives. The NVZD
promotes professional practices and represents their interests.
In other domains, like welfare and social work, comparable attempts can
be traced, but compared with health care they are relatively weak at-
tempts at enhancing managerial professionalism. This is explained
firstly by social work and welfare not being characterised by strong pro-
fessionals on the work floor, and secondly by the fact that welfare organi-
sations used to differ – on average – from health care organisations in
terms of size, financial capacities, technology, and relative autonomy
from (local) government. Nevertheless, we see comparable patterns. In
social work and welfare, professional managers and executives are cre-
ated by such mechanisms as:
– Associations, like the Dutch MO Group or Social Entrepreneurs
Group (www.mogroep.nl).
– Magazines, ranging from brochures and reports with, e.g., standard
contracts to journals with quick, useful, and necessary information.
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– Research and knowledge, like scenario studies that portray welfare
and social work 10 or 15 years from now.
– Schooling and training programs, such as university- and polytech-
nic-based Masters degrees in social policy and social work in urban
areas (e.g., www.uva.nl).
The Dutch MO Group, which brings together most of the welfare and
social work organisations, literally states (see www.mogroep.nl):
Social services providers are professional. They take responsibility and ask
others to do the same: health care providers, decision makers, officials, edu-
cators, citizens and their environments. They know that society offers oppor-
tunities for organisations and individuals. They are sources of commitment.
This is not the end of the story. Executives and managers in charge of
services delivery are not the only ones who have started professionalis-
ing. High-ranking government policymakers who feel responsible and
are held accountable for governing policy fields like health care and wel-
fare have also started to see themselves as professional public managers.
Policy managers at central bodies like the Ministry of Health and Wel-
fare have initiated health care and welfare reform, and have turned de-
professionalisation of real professionals on the work floor into law – less
powerful doctors, more powerful executives – at the same time resisting
powerful executives. This is evidenced by attempts to weaken entrepre-
neurial initiatives in or around health care organisations, which resulted
from more autonomous, professional executive behaviour. It is also evi-
denced by more general policy attempts to control health care systems.
Health care executives must introduce large-scale nationwide regimes,
like ‘diagnosis-related treatment’ systems, and must compete on a qua-
si-market level within strict public and regulatory frameworks that are
being introduced in order to create and maintain ‘level playing fields’. In
social work and welfare, plans for a new law – the Social Support Act
(WMO) – have produced a grand design for social services, with decen-
tralised and privatised service delivery. This law grants freedoms to local
organisations and service providers, but also limits freedoms, e.g.,
through new standards, contracts and performance requirements.
These policy managers – another irony – are trying to become profes-
sional policy managers, while imitating the classic professions. They es-
tablish technical bases with knowledge, skills and competencies, and try
to establish professional associations in order to institutionalise profes-
sional control. The central governments of numerous countries have, in
particular, witnessed the rise of a new managerial class, the ‘senior pub-
lic service’ (SPS). In Dutch central government, the following mechan-
isms have been introduced:
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– Associations, like the Dutch SPS (ABD, www.algemenebestuurs-
dienst.nl) for all upper-level public managers in central government
(900 managers).
– Competency profiles, like the ABD competency profile, with seven
core competencies (the ‘magnificent seven’), and 35 additional com-
petencies.
– Mobility programs, so that organisational pillars are torn down and
(central) government works as one.
– Publications, like ABD publications, magazines and journals, e.g.,
the Dutch (now defunct) magazine Publiek management, and books
on leadership.
– Platforms, like conferences and meetings, such as Dutch Top Man-
agement Team Meetings.
– Schooling and training programs for managers, like the Candidates
Program for upcoming ABD managers.
– Codes of conduct, for instance codes for responsible or ethical beha-
viour, or for remuneration.
Professional Managing in Service Delivery
The foregoing must not be exaggerated, as it sketches a picture that is
rather formal and too black-and-white. The rough sketch of de-professio-
nalising or proletarianising experts on the one hand, and professionalis-
ing managers and executives on the other, presents a simple, unrealistic
zero-sum analysis. In daily reality, experts and specialists on the work
floor are and remain relatively autonomous and powerful professionals,
especially in health care, and managers and executives have not always
become strong organisational players. Paradoxically, moves towards ‘in-
tegrated’ companies in health care have gone hand in hand with the
strengthening of professional bodies and negotiating positions within
hospitals (Kruithof 2005). The interplay between experts and executives
might also lead to win-win outcomes, especially when those working at
the service levels fight against outside forces like central government. In
addition, professionalising policy managers who create new governance
systems and who make managerial laws – driven by ideas about effi-
ciency, cost-control and quality – do not automatically limit space and
powers at the service levels. Health care executives, for instance, have
plenty of possibilities to establish distinctive service realities, not despite
but thanks to a bewildering array of laws, regulations and requirements.
Mild forms of exaggeration might be necessary, however, to put the
current state of affairs into perspective. Too many complaints can be
heard in dismissing critical analyses of developments in health care and
welfare as nonsensical. In many respects, health care and welfare are
heading in the wrong direction. This does not mean that managers are
to blame, as is frequently assumed (e.g., Tonkens 2003; Van de Brink et
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al. 2005). Professionals are also to blame – if blame is necessary. Classic
professionals who are primarily loyal to professional communities can-
not avoid new loyalties to organisational surroundings. They can not ne-
gate blurred financial and client realities, so they have to become ‘orga-
nisational professionals’ or ‘expert professionals’ (Brint 1994; also, Brock
et al. 1999) who combine professional patient care with matters of orga-
nisational capacity and client choice. New discourses are thus needed
which deconstruct simple ‘manager versus professional’ dichotomies,
and which show how managers and executives can combine organisa-
tional responsibilities with social, public and political outlooks, and em-
brace a sense of the collective. Professionalism on the work floor and at
managerial levels must be perceived as a hybrid phenomenon. A hybri-
dised professionalism instead of a pure one suits today’s unclear reali-
ties. If executives and managers have distinctive responsibilities for or-
ganising health care and welfare because it is their formal duty, legal
assignment and socially perceived calling, then the following question
is, how can they professionally organise and manage in health care and
welfare?
One thing is clear by now – professional managers can neither strive
towards maintaining loose organisations of professionals nor towards
establishing simple businesslike organisations. This awareness has led
to pleas for optimising ‘professional organisations’ that combine the best
of both worlds (Brock et al. 1999). Professionalism on the work floor is
simultaneously respected and restrained via all sorts of means and me-
chanisms. Means like flexible organisational structures, decentralised or-
ganisational models, shared responsibilities, professional cultures, and
knowledge management are used to that end. These insights are valu-
able, as they express an emphasis on hybrid organisations, but they are
also insufficient. Given that organisations are not static entities and re-
quire continuous organising (Weick 1995), the question is, how can
managers organise and maintain professional organisations? This is a
matter of day-to-day behaviour, of talk, text and action, of conversational
behaviour (Kaufman 1980; Brunsson 1985; Alvesson 1996; Noordegraaf
2000), which takes place in specific organisational surroundings and
‘streams’ (see also Langley et al. 1995) that are full of loosely defined and
ambiguous issues. Professional organising and managing requires an
understanding of how practitioners make sense of daily realities – also
by way of grand concepts, like ‘professional organisation’ – and of how
they enact organisational realities and act in such realities. What do pro-
fessional organisations mean? How do executives and managers estab-
lish professional organisations? What do managers actually do to enact
them? On the basis of earlier research in public (service) domains, in-
cluding empirical studies in public service delivery (e.g., LeGrand & Bar-
tlett 1994; Exworthy & Halford 1999; Grit & Meurs 2005) and more
anecdotal stories (e.g., Idenburg 1999), the following features can be
said to characterise professional managers in public service delivery:
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Public Service Managers are Institutionalists
When organised realities are portrayed as local and conversational but
are embedded within broader institutional frameworks like laws, regula-
tions, routines, educational programs, ideologies and symbols, manage-
rial behaviour is perceived to be institutionally embedded (see, e.g.,
March & Olsen 1989; Scott 1995). This means that individual behaviour
in domains like health care and welfare must be linked to shared ways of
doing, thinking, and feeling that have developed and evolved over time.
Health care, for instance, contains institutionalised ideas about services,
illness, expertise and patients, and institutionalised ideologies that em-
phasise aspects like care, solidarity and needs. These ideas and ideolo-
gies, which express themselves through laws, professional ethics, codes,
vocabularies and practices, are difficult to change. Empirically, they pro-
vide barriers to change; normatively, they provide shields against grand-
scale and potentially dangerous interventions (Scott 1998). Businesslike
and market-oriented models ignore institutional surroundings, and this
alone creates problems. Other problems also arise, as institutionalised
features also embody values (Selznick 1984), which are placed at risk.
As long as we perceive health care, collectively, as curing and caring for
patients, these values should be upheld. This means that managing and
organising production and services delivery will never be like normal
production in private spheres. It will inevitably be characterised by asym-
metric relations between providers and clients, contradictory private, so-
cial and public interests, and contested measures of effectiveness and
success. In short, care and welfare production will be irregular, and pro-
fessional managers are aware of this. They balance change and conserva-
tion (Terry 1996), and seek transformations that are in tune with the
features and logic of production practices. In practical terms this means,
inter alia, that managers and executives should manage things hands-on
instead of hands-off (Sayles 1989), be visible and walk around (Peters &
Austin 1985), have a ‘feel’ for domains, and understand the stories, his-
tories and idiosyncrasies.
Public Service Managers are Standardisers
All organised action, especially on a large scale, requires co-ordination,
and most co-ordination calls for standards. Professionalism can be seen
as a specific means for co-ordinating organised action: by standardising
skills and values, protected and regulated by professional bodies, profes-
sionals know what to do (cf. Mintzberg 1983). Businesslike and market-
oriented management negates this – it attempts to standardise work pro-
cesses (e.g., planning and control, quality models) as well as outputs (e.
g., contracts, accountability). This will eventually cause trouble, espe-
cially when applied to professional management. Most importantly, stan-
dardised work processes and outputs assume that goals, objectives, and
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problems are given, and that managers can decide how to reach objec-
tives and solve problems. The goal of managerial action, however, could
also be to discover goals. Besides, the problem in organisational realities
often is: what is the problem? Organisational realities are ambiguous;
interpretations of what has happened, what can and should be done,
and who has to be involved, differ (e.g., Weick 1995). In other words,
managers and executives will not work within available standards – they
set standards, and standard setting is a continuous, subtle process (e.g.,
Brunsson & Jacobsen 2000). Such standards are construed, developed
and set in subtle daily talks, interactions and texts. From a practical per-
spective this means that managers are able to use meetings and papers
for setting standards (Noordegraaf 2000), play with conflicting stan-
dards (Brunsson & Adler 1989), establish appropriate rules, routines
and rituals, and respect and guard (professional) standards.
Public Service Managers are Politicians
Local practices are part of institutionalised domains; standards come
from and affect outside surroundings. Professional managers do not
conform directly to these surroundings however. Situations differ, and
professional managers show tendencies to act as ‘associated rivals’ (cf.
Dogan 2003): they associate themselves with managerial communities,
but other managers are rivals too. They might be rivals in the sense of
being competitors when managerial positions become vacant, fighting
for money, having different opinions on appropriate courses of action,
having different stakes in terms of who they want to serve, or holding
different positions on ‘rankings’ that are made public in newspapers or
through the Internet. Because neo-liberal times are characterised by ca-
pacity problems, financial scarcity, strategic ambiguities, emancipated
clients and public pressures to be accountable, such rivalries have be-
come rather normal. To get a businesslike grip on such complexities
and to normalise conditions can be considered as being abnormal.
Health care and welfare management has moral and political twists. Ex-
ecutives and managers will have to find ways to act responsibly, make
choices and weigh the options (Grit & Meurs 2005). Executives and
managers are drawn into politics, with activities like priority-setting, as
capacities are limited (e.g., Hunter 1997; see also Fisher 1998), account-
ing, as performances must be accounted for but are hard to account for
(Noordegraaf & Abma 2003), and legitimising, as trust in public services
has declined. Executives and managers must, for example, determine
how to deal with uninsured illegal foreigners who need care, which cli-
ents are eligible for quicker treatment when several clients need to be
treated, whether to treat citizens from ethnic minorities abroad when
they go back to their home countries for summer vacation, if they should
spend money on cases that barely can be treated, etc. In practical terms,
this means executives and managers are visible, are open about choices,
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challenge themselves, introduce checks and balances, confront dilem-
mas (Grit & Meurs 2005), account for their actions and act courageously,
also vis-à-vis politicians (also Meurs & Van der Grinten 2005).
Conclusion
The foregoing can be summarised in a few simple argumentative steps.
Domains like care and welfare are hybrid and call for hybrid governance.
Hybrid governance calls for subtle mechanisms that meet private, social
and public interests, and it calls for professional managers, who practise
hybridised forms of professionalism. In neo-liberal times, however, it is
difficult to uphold hybrid mechanisms and means. Market and business
models dominate; organisations are pressured to act in a businesslike
and market-oriented fashion. This has started to colour managerial pro-
fessionalism: Executives and managers have not only started to imitate
classic professionals, like medical doctors, in order to limit powers of
classic professionals, but they have also started to embed experts on the
work floor in the areas of problematic planning and control and perfor-
mance regimes. Ironically, this does not improve but actually harms or-
ganisational performance. Merely blaming managers is nonsensical, and
notions like ‘professional organisations’ are insufficient to compensate
for these worrisome tendencies. Executives and managers in the blurred
fields of care and welfare need to find ways of professional organisation
and management. Professional executives and managers in service do-
mains like health care and welfare can be said to be standardisers who
are aware of the politics of public organising, and set standards that are
in tune with local institutionalised surroundings. Professional managers
are critical of popular models, transgress simple dichotomies – and pro-
fessional experts do the same.
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